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Foreword
During the last few years, several international monitoring mechanisms, covering 
various legal fields, have been developed. The area o f corruption is one field in 
which the number of such mechanisms is among the highest. Both global and re­
gional monitoring mechanisms have been set up. Their characteristics, scope and 
output therefore vary considerably. Making comparisons and a certain level o f com­
petition among them is inevitable. The number o f these mechanisms is growing and 
countries are slowly starting to show some resistance towards involvement in this 
developing trend in the international legal sphere. Overlapping is present to a certain 
extent; however, only concrete results count.
It is tempting for all monitoring mechanisms - existing and emerging ones - to at­
tempt to prove their preeminence -  if  only to ensure regular financing of their activi­
ties. They adopt different approaches in order to promote themselves.
GRECO - The Group o f States against Corruption, an Enlarged Partial Agreement of 
the Council of Europe - was the first monitoring mechanism to strictly ensure the 
observance o f the principle of equality of rights and obligations among all its mem­
bers, to ensure that follow-up is given to its recommendations and to sanction non- 
compliance with these recommendations. These all constitute characteristics appre­
ciated by critical experts in the field and, above all, by the governments that finance 
GRECO. In addition, and in contrast to other monitoring mechanisms, GRECO 
appointed an independent Scientific Expert with in-depth theoretical and practical 
knowledge in the field of combating corruption -  Professor Dr. ALBIN ESER, at 
that time director of the world-famous Max Planck Institute for Foreign and Interna­
tional Criminal Law in Freiburg, Germany. He personally followed the adoption by 
GRECO of its country Evaluation Reports. He helped GRECO to achieve consisten­
cy and scientific objectivity by providing critical comments on proposed texts and 
suggesting constructive amendments. Due to this expertise, arrangements were made 
with Prof. ESER and Dr. MICHAEL KUBICIEL, at that time a Research Fellow at 
the Max-Planck Institut, to produce a comparative study o f the findings of GRE­
CO’s First Evaluation Round.
The First Evaluation Round dealt with 3 of the guiding principles described in the 
Council of Europe Resolution (97) 24 on The Twenty Guiding Principles for the 
Fight against Corruption. Those three guiding principles were Nos. 3, 6 and 7, dea­
ling with anti-corruption institutions and immunities. This book is the result o f a 
thorough and lengthy study of 35 country reports. The authors of the book were 
successful in accomplishing a task which originally seemed impossible. They have 
extracted the substantive findings o f all the First Round Evaluation Reports, made a 
comparative analysis o f them and included their own critical observations.
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Due to the fact that individual national anti-corruption efforts cannot be enhanced 
through theoretical assessments alone, GRECO’s principal aim is not to provide a 
self-oriented analysis of national legislation and institutional structures. GRECO 
seeks to prompt change not only in the countries that are evaluated. The comparative 
study covers even the most detailed elements of an effective fight against corruption. 
Prof. ESER and Dr. KUBICIEL provide an in-depth analysis of the core criminal 
law of GRECO member States. They explicitly pinpoint the weaknesses identified 
by GRECO evaluation teams, provide an unbiased outline of possible solutions and 
also include their personal and expert assessment of GRECO’s recommendations 
and observations. This study well reflects GRECO’s extensive monitoring efforts 
and will constitute a very useful handbook for anti-corruption policy-makers and 
practitioners.
The authors should be warmly congratulated for their exceptional work. As Pre­
sident of GRECO I wish to personally acknowledge the invaluable contribution 
made by Prof. Dr. ESER and Dr. KUBICIEL to our work in the fight against corrup­






This study presents the first comprehensive analysis of GRECO’s wo A  against 
corruption.
As its full name implies, the “Groupe d’Etats contre la corruption” - “Group of 
States against corruption” in English - functions as an organisation o f states which 
aims at ensuring respect of international anti-corruption standards within the coope­
rating States. It focuses, in particular, though not exclusively, on corruption in the 
public sphere. GRECO is a body of the Council o f Europe.
As described in more detail in Chapter I on the subject and methodological ap­
proach of this study, GRECO carries out its ambitious task within the framework of 
distinct Evaluation Rounds. The First Evaluation Round dealt mainly with three 
topics: basic substantive provisions against corruption and its prosecution, general 
and/or specialised persons and bodies empowered to prosecute and prevent corrupti­
on, and immunities of certain persons and organs which may impede or even bar the 
investigation and prosecution of corruption.
Due to the fact that no analysis had hitherto been made of the substantial quantity 
of information provided in the national Evaluation Reports on the law and practise 
of GRECO member States, it had been difficult to identify convergent or divergent 
approaches in national corruption policies. In my capacity as Scientific Expert of 
GRECO, I was therefore mandated to cany out a comparative study o f the national 
anti-corruption strategies examined by GRECO during its First Evaluation Round.
Fortunately, my position at that time as Director of the Max-Planck-Institut for 
Foreign and International Criminal Law in Freiburg, allowed me to benefit from the 
excellent assistance of MICHAEL KUBICIEL as co-researcher. I am greatly indeb­
ted to him for the thorough research and thoughtful drafts he has contributed during 
the fulfilment of this challenging task.
Our work has not been limited to a comparative study. Although we were not 
mandated to formulate recommendations ourselves, we have at times identified 
deficiencies in national anti-corruption systems. Where we have transgressed from 
mere description to critical evaluation, it should be noted that the views expressed 
are our own and not those of GRECO.
This is not the place to anticipate what will be dealt with later on in this study. I 
do, however, wish to address two features of GRECO’s efforts here: First, as ex­
pressed in the title o f this study, an efficient fight against corruption requires more
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than merely improving old or introducing new “norms”. It rather needs “instituti­
ons” which provide an integral set of substantive and procedural rules and appropri­
ate means of practical implementation, capable of approaching corruption from 
various angles and on different levels are also needed. Therefore, GRECO quite 
correctly does not content itself with solely analysing penal provisions on corruption 
but also pays attention to administrative safeguards and organisational structures, in 
particular those of the prosecution and tax authorities. Second, GRECO serves as an 
excellent example of the remarkable potential of the Council of Europe to promote 
standards for the protection of this region’s citizens and institutions.
Finally, I would like to take this opportunity to express my sincere thanks to 
GRECO, its President, Secretariat and national delegates, for the confidence they 
have shown me in electing me as GRECO’s Scientific Expert and mandating me 
with this study, and for their invaluable co-operation throughout this transnational 
comparative enterprise.
Freiburg, August 2005 ALBIN ESER
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I. Subject and Methodological Approach
A. Empirical background
Ever since society has been organised by the division of labour and the decision­
making process has been realised in a structured way, people have tried to influence 
this process in their favour by means of corruption. Thus, corruption has become a 
constant companion in the development of humankind. The silent and discrete na­
ture of this companionship may have led to the underrating of its influence on the 
goals and directions of society. Aside from a few truly grand decisions, perhaps 
even on war or peace, that have been influenced by corruption, it is a multitude of 
petty bribes which can cause a society to tumble and to deprive it o f its stable fun­
dament: Where the prosecution of a crime, the participation in public procurement 
or, in general, political benevolence of decision makers can be bought, distortion of 
single proceedings is not the only result; even more dangerous appear subliminal 
alterations as their symptoms often only come to the awareness of an affected soci­
ety once a cure, if not impossible at all, can be accomplished only with the most 
painful efforts.
Susceptible to corruption are all levels o f social systems: individuals as well as 
parties, public administration as well as private economy. For this reason it is inevi­
table to fight corruption in the entire social system. To not only prevail in an occa­
sional skirmish, but for winning a sustainable victory, it is necessary -  not at least 
due to the progressing internationalisation of trade and the globalisation o f the 
European countries and beyond -  to establish an international alliance in the spirit of 
common values and by way o f coordinated actions.
To be sure, countering corruption requires clear and realistic goals. Since human 
profit-seeking as conditio humana is not fundamentally amendable, corruption will 
never be completely eradicated in a society. Nevertheless, it appears possible and 
therefore should at any rate be attempted to create an environment where corruptive 
cancer cannot ulcerate and may more easily be detected and controlled.
B. GRECO s goals and procedures
On the European level, it is in particular the Council o f Europe that joined the fight 
against corruption.1 At their 19th Conference, held in Valletta/Malta in 1994, the 
European Ministers o f Justice recommended to set up a Multidisciplinary Group on
1 See the GRECO website: www.greco.coe.int.
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Corruption (GMC) with the task of preparing an international programme of action 
and examining the possibility of drafting legal instruments in this field. After the 
adoption of such a programme by the Committee of Ministers in 1996 and the in­
struction of the GMC to implement it until the end of 2000, a further decisive step 
was taken by the Second Summit o f  Heads o f State and Government o f  the Member 
States o f the Council o f Europe, held in Strasbourg in October 1997, by adopting an 
Action Plan against corruption and instructing the Committee of Ministers to de­
velop Guiding Principles for domestic legislation and practice, to secure the rapid 
completion of international legal instruments and to establish an appropriate and 
efficient mechanism for monitoring the observance of the guiding principles and the 
implementation of the said international instruments. Main products of this common 
determination to take action against the dangers of corruption are the Resolution 
(97) 24 on 20 Guiding Principles for the Fight against Corruption (GPC) of 6 No­
vember, 1997, the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption of the Council of 
Europe2 (Criminal Law Convention), as well as the Civil Law Convention on Cor­
ruption3 4 and the Recommendation R (2000) 10 on the Codes o f Conduct for Public 
Officials* In an organisational context, the most decisive measure based on the 
resolutions of the Council of Europe (98) 7 and (99) 5,5 was the establishment of the 
“Group o f  States against Corruption/Groupe d ’Etats contre la Corruption” 
(GRECO). According to its statute, the principal aim o f GRECO is to monitor, by a 
process of mutual evaluation and peer pressure, the observance of the Guiding Prin­
ciples in the fight against corruption and the implementation of international legal 
instruments.6 Up to now 39 nations have joined GRECO, and although the absence 
of Italy leaves a gap, the participation of the United States of America signals the 
opening of these pan-European efforts to a transatlantic reach.
2 Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (ETS No. 173) opened for signature on 27 January 
1999.
3 Civil Law Convention on Corruption (ETS No. 174) opened for signature on 4  November 
1999.
4 Available at cm.coe.int/ta/rec/2000/word/2000rl0.doc.
5 Resolution (98) 5 adopted on May 5, 1998; Resolution (99) 7 adopted on 1 May, 1999.
6 See Art. 1 Statute o f GRECO: “The aim o f  the Group o f  States against Corruption is to ¡m- 
prove the capacity o f  its members to fight corruption by following up, through a dynamic 
process o f  mutual evaluation and peer pressure, compliance with their undertakings in this 
field”.
7 In particular with regard to the similar methodology o f  the so-called “peer review“ see Fabri- 
zio  Pagani, Peer Review: A Tool for Co-ordination and Chance, OECD SG/LEG(2002)l 
OECD (ed.).
The activities of GRECO, however, are only part of the growing international at­
tention directed toward the dangers of insufficient actions against corruption. Aside 
from the UN Convention against Corruption adopted by the General Assembly on 
12 November, 2003, the measures taken by the OECD are particularly worth men­
tioning, although they still fall short of the scope and intensity of GRECO’s investi­
gation.7 In contrast to the comprehensive scope of the European instruments, as in 
particular the 20 Guiding Principles, the Criminal Law Convention, the Civil Law
14
Convention and the Recommendation on the codes of conduct, the OECD Conven­
tion on Combating Bribery o f  Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transaction comprises the relatively limited sector o f the criminal prosecution of 
border crossing corruption. As a consequence, the monitoring programme o f the 
OECD Working Group on Bribery8 is substantially restricted to this issue. This 
limited task makes plain that the monitoring by the OECD, at least in its beginning, 
confined itself to comparing all components of the national criminal law provisions 
with the requirements of the OECD Convention.9
8 Provided for by Art. 12 o f  the OECD Convention.
9 Meanwhile, however, in its second evaluation round the OECD monitoring was opened to 
further questions, such as “awareness arising”, “whistle-blowing” or intra-administrative co ­
operation, as exemplified by Germany, Phase 2 Report on the Implementation o f  the OECD 
Anti-Bribery-Convention o f  3 July, 2003.
10 When here and in the following the criminal law o f  Bosnia and Herzegovina is referred to, this 
applies to the criminal codes o f  the Federation (FBiH) and the Republic Srbsca, but not the 
district Brzko as so called “Third Entity”. Cf. GRECO Report on Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
para. 8.
11 Resolution (97) 20  adopted by the Committee o f  Ministers on 6 November 1997 at the 101 st 
session o f  the Committee o f  Ministers.
The more comprehensive task of GRECO makes it possible to gain a broad as 
well as thorough insight into the legal systems and the organisation o f the participat­
ing countries. The knowledge to be expected from this comparison is not only nec­
essary and adequate for understanding a problem as complex as corruption, but may 
also provide advice for the participating countries in their fight against corruption. 
As it would be impossible to perform the entire monitoring programme of GRECO 
in one step, it was decided to carry it out in various consecutive evaluation rounds, 
in which each time various aspects of national anti-corruption strategies are investi­
gated and evaluated with regard to their compliance with the legal standards set up 
by the aforementioned instruments of the Council of Europe and its organs.
The First Evaluation Round, began on 1 January, 2000, and by March 2003 fi­
nally covered 35 member states: these are Albania, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzego­
vina,10 Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Roma­
nia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, „Former Yugoslav Republic of „The 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia“, United Kingdom and the United States 
of America. This round was to explore in which way and to what degree the legal 
provisions as well as the factual structures and practice in these countries is in com­
pliance with the aims pronounced in the Guiding Principles Nos. 3, 6 and 7.11 
Within this reach of the GRECO evaluation, the obligations to be complied with by 
the member states are the following:
Guiding Principle 3: to ensure that those in charge of the prevention, investiga­
tion, prosecution and adjudication of corruption offences enjoy the independence 
and autonomy appropriate to their functions, are free from improper influence and 
have effective means for gathering evidence, protecting the persons who help the
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authorities in combating corruption and preserving the confidentiality of investiga­
tions;
Guiding Principle 6: to limit immunity from investigation, prosecution or adju­
dication of corruption offences to the degree necessary in a democratic society;
Guiding Principle 7: to promote the specialisation of persons or bodies in charge 
of fighting corruption and to provide them with appropriate means and training to 
perform their tasks.
In short, the First Evaluation Round dealt mainly with three topics:
basic substantive provisions against corruption and its prosecution and 
practice,
general and/or special persons and bodies empowered to prosecute and pre­
vent corruption,
immunities of certain persons and organs by which the investigation and 
prosecution of corruption may be impeded or even barred.
The evaluation by GRECO is basically performed in the following way: After the 
country to be evaluated has turned in its “Reply to the Mutual Evaluation Question­
naire” (cf. Art. 11 GRECO Statute), which was developed by GRECO in a standard­
ised manner and sent to all countries concerned, the respective country will be vis­
ited by a “GRECO Evaluation Team” (GET, cf. Arts. 12, 13 GRECO Statute), regu­
larly consisting of at least three experts from different countries and accompanied by 
a member of the GRECO Secretariat, then a “Draft Evaluation Report”, prepared by 
the GET in communication with representatives of the country concerned, is submit­
ted to a Plenary Meeting of all GRECO members (Art. 14 GRECO-Statute) which in 
two readings -  again assisted by the experts of the GET and in consultation with the 
representatives of the country concerned -  finalise the “Evaluation Report” which 
upon the agreement of the country concerned is made public (Art. 15 GRECO Stat­
ute).12
After introductory notes to the composition of the GET and its proceedings, each 
GRECO Report consists of (i) a descriptive part of the factual situation and the ex­
isting provisions with regard to the subjects of the Guiding Principles concerned, (fi) 
an analytical part providing the evaluation by GRECO and (iii) final conclusions 
containing the recommendations and observations of GRECO, ending with the de­
termination of the time period (of regularly 18 months) within which the country is 
expected to report on the implementation of the recommendations made by GRECO 
(Art. 15 [6] GRECO Statute). This statement is the basis for a “Compliance Report”, 
in which the measures taken by the state concerned to implement the recommenda­
tions are analysed and evaluated (Rule 31 Rules of Procedure). After again having 
been finalised in a GRECO Plenary Meeting, this report is made public as well.
As may already be stated at this point, the GRECO Reports of the First Evalua­
tion Round, the analysis and comparison of which are the subject of this study, are -  
not at least due to the coordinating hand of the GRECO Secretariat -  of remarkable 
coherence. In describing and analysing the situation they do not narrowly restrict
12 These reports are available at www.greco.coe.int/evaluations/Default.htm.
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themselves to the main subjects of the three Guiding Principles in question here, but 
present a far reaching impression of the institutions that are employed by the various 
members of GRECO in their fight against corruption. Thus, they provide a solid 
base for this inquiry into the national anti-corruption strategies.
C. Theoretical and methodological aspects
Obviously, this study does not pretend to present a comprehensive description and 
analysis of the GRECO Member States’ fight against corruption. For as the 
GRECO’s First Evaluation Round was focused on and, thus, limited to three of its 
general principles only, a full picture cannot be available until all the guiding princi­
ples with regard to their implementation in national law are described and analysed 
by further evaluation rounds. Although the Second Evaluation Round, dealing with 
GPC 4 and 19 on “Proceeds of Corruption”, GPC 9 and 10 on “Public Administra­
tion and Corruption” and GPC 5 and 8 on “Legal Persons and Corruption”, is al­
ready on its way since December 2003,13 it appeared appropriate to present a com­
parative analysis of the First Evaluation Round without waiting for further reports: 
first, for substantive reasons as the subject matters of the First Evaluation Round are 
of basic importance for the whole evaluation process, and second in expecting that 
further evaluation rounds could learn from the lessons learned in the First Evalua­
tion Round.
13 To the extent finalised and made public, these reports are available on internet in the same way 
as those o f  the First Evaluation Round.
14 E. Furubotn/R. Richter, Institutions and economic theory. The contribution o f  the new institu­
tional economics, Ann Arbor 1998, p. 6 define an institution as a set o f  formal and informal 
rules, including their enforcement arrangements, with the purpose to steer individual behaviour 
in a particular direction.
Focussing on the subject o f the Guiding Principles 3, 6 and 7 does not mean, 
however, that this comparative analysis is strictly following the sequence of the 
country reports, as well as it does not pretend to take notice of every detail and na­
tional pecularity therein. For as expressed in the title o f  this study, it rather aims at 
presenting the main features of institutions and strategies a country is employing, or 
may lack, in fighting corruption.
When talking o f “institution” this is not meant in the narrow sense of public au­
thorities or organisation, but rather as the entirety of legislative and administrative- 
organisational means and measures the existence of which may influence a person 
who takes corruption into account of its decision making.14
This approach therefore encompasses both the norms and all authorities in charge 
o f the supervision and enforcement of norms. Drawing on terminology of game 
theory, an institution can be understood as a “collectively perceived summary repre­
sentation of an equilibrium of the game and the players and die rules of the game
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can be contoured as essential components of this game.15 This institutional under­
standing calls for both a broad view on the institutions and an individual approach to 
the addressees of these institutions: Whether the fight against corruption will be 
promising cannot be answered with an abstract and normative “ideal state“ of soci­
ety as decisive criterion for the evaluation of national anti-corruption strategies. 
Such an evaluation would neglect that the state of society is merely a reflection of 
individual behaviour. The decisive scale is therefore whether the implemetation or 
modification of certain institutions can motivate an individual to refrain from in­
tended corruption.16
15 Cf. Masahiko Aoki, What are Institutions and how should we approach them, in: Gudrun 
Kochendörfer-Lucius/Boris Pleskovic (ed.), The Institutional Foundations o f  a Market Econ­
omy, Berlin 2001, pp. 31,33.
16 This relates to the doctrine of “methodological individualism”, that is to say, all social phe­
nomena are explained only in terms of individuals -  their properties, goals and beliefs; funda­
mental Joseph A. Schumpeter, Das Wesen und der Hauptinhalt der theoretischen Nationalöko­
nomie, Wien 1908, pp. 88 ss.
17 Background o f this economic approach is the “rational choice“. According to this theory 
individuals adjust their behaviour to the expected profit (cf. Gary S. Becker, A  Theory o f So­
cial Interactions, 82 Journal o f Political Economy (1974), pp. 1063-1091), and, consequently, 
evaluate a possible illegal action pursuant to the trade-off between expected advantages and 
disadvantages.
The analysis of the impact of institutions on the behaviour of individuals starts 
from the assumption of rational choices made by a homo oeconomicus. The figure 
mentioned, the homo oeconomicus, does not claim to represent the nature of man in 
its entire complexity. However, it is a solid heuristics to predicate decision-making 
in a field -  such as economic crime — where acteurs opt rationally since irrational 
decisions may lead to unwanted consequences. Consequently, we can assume, that -  
facing the choice between lawful and unlawful behaviour -  a rational individual 
would realise that the costs of unlawful behavior rise the tighter the “net” of institu­
tions is woven. Beyond a certain degree of marginal costs lawful, that is non- 
corrupt, behaviour would be the economically rational choice.17 This institutional 
approach leads to an understanding of criminal law and its enforcement as a mean to 
prevent criminal behaviour. Certainly, the issue of prevention is not an unique ex­
planation for punishing, but can, for example, be accompanied or substituted by the 
purpose of retribution. However, since GRECO’s work aims to help nations to com­
bat corruption, the approach mentioned above seems to be justified: Institutions, 
such as criminal law and the law enforcement bodies, are understood as tools in 
steering the individual and the society as a whole in the direction defined by democ­
ratic legislation.
With respect to corruption the direction is clear: Corruption shall be prevented as 
it is incompatible with the essential standards of a democratic society. According to 
the Criminal Law Convention of the Council of Europe the prohibition of corruption 
subserves the protection of standards such as “the rule of law, democracy, human 
rights, good governance, fairness and social justice, competition, economic devel-
18
opment, stability of democratic institution and the moral foundation o f society”.18 
Since there are more obvious threats to democracy, social justice and fairness than 
corruption, the enumeration does not highlight the specific corruption-related risks 
for these values. To understand this connection one has to adopt a more abstract 
level: The ban of the corruption aims at the protection o f social procedures and the 
trust o f the citizens in their functioning and their neutrality. So the institutions 
against corruption safeguard the required confidence of the people in the functioning 
of the procedures, or -  metaphorically speaking -  in the game and the rules of the 
game. This confidence is the essential basis for the cohabitation of people in a soci­
ety: People are willing to delegate decisions affecting their own concerns to rules 
and procedures only as long as they trust the “proposal of acceptable results” re­
flected by these rules and procedures. Acceptable results essentially depend on the 
observance of the rules defining the procedure. It is therefore necessary to impose 
corruption bans on these persons who make decisions in the procedures or observe 
these decisions, in order to safeguard that these people do not serve their own wel­
fare but the functioning of the system. Consequently, the anti-corruption norms 
protect the normative requirements of procedures, in order to ensure that the promise 
of just results made by these procedures are transformed into social reality.
18 Cf. the Preamble o f  the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption: “Emphasising that corrup­
tion threatens the rule o f  law, democracy and human rights, undermines good governance, 
fairness and social justice, distorts competition, hinders economic development and endangers 
the stability o f  democratic institutions and the moral foundations o f  society”. Similar wording 
in the Preamble o f  the Civil Law Convention. Cf. also the Preamble o f  Resolution (97) 24: 
“Aware that corruption represents a serious threat to the basic principles and values o f  the 
Council o f  Europe, undermines the confidence o f  citizens in democracy, erodes the rule o f  law, 
constitutes a denial o f  human rights and hinders social and economic development”.
19 Cf. the mentioning o f  the topics “economic development“, “competition“ in the preambles o f  
the said conventions.
An additional reason for prohibiting corruption follows from the economic con­
sequences o f corrupt behaviour.19 According to the overwhelming opinion in eco­
nomic theory, corruption has to be fought because the national economy is damaged
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by social costs.20 Losses in social welfare not only result from the possibility of 
corrupt participants to delegate their expenditures to the public by means of higher 
prices or taxes. Moreover, substantial social costs are caused by the distortion of 
competition: Competition is the main social procedure to coordinate offers and de­
mands in the market and to recompense efforts and innovation, guided by the fa­
mous “invisible hand”.21 Functioning competition is not only a concrete result of the 
legal guarantee of freedom but also a swift mechanism to promote social and eco­
nomic development. Societies have opted for a market ecomomy because the major­
ity of people believe that this social procedure leads to a maximum of freedom and 
an increase in welfare. In order to fulfil these expectations the private “self­
coordination” by competition, therefore, requires the same protection of its prerequi­
sites as the public procedures in the administrative sector. Corruption — in addtition 
to cartels and the abuse of dominant market power -  is the most effective means in 
public and private tender to foster the success of the suboptimal and to hamper the 
success of the better offer. For these normative and economic reasons, competition 
as a procedure has to be protected against corruption, regardless of the question of 
whether a public official or a decision-maker in the private sector has been “in­
fected”.
20 Cf. Center fo r Democracy and Governance, US Agency fo r International Development (ed.), A 
Handbook on Fighting Corruption, Washington DC, 1999, p. 5: “Corruption also undermines 
economic development by generating considerable distortions and inefficiency. In the private 
sector, corruption increases the costs o f  business through the price o f illicit payments them­
selves, the management costs o f  negotiating with officials, and the risk o f breached agreements 
or detection. [...] Where corruption inflates the cost o f  business, it also distorts the playing 
field, shielding firms with connections from competition and thereby sustaining inefficient 
firms. Corruption also generates distortions in the public sector by diverting public investment 
away from education and into capital projects where bribes and kickbacks are more plentiful. 
Officials may increase the technical complexity o f  public sector projects to conceal such deal­
ings, thus further distorting investment. Corruption also lowers compliance with construction, 
environmental, or other regulations; reduces the quality o f government service and infrastruc­
ture, and increases budgetary pressures on government” According to a dissenting opinion in 
economics, corruption is a useful mean to speed up decisions in a overextended bureaucracy 
(N. Leff, Economic Development through Bureaucratic Corruption, American Behavioral Sci­
entist 1964, p. 8; cf. Paul Holden/Jennifer Sobotka, Corruption: An Economic Perspective, in: 
Paolo Bemasconi (ed.), Responding to Corruption, Social Defence, Corruption, and the Protec­
tion o f Public Administration and the Independence o f  Justice, Napoli 2000, pp. 54, 55).
21 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes o f the Wealth o f Nations, 1776, passim.
22 A. J. Heidenheimer/M. Jonston/V. J. LeVine, Political Corruption: A Handbook, New Bruns­
wick 1989, pp. 3-15.
As has been seen, the prohibition of corruption in the private sector subserves the 
protection of procedures and the trust of the participants in the prevalence of the 
rules and the functioning of the “game”. Consequently, solid institutions against 
corruption ask for a comprehension of corruption that includes the protection of 
procedures both in the public and in the private sector. Distinct to the common defi­
nitions of corruption22 -  the “abuse-advantage-approach” and the “interests-
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violation-approach”23 -  a “procedural approach” is preferable. According to this 
approach, corruptive behaviour is contoured by the following characteristics: Cor­
ruption is the (1) influence (2) by inadequate incentives (3) on procedures within 
organisational structures (4) in favour of particular interests. Incentives can be called 
inadequate when they are not or not in this specific manner provided for in the pro­
cedure.
D. Structure o f this study
Although substantive criminal law was not explicitly the subject matter of the First 
Evaluation Round, institutions against corruption cannot be described without 
knowing the basics of the relevant crime provisions against bribery. Therefore it is 
appropriate that all GRECO Reports start with a short description of the national 
crime provisions against corruption. Accordingly, the first step in this study must be 
a comparative analysis of the aims and structure of the core crimes against corrup­
tion, not at least because they may already open the view to potential deficiencies 
(II). This is followed by an analysis of the ways on which the substantive corruption 
provisions are implemented in practice and how far the Guiding Principles are com­
plied with (III). The third step presents a compilation of national deficiencies as 
found in the Country Reports and as expressed in various GRECO recommendations 
and observations (IV). Finally some concluding considerations will be presented 
(V).
23 According to this theory corrupt behaviour is characterised by the adverse variance from 
public interests.
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II. Core Criminal Law Provisions that Prohibit Corruption
At first glance, the GRECO Reports present a rather homogeneous picture.24 All 
countries covered by this study have criminal provisions penalising and sanctioning 
corruptive conduct in a similar way. At a closer look, however, the various provi­
sions reveal significant differences with regard to their effectiveness; therefore, a 
more detailed structural analysis of the relevant provisions is advisable.
This inquiry starts with a comparative survey of the core criminal law provisions 
of the GRECO member states by elucidating both common features and variations 
in the regulative technique (A). This will help to disclose structural weaknesses in 
the institutional fight of the criminal law against corruption (B).
A. Comparative overview o f  the core criminal law o f the GRECO Member States
1. Active and passive bribery
In principle, all GRECO member states prohibit active and passive bribery by crimi­
nal law. When it comes to the concrete formulation of these prohibitions, however, 
quite a few differences with corresponding consequences come to the surface.
a) The “subject” of corruption: the public official
A definitional element of the crime provision with substantial consequences for the 
institutional reach of the prohibition is the human subject of corruption, be it the 
active giver in the case of active bribery or the addressed recipient in the case of 
passive bribery.
24 The basis for the following analysis are, in general, the GRECO Reports which either in their 
appendices or in their descriptive parts, reveal the criminal law provisions in their original 
wording or summarised. In the case of Malta, the information of the GRECO Report has been 
complemented by additional sources. For the divergences o f the information provided by the 
GRECO Reports the following analysis renders the names of countries as examples. A com­
plete overview of the information to all GRECO member nations can be found in the appendix 
o f this study.
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(i) Statutory-formalistic versus functional notion
Whereas the active briber normally can be anybody, the person bribed is mostly 
denominated as “public official”, thus following a “classical” notion o f bribery ex­
clusively guided by the protection o f proceedings within the state (or similar public) 
organisation.
>  This status oriented approach is best expressed by provisions which require 
a special formal appointment for the qualification as “public official”, thus consider­
ing the status of the person concerned as the decisive criterion (as it is the case in 
Estonia, Malta, Norway25 and, with certain reservations, also Albania26). In such a 
“statutory” concept, the prohibition of corruption appears as consequence of the 
appointment and, as connected with the person in terms of a “status-public-official”, 
remains valid even if  the said person is in fact not (or no more) active in a function 
with decision power susceptible of corruption.
25 Although the latter’s formulation “any person exercising public functions, whether appointed 
or elected“ (GRECO Report on Norway, para. 7), seems to rely on both a certain status and 
function.
26 Whereas in the case o f  active bribery the formulation for the recipient clearly requires an 
“official holding a state duty or public service“ (Arts. 244, 245 Albanian Criminal Code), the 
formulation o f  passive bribery appears also open for a “functional“ approach when speaking of 
a “person holding state functions or public service“ (Arts. 259 ,260  Albanian Criminal Code).
27 E.g., cf. Arts. 28, 29 Polish Criminal Code: “performance o f  public function” or “person per­
forming public functions”; see also phrases like “who misuses ... his employment, position or 
function” in the Slovak Republic; similarly in Denmark, Greece, Norway.
28 Cf. GRECO Report on the Netherlands, para. 8 (footnote 2).
>  This contingence of the corruption provisions on a certain status has been 
given up in other legal systems in favour of a more functional notion of the subject 
o f corruption by essentially relying on the function performed by the person con­
cerned rather than by its formal appointment. In this functional approach, a public 
official can be anybody who performs tasks based on some sort of state (or equally 
public) authority and is, thus, with regard to its function integrated into the public 
sector.27 In this approach, the official status of the person concerned is merely an 
indicator for the critical question whether he or she performs public tasks. In con­
trast to a “status-public-official” as dealt with before, persons in question here may 
be described as “function-public-official”. This “approach” is, for instance, mirrored 
in the jurisprudence of the Dutch Supreme Court when considering a person as pub­
lic official “when s/he carries out her/his job under the supervision and responsibil­
ity o f the government and whose work cannot be denied to be of public character in 
order to fulfil functions of the state and of his bodies”.28
>  Between those positions which take either a status- or function-oriented ap­
proach, one can also find definitions which, in order to secure a comprehension of 
public officials as wide as possible, by means o f a “reserve norm” supplement the 
status-definition with functional elements. In these terms the Croatian Criminal 
Code speaks of “public officials or persons performing official duties in bodies of
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the executive, legislative and judicial branch of the State”.29 Similar formulations 
can be found in Denmark, France, Georgia and Germany. The same result can be 
reached by definitions that are open for being construed in both directions, particu­
larly if their source lies outside of criminal law. If, for instance, a public official is 
seen in “every person who permanently or temporarily performs his or her duties in 
the state or local government and who has the right to make decisions binding on 
other persons”3 0  it is finally left to the interpretation o f  extra-criminal norms under 
which conditions such a right exists.
>  A truly categorical step beyond tradition is finally taken if  any binding to 
statutory or functional elements of public nature are left behind by simply speaking 
of “employee” instead of public official, as it is the case in Sweden29 301 and Roma­
nia.32 In this way, the corruption provisions are easily extended beyond the public 
into the private sector without a special regulation being required. This is certainly 
also a safe way for avoiding criminal loopholes which can arise if special corruption 
norms for the private sector are deemed necessary. Another consequence of this 
broad approach appears noteworthy: If the corruption prohibition is already based on 
the employment and/or the exercise of certain (public or private) functions, the 
status as “public official” loses its otherwise decisive role o f making the conduct 
criminal and, instead, can be used as an aggravating factor, as, for instance, in Slo­
vakia.33
29 See GRECO Report on Croatia, para. 24.
30 Sect 316 Latvian Criminal Code.
31 Cf. Chapter 17 Sect 7 Swedish Penal Code, GRECO Report on Sweden, para. 7.
32 Cf. GRECO Report on Romania, para. 9. Cf. also Art. 347 Croatian Criminal Code according 
to which “official or responsible person” is to mean both public officials as w ell as private per­
sons entrusted with particular tasks. Cf. GRECO Report on Croatia, para. 25. The subverdict 
prevention o f  corruption law can also be understood in such broad terms.
33 Sect 160a (2) Criminal Code.
(ii) Elected persons as public officials
As important figures within institutions, obviously parliamentarians may easily 
come under corruptive influence. For this reason it is o f  central significance for the 
prohibition of corruption as to whether -  aside from executive officials -  persons 
elected into parliaments or similar organs of public representation can be the subject 
of corruption provisions. In this respect, three approaches can be distinguished:
>  On the one hand, a clear majority of countries that simply comprise of 
“public officials”, as well as law makers and other parliamentarians o f any kind. 
This applies to Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, England and Wales, Estonia, 
France, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, „The Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia“, Moldova, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
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Romania, Slovak Republic, Spain, USA and eventually also Georgia, Sweden and 
the Czech Republic.34
34 The latter one, however, instead o f  using a personal determination, by referring in a more 
functional way to “dealing with public interest affairs“ (Sect. 160 Czech Criminal Code); cf. 
GRECO Report on Czech Republic, para. 14 footnote 2.
35 In this part o f  the territory o f  the United Kingdom neither statutory law nor common law 
seems to be applicable to the corruption o f  parliamentarians.
36 The new Criminal Code o f  Lithuania extends the criminalisation on foreign public officials, 
but was not in force at the time o f  the evaluation, cf. GRECO Report on Lithuania, para. 30.
37 While active and passive bribery o f  officials o f  the European Union is prohibited the ban o f  
corruption o f  (other) foreign public officials is only extended to the active form, cf. GRECO 
Report on Greece, para. 19.
>  The opposite position, by not criminalising the corruption o f elected per­
sons at all, is taken by very few countries only, including Finland and Scotland.35
>  A middle position can be found in countries which, instead of equating par­
liamentarians with “public officials”, subject them to the provisions against corrup­
tion by special regulations, as in Germany, Greece, Malta and Portugal, while Cy­
prus directly implemented the relevant provision of the Criminal Law Convention 
into its criminal law.
(iii) Foreign public officials
From a transnational perspective it is of particular significance if and to what degree 
foreign public officials and members of international organisations, parliaments and 
courts may also be addressees o f national provisions against corruption. For that 
reason the ban of corruption of foreign public officials is provided for by interna­
tional treaties, as in particular the Criminal Law Convetion on Corruption and the 
OECD Convention. The fight against border crossing corruption is not only a matter 
of international necessity: Both a comprehensive and coherent national fight can 
only be expected if  the domestic corruption law is not limited to briberies on one’s 
own territory or if  committed by own citizens or against own national public offi­
cials, but where bribing of foreign public officials even beyond the own national 
borders is criminalised. In this respect, full international uniformity cannot be no­
ticed either, although a clear tendency in favour of criminalisation can be observed.
>  On the one side, there is a group of countries which implemented the man­
date of the transnational fight against corruption by penalizing the corruption of 
foreign public officials, both in form of active or passive bribing, as in Belgium, 
Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, “The Former Yugoslav Re­
public of Macedonia“, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovak Republic.36
>  Less far go those countries which by domestic law merely penalise the ac­
tive bribing of foreign public officials, as it is the case with Bulgaria, France, Ger­
many, Greece,37 Iceland, Norway, Portugal, Slovania, Spain, Sweden and USA.
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>  On the other side, however, are still quite a few countries lacking a transna­
tional extension o f their domestic law, as Albania, the Czech Republic, Georgia, 
Latvia, Moldova and Romania.38 It has to be stressed that the mere possibility to 
apply national law on extraterritorial crimes is insufficient as long as the national 
law, in particualar the term “public official”, exclusively covers national public 
officials only.
38 Uncertain is the legal situation in the United Kingdom. The OECD Working Group “was not 
in a position to determine whether the bribery o f  foreign public officials came within the statu­
tory or common-law offences”, cf. GRECO Report on United Kingdom, para. 14.
39 As examples o f  how this inclusion o f  intangible advantages is sometimes performed, see 
Art. 324 Moldavian Criminal Code 2003 which, by mentioning “services or privileges“ in ad­
dition to different kinds o f  “material benefit“, obviously intents to cover any type o f  undue ad­
vantage; similar Arts. 228, 229 Polish Criminal Code when speaking o f  “material or personal 
benefit”.
b) The “object” of corruption: the undue advantage
Another point relevant for the scope and extension of the criminal prohibition is the 
object of corruption by which the conduct o f a decision maker can be influenced. As 
to this element of bribery differences exist in two respects in particular.
(i) Tangible goods or intangible advantages
The most striking differences can be observed with regard to the character and quali­
fication of the possible object of corruption: It can either be narrowly restricted by 
requiring a specific tangible or at least otherwise financial or monetary object (such 
as a car, money, employment or professional promotion, payment o f meals or trav­
els), or by expanding it to any intangible values or advantages (such as public hon­
ours or sexual offers). The more broad the concept of undue advantage is, the more 
comprehensive corruptive influences can be subjected to criminal control. Although 
the ambiquity of certain national corruption provisions makes it difficult to draw 
clear lines, three main groups can be noticed:
>  There is still a remarkable number of countries which require some tangible 
good or economical value as the pertinent object o f bribing: Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Georgia, Spain, and, prior to its new penal code, Lithuania.
>  In contrast, a growing number of countries, although not always explicitly 
expressing it in their code, but reportedly employing it in practical jurisprudence, 
have moved away from a strictly financial oriented notion in favour o f  also compris­
ing intangible advantages: Albania, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, 
Greece, Latvia, Malta, Moldova, Norway, Poland, Portugal and USA.39
>  Less easily to be ascribed to the one or the other group are formulations 
such as “bribe or other improper reward” (Sweden), “gift and any other advantage”
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(Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iceland), “gift or promise” (the Netherlands), or “any 
benefit whatsoever” (France). These formulations can be interpreted as comprising 
“intangible advantages” as well, if, by way of teleological interpretation, the protec­
tive aims (as described supra I.C) are taken into consideration. This conclusion 
equally applies to the legislation of Cyprus, Hungary, Ireland, Romania, , Slovak 
Republic and “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia“.
(ii) The recipient o f the undue advantage
In this respect, the question is whether the public official whose decision is to be 
influenced must personally be the recipient o f the undue advantage or whether this 
can also be given to another person, thus influencing the public official indirectly. 
This issue again is dealt with differently by various countries.
>  The traditional approach of requiring that the person to be influenced in his 
or her decision and the recipient of the advantage must be identical is still followed 
by a great number of countries, such as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia,  
Czech Republic,  Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, Moldova, the Netherlands, Poland, Por­
tugal, Romania, Sweden and „the former Yugoslav Republic o f Macedonia“. Thus, 
in these countries punishment for corruption requires a connection between the 
public act and personal gain of the official.
40
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>  Meanwhile, however, there seems to be a growing number of countries 
which do not necessarily require a direct advantage of the official to be influenced in 
his decision, but where the advantage can also be given to a third person, thus, 
criminalising “indirect” bribing as well (Bulgaria, Denmark, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Lithuania, Norway, Slovak Republic, Spain, USA, and recently also Cy­
prus42).
40 With regard to this country it should be noted, however, that an official or responsible person 
can be punishable for the abuse of office and offical authority according to Art. 337 if he or 
she was influenced by gifts given to a third party; yet, this does not provide full protection 
against “indirect” bribery because the Article in question is only applicable in case of unlawful 
acts (in terms of infra 11. A. 1(d)) of the official.
41 As the wording of relevant Sect. 161 of the Czech Penal Code is rather broad, however, in case 
of active bribery, by very generally speaking of “offering or promising a bribe”, it might per­
haps also be construed as comprising advantages given to a third person in order to influence 
the official in an indirect way.
42 Prior to this amendment, the Cypriot law appeared somehow inconsistent: Whereas Art. 100 of 
the amended Criminal Code is explicitly covering “any property or benefit of any kind for 
himself or other person”, the Prevention of Corruption Law appears more restrictive by only 
encompassing advantages given to the “agent” and by restricting it to a “valuable considera­
tion”. Therefore, the main progress made by the prevention of corruption law seems to be its 
extension into the private sector and certain shifts in the burden of proof. This discrepancy 
seems to have been remedied, however, by the “Law to Ratify the Convention of the Council 
of Europe for the Penalisation of Corruption”.
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>  Between these opposite positions quite a few different middle of the road 
approaches, leaving this or that gap with regard to the required recipient o f the un­
due advantage, can be observed: Whereas, for instance, Hungary would punish pas­
sive bribery only if  the public official has been personally the recipient o f the advan­
tage, the active briber can also be punishable in the case of a gift being given to a 
third person.43 The coverage o f  corruption appears also incomplete in France and 
Georgia where an advantage gained by a third person renders a public official pun­
ishable for corruption only if  the third person had acted as a kind of “intermediary”, 
meaning that in fact the advantage was ultimately to go to the official.44 Otherwise 
giving a bribe to a third person is punishable in France only in the case of an “unjus­
tified benefit through a breach of legislative or statutory provisions guaranteeing 
freedom of access to an equal competition in public tenders and public service dele­
gation”.45 Although the penalisation of such conduct is certainly important, it still 
cannot be ignored that in this way influencing public proceedings with reference to 
particular third party interests as, e.g., those of a political party, is not barred by 
criminal law.
43 Cf. Hungarian Penal Code S ect 250 on the one hand and Sect. 253 on the other.
44 Cf. A rt 432-11 French Criminal Code; to Georgia see GRECO Report, para. 94.
45 Art. 432-14 French Criminal Code.
46 A s so far in Luxembourg and in the case law o f  France where even the legislation o f  30 June 
2000 did not bring full clarity in practice; see GRECO Report on France, para. 44.
c) The connection between the (offered or granted) advantage and the (intended or 
performed) official act
Whereas the definitional elements o f  bribery provisions as considered so far are 
easily conceivable in their relevance for the prohibition o f  corruption, a closer look 
is required for comprehending the special connection which may (or rather may not) 
be required between the (offered or received) advantage and the (expected or exer­
cised) act o f the official. With regard to this issue, in some countries characterised as 
requiring a so-called “Unrechtsvereinbarung” (in terms o f an “agreement of wrong­
doing”), mainly two groupings can be identified:
>  The first main group of countries, in following the probably more tradi­
tional approach, requires proof of a somehow subjective-intentional connection 
between the undue advantage and the act to be performed by the official. In this 
concept, the aim of the active and passive participants in terms o f a mutual exchange 
of an advantage for an official act must be an integral part of the wrongdoing. This 
collusive nexus between the actors o f  a corruption is particularly apparent in provi­
sions which, by way of the definitional element of a “pre-existing pact” (as so far in 
Luxembourg and France)46 or a “corruption pact” (as until 1990 in Belgium and
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partially in Germany,47 Greece,48 and probably also in the United States49), require 
that the granting of an advantage is part of an explicit or at least conclusive agree­
ment between both sides of the corruption. Even more than some kind of collusion 
seems required if, as in Slovakia, the bribe must be accepted “in exchange for a 
misuse”, as according to this wording the aim and object o f  the agreement must be 
the quid pro quo of the advantage and the act. The new legislation o f Lithuania, too, 
could be interpreted in this way.50 Although not so for “simple bribery”, at least for 
“qualified” corruption an agreement according to which the official act is traded in 
for a tangible value is also required in Poland.51
47 According to § 299 German Penal Code, at least in the private sector the advantage must be 
granted as a return favour for a preferential treatment; this can hardly be understood other than 
the requirement of a “Unrechtsvereinbarung”. The same applies for bribery of parliamentarians 
(§ 108e) and judges (§ 331 [2], 332 [2], 333 [2], 334 [2]), whereas in the main area of corrup­
tion in the public sector, due to a change of the German Criminal Code in 1997, the require­
ment of a “corruption pact” is at least loosened in so far as no proof of a relationship between 
the advantage and a specific act is required, since granting of advantages for gaming general 
benevolence of a public official is sufficient.
48 Partial in so far, as a “corruption pact” is merely required for special provisions for elected 
persons, but not for the general corruption provision (cf. Art. 159 Greek Criminal Code; 
Art. 12, Law 5227).
49 As the phrase “in return for” in case of passive bribery according to Sect 201a United States 
Criminal Code may be interpreted.
50 Compare Art. 282 Lituanian Criminal Code in force with Art 225 Lithuanian new Criminal 
Code not in force.
51 Cf. Art. 228 § 4 Polish Criminal Code.
52 In the Netherlands, however, the narrowness of this approach is broadened in so far as Art. 362 
Dutch Criminal Code also covers the later acceptance of advantages if done in knowing that it 
was granted for a prior official conduct
53 Whereas in this country preparatory bribery activities (like proposal or asking for) seem not to 
require the connection to a specific official act, for the completion of active and passive brib­
ery according to A rt 245 Albanian Criminal Code (remuneration given to officials) and 
Art. 260 (receiving a bribe) require an intentional connection (“to have him act or refrain” or 
“in order to carry out or to avoid carrying out” respectively). Cf. GRECO Report on Albania, 
paras. 27 ss.
> Within this first main group, a subgroup is formed by those countries 
which, although not strictly sticking to a special exchange agreement, at least re­
quire a subjective-intentional relationship between undue advantage and influence, 
as expressed in various ways: In some countries the advantage must be given “in or 
to induce (the public official) to take an action” (as in the case of active bribery in 
Denmark and Iceland), “for the exercise of his duties“ (Germany), “in order to ac­
complish ... an act” (Romania) or “for the performance of his duties” (Sweden). In 
other countries the advantage must be intended “for carrying out any action or omis­
sion” (as in Spain and similarly in Croatia, Cyprus, France, Georgia, Lithuania, 
Moldova, Norway, USA, in case of passive bribery also in the Netherlands52 and 
partly Albania53). This subgroup is furthermore subdivided, however, with regard to 
the character o f the act (to be) influenced by the bribe. Whereas some laws in a more 
abstract manner speak of “duties” (as Denmark, Germany, Sweden and similarly
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Lithuania),54 in other countries reference to a more concrete “act/omission” is asked 
for (as in Croatia, Iceland, Moldova, Norway, Romania and Spain). Correspond­
ingly, where punishment is attached to a broader range of acts in that the granting of 
an advantage must be merely aimed at any official act, the situation o f benevolence 
in the foreground of concrete official acts is already encompassed. By contrasty 
where a special connection to a concrete (or at least determinable) official action is 
required, corruptive gifts or other favours without a concrete return service in mind 
remain free from punishment. Despite these significant differences the common 
denominator of this first main group still is that the crime provisions for corruption 
require some kind of subjective-intentional connection between advantage and act, 
with the very important and practical consequence that all cases in which the diffi­
cult proof of some kind of collusive understanding between the giving and the re­
ceiving person cannot be established, fall short of incrimination.
54 Similarly broad is the language in Art. 245 Albanian Criminal Code: “Remuneration given to 
officials holding a public office ... to have him act or refrain from acting on an action con­
nected to his duty or service”.
55 This concerns the case that “an official person . . .  after the official a c t ... is committed or not 
committed, requests or receives a present or some other benefit in connection with this ...“ 
(Art 357(3) „The Former Yugoslav Republic o f  M acedonian Criminal Code).
56 Cf. Sect. 144 Danish Criminal Code.
57 Cf. Art. 259 Albanian Criminal Code.
>  The second main group is less strict and, thus, broadening the corruption 
prohibition by not requiring any intentional reference to a certain act of the official, 
but by merely requiring some kind of objective connection between granting the 
advantage and the official’s conduct. This is expressed by formulations such as “in 
connection with the performance of his duties” (as with passive bribery in Iceland or 
active bribery in the Netherlands; similar Hungary and Malta), “in respect of any 
matter or transaction whatsoever” (as in Ireland), or “in connection with the provid­
ing of a thing of public interest” (as in the Slovak Republic and similarly in the 
Czech Republic). Comparably wordings can be found in „the former Yugoslav Re- 
public of Macedonia“55 and Poland whereas for passive bribery in Denmark the 
functional connection is drawn as far as to penalise even any receiving o f advan­
tages during exercising a public office or function;56 the same applies for foreground 
efforts of “asking” or “receiving” a remuneration in Albania.57 In this group it suf­
fices for the prosecution to prove some connection between (offering, rendering, 
asking for or receiving) an advantage and the position or function o f the official the 
participants are familiar with, whereas neither a special collusive agreement nor the 
intended purpose of the advantage must be proven.
d) The legal nature of the influenced action
Irrespective of whether a specific aim of the active briber must be proven or whether 
an official has received a favour in connection with his position or function (as ana-
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lysed before), in its essence corruption is directed at a present or future act or omis­
sion of an official in exercising his function. Still the question remains whether the 
influenced conduct o f the official can be an action or omission o f any kind or 
whether it must bear the character of some illegality. In this question again different 
requirements -  sometimes even within the same country by distinguishing between 
different degrees of corruption -  can be observed.
>  At first glance, one might assume that the conduct expected from the public 
official must be unlawful or must at least lead to a result o f the corruptively influ­
enced decision process inconsistent with the law. This view could find support in the 
assumption that no tangible damage is done if, by employing an undue advantage, 
the outcome of the official’s action would in substance not differ from the result of 
an uninfluenced decision process. From this point of view, the mere influencing of a 
proceeding by an undue advantage without a causal distortion of the result may be a 
violation of certain public duties, but not corruption worth being punished. This is a 
notion of corruption as defined in the Estonian Criminal Code by penalising as act 
of corruption “the making of undue or unlawful decisions or performance of such 
acts, or failure to make reasoned and lawful decisions or perform such acts by an 
official through the use of his or her official position for receiving income derived 
from corrupt practises or self-serving purposes”.58 In a similar way, other countries 
as well appear to employ penal law only where the exertion of influence leads to an 
irregular decision. This applies to Spain which requires an “unjust act or omission” 
as well as to Greece where the wording of the bribery provision applies only if the 
act of the official has been illegal.59
58 On a closer look, however, this definition in paragraph 1642 (1) of the Estonian Penal Code 
reveals that it has to be read in connection with a specific act, such as “accepting a bribe”; 
therefore, the Estonian Penal Code is not as “atypical” as pronounced in the GRECO Report 
on Estonia, para. 15.
59 Cf. Arts. 235, 236 Greek Penal Code in connection with Art. 2, Law 2802 of 2000. These 
provisions always require a violation of his (the public official’s) duties. Should this wording 
intend not only to delineate social adequate advantages from “undue advantages” but also to 
express the idea that the act o f the public official must have been unlawful, the Greek Criminal 
Law also would contain a  restrictive understanding o f corruption.
>  In contrast, a larger group of countries aims at a more comprehensive pe­
nalisation of corruption by not requiring that the influenced act or omission of the 
official must be illegal as such. This means that the fight against corruption is not 
only directed against the prevention of unlawful acts that might be detrimental to a 
specific person, but that for the sake of integrity in performing public functions the 
mere influencing of decisions is to be prevented and, if committed, sanctioned. This 
position is meanwhile taken by Albania, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ger-
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many, Iceland, Latvia, Malta, Moldova, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, 
USA and „the Former Yugoslav Republic o f Macedonia“.60
60 Although not explicitly, a conceptual distinction between an act to be performed lawfiilly and 
to be omitted as otherwise unlawful, can also be found in Art. 338 Georgian Criminal Code 
when speaking with regard to “performing or not performing this or that action in favour o f  the 
bribe-giver that the officer or the person equal thereto must have or could have performed by 
using his official position...”.
61 Cf. Art. 177a Dutch Penal Code.
>  The opening of the concept of corruption to any conduct o f the official in­
fluenced by an undue advantage does not mean, however, that the illegality of an 
official act procured by a bribe is completely irrelevant; for by differentiating with 
regard to the unlawfulness or the correctness of the influenced conduct as such, 
many countries make use o f creating different degrees o f  bribery. This again can be 
accomplished on different ways depending on policy considerations o f  more techni­
cal nature. The great majority of this group of countries would regulate the undue 
influencing of official conduct as the basic provision that can be aggravated in case 
of an illegal act or omission by the bribed official as a qualification to be sanctioned 
with higher punishment (as provided for in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, 
France, Germany, Hungary, Malta, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic and 
“the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia“). Just the opposite way is, for in­
stance, taken by the Netherlands, by regulating the corruptive procurement o f an 
unlawful act of the official as the basic provision and by granting mitigation if  the 
influenced conduct was not unlawful as such.61
2. Other instruments o f the core criminal law relevant to corruption
Beside core criminal provisions against bribery many countries provide additional 
provisions -  partly inside, partly outside the basic penal code -  to fight corruption in 
its foreground and ambit.
a) Trading in influence
Exemplary for preventing the influencing o f officials in the foreground o f bribery is 
France, by providing punishment when a person holding a public office or a private 
individual illegally requests, or, directly or indirectly, consents to any kind of advan­
tages in exchange from misusing his or her actual or imaged influence to procure 
privileges, employment, contracts or any other favourable decision from a French 
authority or a government department; to the same extent active trading in influence
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is punishable when a third party unlawfully offers, directly or indirectly, any kind of 
advantage to a person holding a public office or to a private individual as described 
before.62
62 Cf. Art. 432-11/432-2, 433-1/433-2 French Criminal Code, GRECO Report on France, 
para. 17. To a certain degree, similar prohibitions can also be found in Albania (GRECO Re­
port, para. 28) and in the new criminal code o f  Lithuania (Art. 226).
63 Even there, however, corresponding legislation is on the way, cf. GRECO Report on Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, para. 24.
64 A s in particular provided by the 1988 UN Convention on Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances (www.incb.org/e/conv/1988/), the 1990 Council o f  Europe Conven­
tion on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation o f  the Proceeds from  Crime (ETS 141, 
http://conventions.coe.int), the 1991 European Communities Directive on Prevention o f  the 
Use o f  the Financial System fo r  the Purpose o f  Money Laundering (Official Journal L 166, 
28.6.1991, p. 77), and the 40  Recommendation o f  the Financial Action Task Force 
(www 1 .oecd.org/fatf)
Much greater is the list o f those countries, however, which do not have similar 
provisions against (active or passive) trading in influence, as in the case o f Bulgaria, 
Denmark, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway. 
This is not to say that these countries would ignore the phenomenon o f “trading in 
influence” altogether; for, even if  not under this label, these countries may still have 
other general provisions in their penal code by which undue influencing of officials 
or the abuse of public duties may be punishable, without finding it indicated in the 
relevant GRECO Reports.
b) Money laundering
The penalisation of money laundering is another device by which corruption can be 
fought indirectly. For the more it is made difficult to hide money gained by corrup­
tion, the more the temptation of bribes loses attraction. Fortunately, meanwhile all 
GRECO members -  with the exception of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzego­
vina63 - have implemented anti-money laundering provisions according to interna­
tional standards.64 To be sure, however, this attempt of indirectly drying out finan­
cial corruption can function only if  bribery in all its various forms is integrated as a 
“predicate offence” into the money laundering provisions.
c) Public procurement
Although not appearing corruptive on its face, the integrity of public administration 
can also be endangered if  the competition in public calls for tenders is impaired by 
irregular bidding agreements or unlawful disclosure of background circumstances. 
For this reason it is not surprising that Germany incorporated the prohibition of 
“anti-competitive arrangements in submissions” (wettbewerbsbeschrankende Ab-
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sprachen bei Ausschreibungen) into the penal code (§ 298) as part o f its Law on 
Fighting Corruption of 1997.65 6789
65 Therefore, this law would have deserved to be mentioned in the GRECO Report on Germany. 
Although not going so far, a similar provision can be found in S ect 401 Norwegian Criminal 
Code.
66 Compliance Report on Bulgaria, para. 19.
67 GRECO Report on Poland, para. 18, footnote 5.
68 Still it could be doubted, however, whether this provision in fact comprises all levels o f  em­
ployees “from top to the bottom”, as supposed by the Explanatory Report (para. 55) to the 
Criminal law Convention on Corruption.
69 Cf. GRECO Report on Germany, para. 16.
3. Criminalisation of bribery in the private sector
Traditionally, corruption was perceived as a phenomenon in public service. Mean­
while, not least by becoming aware that power and its abuse is also a phenomenon 
in private economy, more and more countries recognise the need o f extending the 
fight against corruption into the private sector. Probably depending on the awareness 
of the problem and divergent political views on how to cope with it, different ap­
proaches can be observed:
>  The traditional position by limiting the penalisation of corruption to the 
public sector seems still to be upheld by Albania, Bulgaria and Poland. Whereas 
Bulgaria has meanwhile also criminalised bribery in the private sector,66 the Polish 
plans of taking the same course by an amendment of the penal code67 seem not to 
have been realised so far.
>  By contrast, the majority o f GRECO members have at least in principle ex­
tended the criminalisation of corruption to the private sector, as -  with differences in 
details - Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, 
Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, „The Former Yugoslav Republic o f  Mace­
donia“, Malta, Moldova, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, Sweden as well as penal regulations of the United Kingdom. The legal 
technique mostly applied for incorporating the private sector into the corruption 
provisions is the encompassing of any persons entrusted with decision functions as 
possible subject of corruption. This can be done by simply speaking o f any “em­
ployee” (as in Sweden and similarly in Croatia) or of a person who “misuses ... his 
employment, position or function” (Slovak Republic), or by expanding the notion ol 
“public official”, as done by Art. 8 Romanian Law on Prevention, Detection and 
Sanction of Corruption.68 Another legal technique, as practised in Germany, is the 
creation o f a special provision against corruption in the private sector.69
>  A third group of countries, although prepared to criminalise corruption in 
the private sector in principle, is refraining from realising this to the same extent as 
in the public sector. Examples of a merely partial coverage o f the private sector are
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Greece70 and Bosnia and Herzegovina.71 The same applies to some state jurisdic­
tions in the USA which try to encompass corruption in the private sector by other 
norms not especially designed for corruption. Another example o f some (although 
merely indirect) relevance for bribery in the private sector may be the criminal 
“breach of duty” according to Sect 275 Norwegian Criminal Code, which aims at 
protecting confidence in a certain position and not at the prevention o f corruption. A 
different purpose is also persued by Sect. 149 Czech Criminal Code on “unfair com­
petition”: although this provision may also concern corruptive conduct,72 its scope 
is neither sufficiently determined nor comprehensive enough, since the potential 
addressees may not realise that bribery is encompassed by this prohibition and the 
use of bribery in the private sector is not always contingent to a concrete competi­
tive situation. A similar middle course is also taken by Iceland in prohibiting corrup­
tion in the private sector by means of “unfair competition”, without being supported 
by a criminal sanction, however.
4. Criminal liability of legal persons
Although this issue will be one of the main topics of the Second Evaluation Round, 
it was already addressed by most GRECO Reports of the First Evaluation Round. 
Thus, a first impression of the inclusion of legal persons in the fight against corrup­
tion can already be given here. Compared with the elements o f criminal corruption 
dealt with before, it cannot come as a surprise that with regard to the criminal liabil­
ity o f legal persons the legislation o f the GRECO members offers a rather heteroge­
neous picture, due to the fact that the notion of “punishing” a non-natural person is 
still foreign to certain doctrines of criminal law and a tricky affair of legal policy in 
many jurisdictions. Therefore at least three main camps can be distinguished:
>  On the one hand, those countries which, either ever since or in course of in­
ternational development, are prepared to hold legal persons criminally liable. This 
applies to Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Iceland, Malta, 
Moldova, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, United Kingdom, USA.73
70 At any rate, Greece is penalising “trading in influence“, bribery in connection with votes in 
general meetings o f  public or private limited companies, passive corruption in the case of 
rigged sports fixtures (cf. GRECO Report on Greece, para. 19, footnote 13).
71 Cf. GRECO Report on Bosnia and Herzegovina, para. 23. Although this report sees the private 
sector covered by the corruption provision, this may be questioned: even if, on the one hand, 
Art. 260 (“forming a prejudicial act”) goes beyond “classical” bribery in merely requiring that 
the forming o f  a contract is “contrary to the authority vested in him”, it is, on the other hand, 
restricted by requiring proof o f  a damage.
72 A s obviously assumed by GRECO Report on the Czech Republic, para. 18.
73 A  limited possibility o f  fines against legal persons is also provided for by Sweden and, since 
her entry into the European Union, by Hungary; Lithuania as well is planning criminal liability 
o f  legal persons in its draft criminal code.
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>  A similarly large group o f countries is still reluctant in applying criminal 
law on legal persons, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Georgia, 
Greece, Latvia, Luxembourg, Romania, Slovak Republic and Spain.
> Although rejecting criminal responsibility as well, some countries pursue a 
middle course made possible by taking administrative offences or similar contraven­
tions of minor weight out o f  criminal law and by subjecting them to non-punitive 
sanctions. This is the case with Albania, Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany and in 
„The Former Yugoslav Republic o f Macedonia“. Poland, too, could be mentioned 
here with regard to the ascription o f active bribery to a legal person.74
5. Sanctions and other legal consequences of criminally corruptive conduct
Although it may be interesting to learn how corruption is sanctioned by various 
GRECO members because this could indicate the political importance attached to it, 
a complete categorisation o f the kinds and framework of the different sanction sys­
tems is neither possible here nor is it truly necessary. For in order to get a reliable 
picture, it would not suffice simply to compare the types and ranges of sanctions of 
one country with those of others since the greater or lesser weight o f a sanction 
attached to corruption cannot be measured without knowing its location within the 
overall sanction system. Therefore details of sanctioning in the various countries 
may be found in the individual GRECO Reports and additional surveys.74 5 Neverthe­
less, some general observations appear appropriate.
74 Cf. GRECO Report on Poland, para. 17.
75 Such as in the survey by Barbara Huber, Sanctions against Bribery Offences in Criminal Law, 
in: Cyrille Fijnaut/Leo Huberts (eds.), Corruption, Integrity and Law Enforcement, The 
Hague/London/New York 2002, pp. 137, 142 ss.; further cf. the country reports in Albin 
Eser/Michael Überhofen/Barbara Huber (eds.), Korruptionsbekampfung durch Strafrecht, 
Freiburg 1997.
> If compared with crimes against life or limb that are probably punished 
everywhere with sanctions o f the same gravity, the sanctions attached to bribery 
partly deviate with great variations from country to country. A particularly extreme 
example may be die maximum punishment up to 12 years in Lithuania and Poland 
as compared to the maximum penalty o f half a year for “simple” active bribery in 
Norway. That must not mean that Norway would take corruption lightly; for as 
already mentioned before, as long as this sanction is not seen against the background 
of the entire Norwegian sanctioning system and not correlated to the criminological 
significance of corruption in this country, no final evaluation is possible.
> Significant differences exist with regard to the legal technique by which 
aggravating factors of bribery should be taken into account. Taking as granted that 
any legislation will somehow distinguish between active and passive bribery, the 
further way goes apart in two main directions: The more traditional one, followed by 
the majority of countries, stays with a method o f comprising the main types o f brib­
ery in one provision with a sanction o f broad range within which it is left to the
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court to determine the appropriate punishment according to the gravity of the crime. 
In the other direction, corruption is already split in different provisions according to 
aggravating circumstances with differently graduated sanctions attached to it. This 
method of a basic corruption provision with an additional “qualification” for certain 
aggravations is followed by Albania, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, 
Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Moldova, the Netherlands, Poland and the Slovak Repub­
lic. Qualifying factors may, for instance, be that the bribed official was o f particu­
larly high range or a judge (the Netherlands), that it was a repetitive case (Lithuania) 
or committed by a group (Albania, Estonia, Georgia), or that it caused great damage 
or procured particularly valuable advantage (Slovak Republic).76 Most common as 
aggravating qualification is the case that the conduct of the official in question was 
not only influenced by a bribe but even unlawful as such.77
76 In this context, the Irish Prevention o f  Corruption Act 1916 may be noteworthy for providing a 
higher punishment if  “the matter or transaction in relation to which the offence was committed 
was a contract or a proposal for a contract with His Majesty or any Government Department or 
any public body or a subcontract to execute any work comprised in such a contract” (Chapter 
64 (1)). This pecularity might go back to the English Prevention o f  Corruption Act o f  the same 
year (cf. GRECO Report on the United Kingdom, para. 13).
77 More to this type o f  qualification between “simple” and “grave” bribery see supra II.A.l(d) 
and H.A.5.
>  Beside the “normal” punitive sanctions, as in particular imprisonment and 
fines, corruption is a type of crime which is hardly efficiently sanctioned if advan­
tages gained by corruption were left to the perpetrator. Therefore most countries, in 
addition to a penalty, also order the confiscation or forfeiture of the values gained or 
otherwise having been the object of a corruption offence. As the scope and practical 
implementation of these measures will be dealt with in detail by the Second Evalua­
tion Round, it may suffice here to name those countries which, to a certain extent, 
already deal with this matter in the GRECO Reports o f the First Evaluation Round: 
Albania, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Malta, Moldova, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania and „the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia“.
6. “Negative prescription” - The period of limitation
The periods limiting the prosecution of a crime o f corruption differ to a great degree 
within the GRECO area. This is not surprising, however, since the length of a period 
of limitation not only depends on the general limitation system of a country but 
mostly also on the gravity o f the crime and/or the sanction provided for. Therefore it 
would not make much sense to attempt a detailed breakdown of the different periods 
of “negative prescription” as they may be found in the various GRECO Reports.
One general point, however, seems noteworthy: as the sanctions for corruption 
used to range within the lower third of the sanctioning framework, it can be con-
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eluded that corruption crimes belong to those where the period o f limitation passes 
relatively quickly.78
78 As an example cf. GRECO Report on Norway, para. 10. For criticism to this general observa­
tion see infra II.B.10.
79 The Law Commission for England and Wales found the law on corruption “outmoded, uncer­
tain and inconsistent” (GRECO Report on the United Kingdom, para. 14).
80 Cf. GRECO Report on Romania, para. 84. Although A rt 255 deals with active bribery, this 
remains incomplete because, by referring to A rt 254 only, the case o f  A rt 256 dealing with 
undue advantages given after the act is not comprised.
81 Cf. GRECO Report cm Georgia, para. 93; similar gaps can be found in the Lithuanian law.
82 As Georgia is referring to.
B. National corruption law in relation to the requirements o f  the Criminal Law 
Convention on Corruption -  Deficiencies and corrections
Apart from legislation,which more or less openly deem a reform o f their corruption 
law as necessary, as in particular the United Kingdom,79 this descriptive survey so 
far permits to summarise the present state of the national criminal laws on corrup­
tion as basically homogeneous and, to a remarkable degree, also comprehensive. 
Therefore, new penal provisions may be needed only in few cases. Nevertheless, for 
improving the institutional efficiency of the penal law, certain details might be op­
timised. This is to say that the corruption provisions would need improvement less 
with regard to their “effectiveness in breadth” than to their “effectiveness in depth”. 
The following is to show in which points this might be possible and needed.
1. Completeness in the penalisation of corruptive conduct
Obviously, the institutional efficiency o f corruption provisions is substantially re­
duced if  they leave loopholes by not penalising corruptive acts sufficiently compre­
hensive.
>  As an example of possible gaps that may serve the Romanian Criminal Law 
which penalises the “acceptation of undue advantages” and the “trading in influ­
ence”, but not its corresponding “active” forms.80
> Other loopholes are left open if merely completed acts o f “giv - 
ing/accepting” are penalised, but not yet -  as in the case of Georgia -  corruptive 
conduct on the foreground, such as “promising” or “offering” by the active part or 
“requesting” or “accepting a promise” by the passive part.  Gaps o f  this sort cer­
tainly fall short of die requirements in Arts. 2 and 3 Criminal Law Convention on 
Corruption. Even if the attempt of “giving” and “accepting” is punishable as well,  
the borderline between the attempts o f  “giving” or “accepting” still lies behind 
“promising” or “requesting” the Convention also wants to see punished, and this so 




is to be protected and promoted, this integrity can already be shakened by requests, 
offers or promises. Also in order to enable bodies and institutions in charge of the 
fight against corruption to step in as early as possible, not at least to prevent an 
unlawful official act to occur, the criminal prohibition cannot wait until the damage 
is done.
2. The notion o f the public official
a) Statutory-formalistic or functional notion
Another definitional element o f  corruption provisions in the public sphere readily 
open for gaps is the notion o f “public official” as perpetrator, particularly if  it is 
understood in a status-oriented way.83
Although the wording o f Art. 1 (a) Criminal Law Convention on Corruption 
leaves defining “public official” to the relevant national law, thus not precluding a 
status-oriented definition if  the national legislation deems it appropriate, on the other 
hand, the Convention does not preclude a functional understanding either, should it 
not even favour it by referring to the “function” performed by the person in ques­
tion. At any rate, as a matter o f legal policy a functional understanding appears pref­
erable for various reasons.
First, if proceedings shall be protected from being inadequately influenced and if, 
thus, the exercise of a certain function shall by no means allow the acceptance of 
any values or advantages, there is no apparent reason why the punishing of such an 
influence should be dependent on how the office is organised with regard to its 
status. For the protective purpose of the prohibition of corruption it only matters 
whether the bribed person is the “player” within the proceeding whom is to be safe­
guarded. The assumption that it is endangered, can, as a rule, be concluded from the 
mere fact that the briber grants an advantage just to this person. This will be done 
not because o f his or her status but because of that person’s function and influence 
within the organisational framework. In this perspective, the statutory position can­
not be more than an indicator for the finally decisive functional quality of the person 
concerned.
Second, the irrelevance o f the statutory denomination of the person in comparison 
to his function can also be concluded from the fact that quite a few activities which 
in former times were considered as state-controlled, now are performed in organisa­
tional forms of private law, if  they are not totally privatised. Even if the latter case 
has still to be treated as part o f  corruption in the private sector (infra II.B.8), with 
regard to conduct within state and similarly public organisations it cannot make an
83 Cf. supra II.A. 1(a).
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essential difference whether the bribed decision maker is proceeding according to 
public or private law or what his/her status is.
Third, although with the opposite result, a status-oriented notion cannot only lead 
to a restrictive notion of “public official”, with the consequence o f  gaps in the pro­
tection against corruption as described before, it can, to the contrary, entail inade­
quate widening of the provision. For if  the status is the decisive criterion, such a 
person runs the risk of criminal liability even if he or she does not (or no more) 
exercise a function as decision maker in which he or she could be corruptly influ­
enced. A mainly static determined public official could to an undue extent trust 
resources of supervising or law enforcement bodies and expose public employees to 
punishment although they -  due to their current function -  present no relevant “dan­
ger”. On the other hand, the exemption from the prohibition of public corruption has 
to be supplemented by the ban of corruption in the private sector, in order to avoid 
legal gaps.84
84 For example, the German Federal Court recently had to decide whether a public official who 
worked for the former “Deutsche Bundesbahn” (German National Railroad) and who -  after 
the privatisation o f  the “Bundesbahn” -  had been furloughed but formally kept his status and 
continued his work for the private “Deutsche Bahn AG” is encompassed by the definition o f  a 
public official. The court held that contrary to his formal status he did not fulfill his duties for 
the state but solely worked for the Deutsche Bahn AG on  the basis o f  a private contract and, 
for this reason, functionally could not be regarded as a public official (cf. Bundesgerichtshof, 
57 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 43/2004, p. 3129). D ue to the understanding o f  this term 
and the postulate o f  ”mdla poena sine lege” this result is  mandatory, but unsatisfactory when 
the relevant behavior is not encompassed by the prohibition o f corruption in die private sector.
85 If informed about his duties and his criminal liability on this way, the official could also be 
precluded from invoking mistake o f  law, as it is -  at least to a certain degree -  recognised in 
modem criminal codes as an excuse.
86 Cf. infra B I .D .l.
Despite this preference for a function-oriented notion it must not be ignored, 
however, that it also entails a weakness that requires precaution. While public offi­
cials are apparently warned of their special responsibilities and duties upon ap­
pointment to certain positions, this warning is not as evident in case o f  exercising a 
certain function, in particular if it was assumed without an official inauguration, i.e. 
in “silent” manner or by implicit agreement. To make an employee aware o f  the 
duties attached to the exercise of certain functions, including the prohibition of be­
ing influenced by any advantages granted from a third person, explicit information 
and written recognition of these duties are to be called for,85 perhaps at best by way 
o f a “code of ethics”.86 
b) Foreign public official
For good reasons, the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption in its Arts. 5 ,6 ,9 ,1 0  
and 11 requires the inclusion of bribing foreign officials o f  different kinds into the 
corruption prohibitions. Otherwise it would be too easy to arrange corrupt agree-
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ments preferably with foreign officials or to transfer them altogether to foreign terri­
tory. Therefore, countries that still direct their corruption provisions to own officials 
only,87 must be aware that they are not in compliance with the Criminal Law Con­
vention.
87 Cf. supra Il.A. 1 (aXiii)-
88 Cf. supra n.A.l(bXi).
89 As to be seen infra II.B.3(a).
3. The undue advantage
Gaps in the coverage of corruption can also emerge from an inappropriately narrow 
understanding of the “undue advantage” granted in view or in exchange for a fa­
vourable conduct of the official.
a) Gaps on account of a tangible understanding of “advantage”
A particularly detrimental deficiency can result from restricting the “advantage” by 
which the conduct of the official may be influenced to tangible in terms of corporeal 
objects, money, financial or similar material values, thus, excluding intangible fa­
vours or benefits (like honours or sexual offers) from the illicit means by which 
human behaviour can be influenced, as it is still the case in quite a few national 
legislations.88
This focussing on tangible advantages is misguided for various reasons. First, by 
failing to appreciate the socio-psychological experience that material goods are 
nearly one value among others chosen by the rational human being in the pursuit of 
individual happiness, with the consequence that it is finally a personal question and, 
thus, a question hardly determined by objective criteria, about what particular possi­
bilities out o f a range may influence a person. Second, since decisions are always 
contingent on individual conditions and preferences of the person concerned, with 
the consequence that a truly objective decision -  as, for instance, in placing an order 
or employing an applicant -  is a mere chimera and perhaps not even an ideal to 
pursue, it becomes apparent how difficult it is in such borderline areas to use the 
kind of advantage as a criterion for distinguishing between socially tolerable from 
criminally reprehensible influencing. Nevertheless, in the final end, there is no get­
ting away from sorting out subjective feelings of sympathy or wishes of harmony, as 
they are connected with any human interaction, as socially adequate and, thus, not 
deserving criminal reprehension. This clarification, however, might be better real­
ised with regard to the “undue” or “not undue” character o f an advantage89 rather 
than by restricting the notion of a reprehensible “advantage” as such to tangible 
goods or values. Third, seen from the protective aim o f the prohibition of corruption,
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the nature o f  the advantage is anyhow irrelevant as long as it is capable o f  exerting 
improper influencing.
In conclusion, the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption was indeed well- 
advised to ask for penalising “any (undue) advantage” and, thus, not to exclude 
intangible values.90 
90 Cf. Explanatory Report, para. 37 to Arts. 2 and 3 Criminal Law Convention.
91 Explanatory Report, para. 38.
92 A s an example may serve the intense discussion in Germany on whether new financing models 
o f  state or equivalent public institutions, as in particular research with “D rittm itter  (grants by 
private persons or firms) in state hospitals or universities, should be considered as “undue” ad­
vantages i f  the officials (as, for instance, professors at a state university) are at the same time 
engaged in business relations with the sponsors. The same problem can arise with regard to 
private sponsoring of public events or state institutions.
93 In these terms, the German jurisprudence, when construing the criminal prohibition o f  “anti­
competitive arrangements in submissions” (cf. supra II.B.2(c)), takes recourse to the value 
judgements o f  unfair trade and competition law, in order to avoid penalising acts which are ei­
ther permissible according to that law per se or exempted on certain conditions.
b) Ambiguities with regard to the advantage as “undue”
As it has become apparent before, i f  the “advantage” is to be understood in broad 
terms, the requirement o f  the advantage to be “undue” is gaining particular weight 
for sorting out advantages which may be “due” and, thus, not amount to criminally 
reprehensible influencing. As commented in the Explanatory Report o f  the Criminal 
Law Convention on Corruption, this criterion aims at “excluding advantages permit­
ted by the law or by administrative rule as well as minimum gifts, gifts o f  very low 
value or social acceptable gifts”.91 Thus, qualifying an advantage as “undue” serves 
as a corrective for exempting from the reach o f criminal law advantages that are 
socially adequate and therefore may not be covered by criminal law.
However, the use of such an open term has advantages and disadvantages. On the 
one hand, as a normative element that is both capable and in need o f  being more 
concretely shaped, it offers the possibility to take into consideration divergent de­
velopments in society and, thus, to adjust the reach o f  the prohibition to the condi­
tions and needs o f  the various legal orders concerned. Consequently, an advantage 
that in one country may be considered as “undue”, in another legal order may appear 
as socially adequate. With similar flexibility, within the same legal order it will even 
be possible to adjust the limits o f penalisation in a dynamic way to new social de­
velopments.92 Furthermore, it is made possible to use the definitional openness o f  
“undue” for integrating extra-penal norms and, thus, to obtain consistent value 
judgements within the legal order.93
On the other hand, an explicit warning against considering grants in certain areas 
as a socio-typical phenomenon seems to be appropiate which might be accepted as 
socially adequate and, thus, not as “undue” in criminal terms. This caution is neces­
sary not only with regard to the acceptance o f  “additional fees” expected from citi-
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zens for raising the officials otherwise insufficient income,94 but must also be ex­
pressed against proposals to tolerate the receipt o f minor advantages up to a certain 
value as not “undue”; for in this way to allow public officials charging some kind o f 
non-punishable “corruption tax” would undermine the citizens’ confidence that 
public fees are owed to the public authority and not contingent on the personal needs 
or desires of public servants.
94 As reported from Slovakia and rightly criticised by the GET; cf. GRECO Report on the Slovak 
Republic, para. 32.
95 Cf. Arts. 2 ,3  Criminal Law Convention with Explanatory Report, para. 36.
96 Cf. supra II.A. 1 (bXii)-
Consequently, by filtering advantages with regard to being “undue”, loopholes 
which might undermine the institutional efficiency of the corruption prohibition can 
be avoided only if the social contingencies taken into consideration are subjected to 
a normative evaluation the requirements of which are, if  necessary, even preserved 
against reversing social developments. One way of keeping the evaluation of “un­
due” on the track, and to safeguard it against individual preferences of the official, 
would be the development of guidelines or codes of ethics, perhaps combined with 
certain procedural precautions.
c) Personal restrictions -  Widening the concept o f recipients to third parties
No less indicative than the nature and character o f the undue advantage is its ad­
dressee. If it is true, as stated before, that proceedings decided upon by human be­
ings are inevitably influenced by individual motivations and conditions, then it is 
less decisive to whom the advantage has been granted or by whom it has been re­
ceived, but rather who was, or was to be, influenced by this transfer. This may be in 
most cases the recipient in person and in his capacity as official; but the official may 
be no less influenced if  the advantage is not directly granted to him, but to a third 
person. From a protective perspective, as well, it is of secondary importance who is 
directly gaining from a bribe. For as corruption is not aiming at the protection of 
property interests, as in case of fraud or other economic crimes, the peculiar wrong­
doing of corruption does not lie in the transfer of advantages to a public official, but 
rather in the possible perversion of a proceeding and the damaging of confidence in 
the integrity and ability of public service.
Therefore the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption was again well-guided in 
requiring that undue advantages, not only if  given to the public official concerned, 
but to “anyone else” as well, should be penalised, thus also including advantages 
granted to political parties or other organisations.95 Consequently, those legislations 
which still confine their corruption provision to public officials as recipients and, 
thus, excluding bribes to third parties96 are not in compliance with the Criminal Law 
Convention.
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4. The wrongful connection between advantage and conduct
Another weakening of the corruption prohibition, which, however, is not explicitly 
addressed by the Criminal Law Convention, can ensue if  a specific wrongful con­
nection between the (offered/requested or given/received) advantage and the (ex­
pected or influenced) conduct is required, as it is still the case in quite a few national 
legislations.97
97 Cf. supra n .A . 1 (c).
98 As the Irish provision “in respect o f any matter or transaction whatsoever, actual or proposed” 
(Prevention o f Corruption Act 1889 and Ethics in Public Office Act 1995) may be understood.
>  Such a counterproductive effect is particularly apparent if the crime defini­
tion of bribery requires a “pre-existing agreement” or a “corruption pact”. For even 
if granting an undue advantage in connection with an official act has been proven, 
this would still not suffice for finding the persons involved guilty if  it cannot be 
proven that the transfer of the advantage was based on some kind o f collusive un­
derstanding. In fact, such a requirement would expect the prosecution to prove both 
an active and passive bribery what, consequently, means to prove the unlawfulness 
of both persons involved in the “corruption pact”. In contrast, a mere objective con­
nection would allow to charge a person o f active bribery without having to prove the 
fact that the public official knew that the gift related to a concrete action or his func­
tion.
> Although less far-reaching, a similar counter-prohibitive effect is still pre­
sent if a “simple” intentional connection between the (offered/requested or 
given/received) advantage and the (expected or influenced) conduct o f the official is 
required. This is particularly true if  the granting of the advantage must be subjec­
tively related to a concrete act or omission of the official. With such a requirement, 
cases of so-called “creating benevolence” by way of granting advantages without 
already having a certain conduct of the official in mind, but with the expectation that 
the official concerned will return the favour, remain outside the reach of criminal 
law.
> This connection issue can also have a temporal component. If  corruption 
provisions penalise undue advantages only if granted prior to the official’s act,98 the 
prohibition can be easily circumvented by granting the advantage after the fact. 
Even if it may be suspected that the transfer after the fact had already been intended 
prior to it, proving this may be no less difficult than with provisions which explicitly 
require a “pre-existing corruption pact”.
Since with regard to this definitional issue no explicit postulations are made by 
the Criminal Law Convention, the national legislations seem free to proceed as they 
see fit. Nevertheless, if  the fight against corruption by way o f comprehensive prohi­
bitions is to be taken seriously, the national law makers are well advised to no 
longer insist on the requirement of a collusive connection between advantage and 
act; instead it should either suffice that the (offered/requested or granted/received) 
advantage was made in relation to the (general) “duties” or “functions” of the offi-
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cial concerned. In addition, the foreground of (attempted or completed) bribery 
should be covered by penalising “trading in influence”.99
99 Cf. infra II.B.6.
100 A s it appears to be required, for instance, in Arts. 419 ,420  Spanish Criminal Code and perhaps 
also Arts. 23 5 ,2 3 6  Greek Criminal Code in connection with Art 2 Law 2802/2000.
101 Cf. Explanatory Report, para. 39.
102 Cf. supra II.A.5.
5. Contingency of bribery on the unlawfulness o f the official’s act
Another gap in prosecuting corruption can result from requiring that the act of the 
bribed official must be unlawful as such; that means that his decision is unlawful not 
(only) due to having been bribed but because (additionally) he breached a certain 
duty or otherwise acted contrary to law as, for instance, by issuing the briber a driv­
ing license although he did not fulfil all requirements for it. If, thus, the granting or 
receiving of an undue advantage as such does not constitute punishable bribery but 
only if  under the influence of the bribery the official is committing an (additional) 
unlawful act,100 then the legal interest to be protected is shifted from the correctness 
of the (uninfluenced) proceeding to the substantive lawfulness of the result. Then, 
however, the prohibition o f bribery would pursue the same aim as the provisions 
violated by the breach o f duty as, for instance, in the case of the unfounded driving 
license the safety o f traffic or, as in case of an illegal tax reduction in return for a 
gift, the state’s fiscal interests. But what is even more detrimental to the efficiency 
of fighting corruption than this unnecessary doubling of identical legal interests is 
that the prosecution is not only burdened to prove the transfer of an undue advan­
tage, but also its resulting in a further unlawful act.
Therefore, the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption was again well-guided in 
leaving it with the (promised/requested or granted/received) undue advantage, and 
not requiring the commission of a special “breach of duty” in terms of an unlawful 
act.101
This must not preclude, however, that a “breach of duty” in return for an undue 
advantage may be qualified as an aggravated case of bribery, as is provided for by a 
number of GRECO members.102
6. Trading in influence
Further institutional gaps in the protection against corruptive conduct must be no­
ticed if  so-called “trading in influence” is not as sufficiently criminalised as is re­
quired by Art. 12 Criminal Law Convention. This is not accomplished if -a s , for 
instance, in Romania -  only the receiving or claiming of goods for influencing a
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subordinate is penalised, whereas the (active) promising or giving advantages for 
such a behaviour is not.103 104 For in order to dry out the “market” for influencing, insti­
tutional precautions must be made both from the supply and the demand side.
103 Cf. GRECO Report on Romania, para. 84.
104 Cf. supra II.A.2(a).
105 A s to the divergent ways o f  penal provisions with regard to parliamentarians see the survey 
supra H A .l(aX ii).
106 Cf. supra II A . 1(c).
Consistent institutions must not only prohibit direct bribery in a “two-person” 
scheme, but also the use of influence by public officials on subordinates to achieve 
results outside the common procedures. Since this “trading in influence” contains a 
higher degree of injustice than a casual incitement, a special norm is advisable. As 
still rather few countries do have provisions against “trading in influence”, Art. 12 
Criminal Law Convention should receive more attention by GRECO members still 
in delay.
7. Corruption in the political sector
A grey area of corruption, not only with regard to its empirical incidence but also to 
the relevant transparency o f the law, still exists in the political sector.105 This situa­
tion is unsatisfactory in particular because the corruption of political representatives 
is certainly a particularly effective instrument in pursuing their own interests. For 
this reason, as also declared in Art. 4 Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, 
filling gaps in the penalisation of corrupting parliamentarians and similar political 
representatives is of top priority in an effective institutional fight against corruption.
>  Loopholes are in particular present in corruption provisions not covering 
elected persons by the notion of “public official”. Thus, if a country, in respecting 
the principal separation of power, does not want to see the legislature identified with 
the executive power by treating parliamentarians as (executive) “public officials”, it 
may fill the gap by special provisions for bribing parliamentarians, as is for instance 
the case in Germany (§ 108 e Criminal Code).
> But even tire criminalisation of “buying or selling voting rights” by special 
provisions can remain fragmentary if  the undue advantage must be o f tangible na­
ture or o f otherwise economic value or, even more so, if  a special “corruption pact” 
or a similar collusive agreement is presupposed.  For if  an advantage is granted or 
accepted after the decisive voting act, without proof of a prior corresponding collu­
sion being possible, the criminal prohibition must fail.
106
>  Provisions of that sort also fail to comprise the subornation o f general po­
litical benevolence by granting advantages without already having a concrete con­
duct of the parliamentarian in mind, although silently knowing that the person con­
cerned will pursue the interests of the briber when the appropriate time will come.
For these reasons, the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, when by its 
Art. 4 obliging the Treaty States “to establish as criminal offence under its domestic
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law the conduct referred to in Arts. 2 and 3 [i.e., active and passive bribery], when 
involving any person who is a member of any domestic public assembly exercising 
legislative and administrative powers“, is well guided in not requiring any qualifica­
tions which, as described before, might undermine the efficiency o f the penalisation 
of corruption in the political sector.
8. Corruption in the private sector
As became apparent in the comparative survey,107 the question as to whether crimi­
nal provisions are necessary for fighting corruption in the private sector is still an­
swered quite differently by the various GRECO members. Although some countries 
are prepared to penalise corruption in the private sector in a similar way as in public 
affairs, there is still a remarkable number of countries that refrain altogether from 
providing penal provisions against corruption in the private sector whereas others 
deem it appropriate to regard private corruption as a phenomenon of economic law 
to be dealt with in connection with special penal provisions against unfair competi­
tion.
107 Cf. supra II.A.3.
108 Explanatory Report, para. 252.
These differences in the political evaluation of corruption in the private sector 
suggest to reflect once more whether the extension o f penal law into the private 
sector, as requested by the Criminal Law Convention (Arts. 7, 8), is indeed neces­
sary as an institutional instrument against corruption. This may appear doubtful as 
the employment of criminal law, particularly in this area, presupposes a balancing of 
individual freedom to pursue one’s own interests, including economic ones, without 
being interfered with by prohibitions, on the one hand, and the legal interests to be 
protected against wrongful impairments, on the other. Thus, the question of crimi­
nalising corruption in the private sector depends on whether this social phenomenon 
is of such gravity as to legitimise the employment of criminal law as the most inva­
sive sanction available.
The Explanatory Report to the Criminal Law Convention enumerates quite a few 
legal interests deemed to justify the application o f  criminal law.108 First, it states that 
“corruption in the private sphere undermines values like trust, confidence or loyalty, 
which are necessary for the maintenance and development of social and economic 
relations”. This is supplemented by the assumption that “even in the absence of a 
specific pecuniary damage to the victim, private corruption causes damage to soci­
ety as a whole”. Furthermore, the protection o f “fair competition” is deemed neces­
sary. Finally, the “privatisation process” of formerly public functions is referred to, 
making it necessary to protect those now privately organised activities against cor­
ruption.
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Although the request o f the Criminal Law Convention to also penalise corruption 
in the private sector shall be agreed with in its result, still some caveats may be 
expressed.
With regard to the interests to be protected, it must be stressed that vague terms 
like “trust, confidence or loyality”, do not pose a solid legitimation for the criminali­
sation of corruption in the private sector since they do not specify the specific cor­
ruption-related dangers for the economy. Compared with this, the procedural ap­
proach to corruption (supra I.C) reveals that the prohibition of corruption in the 
public as well as in the private sector furthers the protection of procedures and the 
confidence of the participants therein. Legal relations between private persons in a 
market economy are grounded on an organisational system in which the pursuance 
of particular interests is tolerated and even fundamental, but limited by the obser­
vance of the rules. These rules -  due to their abstractness - reduce the complexity of 
the multitude of conceivable cases and guarantee the general agreeability of the 
results. The decisive rule in the context o f this study is the prohibition of corruptive 
avoidance of the procedural mechanism vaild for all.
Other reasons mentioned in the Explanatory Report occur as mere reflexes of the 
protection of procedures and are, consequently, o f subordinate importance. As far as 
the protection of “economy” and “fair competition“ is concerned one has to realise 
that these phenomenona are aggregates o f the transactions o f the individuals. For 
this reason, to protect an abstract entity as the “economy” or “competition” requests 
the protection o f the individuals and the procedures they are acting in. Conse­
quently, the prevention of pecuniary damages of enterprises turns out to be a mere 
reflex of the protection of the procedures as well.
Finally, while the protection of the procedures poses the main legitimacy of the 
corruption bans in the private sector, the criminalisation of this type o f corruption 
can also be justified by the theory of the “interdependence o f orders”.109 According 
to this theory all social subsystems mutually influence themselves and their respec­
tive values and maxims cannot be durably insulated against each other. Therefore it 
is not possible to effectively combat corruption in one area while tolerating it in 
another social subsystem. The disturbance o f the private economy and its regulating 
legal order by corruption, thus, has far-reaching consequences for other social sys­
tems such as the political sphere and the administration over the medium term. The 
practical experiences of countries with a disturbed economy exemplify that the ulcer 
of corruption in the private economy forms metastases in the administration if  the 
very same behavior is not fought consistently in these - narrowly interwoven -  so­
cial systems.
For these reasons, not to criminalise corruption in the private sector or to simply 
sanction it by competition law would be a massive weakening o f the institutions 
against corruption.
109 The theory o f the “interdependence o f orders“ was developed by Walter Eucken, Grundsätze 
der Wirtschaftspolitik, 6th ed., Tübingen 1990, pp. 14 ss., 332 ss. This theory requests similar 
and consistent maxims in all social systems, since the economy, the constitutional and civil or­
der are not only normatively contingent but factually.
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9. Sanctions and other legal consequences
The socio-psychological impact o f criminalising a certain conduct is not only con­
tingent on the penal provision as such but also on the kind and weight of the sanc­
tion attached to it and, in case of a verdict, the concrete sentence. For this reason, 
corruption must not only be penalised but adequately sanctioned. If the expectancy 
of punishment is too low, this does not only reduce the institutional effect o f the 
prohibition norm, it rather also has direct influence on the type o f corruption a soci­
ety is exposed to; for the lower the expectancy of punishment, the higher the incen­
tive to a quantitative expansion of corruption in terms of a growing number of cases 
in which public officials may be inclined to expect or even request a “corruption 
fee” and vice versa. A high expectancy of punishment, on the other hand, may entail 
a quantitative reduction of corruption, possibly accompanied, however, with an 
increase of qualitatively graver cases. For the higher the risk of detection and pun­
ishment, the higher the bribe must be in order to be profitable. Although this effect 
may function as an incentive for particularly massive corruption cases with corre­
spondingly high “corruption yields”, the equally rising damages can facilitate detec­
tion and prosecution at the same time, for greater social damages can be detected 
more easily when the non-corrupt ideal result o f a transaction is compared with the 
actual corrupted state.
Therefore, the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, in its Art. 19(1), rightly 
requests “effective, proportionate, dissuasive sanctions and measures”.110 How these 
should be shaped, however, is left open and will, indeed, hardly be definable in a 
general way applicable to all national laws concerned.
110 To the origin o f  this requirement in the jurisdiction o f  the Court o f  Justice o f  the European 
Communities in the (MaisjCase 68/86, cf. Barbara Huber, Sanctions against Bribery Offences 
in Criminal Law, in: Cyrille Fijnaut/Leo Hubertus (eds.), Corruption, Integrity and Law En­
forcement, The Hague/London/New York 2002, pp. 137,139.
I l l  A s sporadically done with regard to Denmark (GRECO Report, para. 102).
112 A s with regard to Malta (GRECO Report, para. 82).
This may explain that the sanctioning systems of the various GRECO members 
are far from homogeneous and why the GRECO evaluators obviously did not have 
the coinage to rate the level of corruption sanctions as insufficient"1 or the differen­
tiation between various bribery crimes as inconsistent.112 At any rate, in general, 
sanctions for corruption may be called effective, proportionate and dissuasive only if 
they correspond to sanctions attached to similar domestic crime provisions. A stan­
dard of comparison could perhaps be established by the sanctions for economic 
crimes such as fraud. Although these provisions are to protect property interests 
against damages resulting from erroneous disposals caused by fraud or other inju­
ries, the motive o f aquiring an undue advantage is similar to that in cases of bribery.
To give some examples o f sanction regimes that might be counterproductive to 
the efficiency of corruption provisions, the following instances from GRECO Re­
ports seem illustrative:
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>  A substantial weakening of the prohibitive effect, as well as a lack of pro­
portionality of sanctions, may be seen in the differentiation between “accepting 
bribes” and “accepting illegal presents” if  at the same time the latter is privileged by 
not being punishable with the deprivation o f liberty.113 Such a differentiation can be 
understood by the parties concerned that the one is more tolerable than the other. 
Even if a clear borderline between “bribe” and “illegal present” could be drawn at 
all, the kind and frame of sanction provided for by the provision should be the same 
for both; this would still leave room for different sentencing in concrete cases ac­
cording to their level of gravity.
113 As it is the case in Georgia (GRECO Report, para. 97).
114 As noticed in Bulgaria, particularly i f  compared to the aggravation o f money laundering in an 
organised maimer (GRECO Report, para. 26).
115 Cf. Explanatory Report, para. 94 in which this understanding is limited to “substitute assets" 
while this limitation can not be grounded on the wording o f  A r t  19 (3 ) Criminal Law Conven­
tion.
> On the other hand, a lack of qualifying certain aggravating circumstances, 
as in particular corruption in an organised manner, by a provision with higher sanc­
tions,114 can also be counterproductive. Even if the continuous and organised com­
mission of the same type of crimes could be taken into consideration in its sentenc­
ing, explicit aggravation by a qualified provision strengthens the preventive signal 
and produces additional impulses against corruption.
>  Furthermore, the strength o f sanctioning can be also substantially impaired 
by a lack of adequate confiscation and/or forfeiture rules. For as long as the parties 
to a bribery are able to speculate on not losing any advantages, be it the bribe as 
such or gains procured by the irregular act, they may take the risk o f corruption. 
Therefore, according to the maxim that “crime must not pay”, any advantages of­
fered, transferred or procured must be confiscated or forfeited. For this reason, the 
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption in its Art. 19 (3) rightly expects of its 
treaty members legislative measures “to confiscate or otherwise deprive instrumen­
talities and proceeds of criminal offences ... or property the value of which corre­
sponds to such proceeds”. It must be noted, however, that the member states of 
GRECO are under no obligation to provide for the criminal law confiscation of 
assets as the words “otherwise deprive” allow for their civil fortfeiture also.115 As 
this institutional instrument in the fight against corruption will be the object of the 
Second Evaluation Round, its result may be waited for. One caveat, however, may 
already be raised here. When it comes to the confiscation of “substitute assets”, in 
particular in cases in which the undue influence was exerted by way o f intangible 
advantages, seizing property that was not involved in the bribery is constitutionally 
perilous. If it shall nevertheless be confiscated, this can hardly be justified as mere 
reversion of illegal gains, but must rather be understood as a kind of (additional) 
punishment, the proportionality of which has to be preserved.
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10. The period of limitation - “Negative prescription”
As stated in the comparative survey, corruption crimes in most countries belong to 
the group of crimes with a relatively short period o f  limitation.116 On the other hand, 
as bribery is the type of crime that usually remains undiscovered over a long time, it 
is astounding to find only relatively few country reports commenting that a quick 
negative prescription of bribery may impede efficient prosecution.117 Against this 
lack of alertness it is to be emphasised that the period of limitation is an integral 
element of sanctioning which influences conduct in a manner not to be underesti­
mated. For this reason, the call for “proportionate and dissuasive sanction” by the 
Criminal Law Convention (Art. 19 (1)) must also be observed with regard to the 
negative prescription since the factual proportionality and dissuation o f sanctioning 
can be undermined if  the period of limitation is determined too generously. Al­
though data collected by GRECO Reports are not comprehensive enough for a final 
evaluation, one must be aware of the assumption that comparatively short periods of 
limitation can engender a structural deficit in the institutional fight against corrup­
tion.
116 Cf. supra II.A.6.
117 See GRECO Report on France, para. 45, also the criticism in GRECO Report on Croatia, 
para. 141.
118 Art. 374 in connection with 364 Portuguese Criminal Code (GRECO Report on Portugal 
appendix I).
119 This criticism is not to say that conflicts o f  interests or a state o f  necessity should be com­
pletely ignored. But instead o f  suspending the corruption provision, resort should rather be 
taken to grounds o f  justification or excuse.
11. Exemption from punishment
Similar to negative prescription, the institutional efficacy of criminal law can also be 
weakened by conceding mitigation or even the remission of punishment. A peculiar 
example o f this sort can be found in the Portuguese provision that the penalties for 
active bribery are “specially mitigated, possibly even extending to discharge, if the 
act was committed with the aim of preventing the official, his spouse [and other 
relatives, including the person with whom he is cohabiting] from being exposed to 
the risk of a sentence or a security measure”.118 Exemptions from punishment of this 
sort are not only invalidating the corruption provision but even undermining the 
entire criminal justice system: instead of stabilising confidence in its functioning, it 
is discredited by exempting persons from punishment who attempt to manipulate the 
proceeding in favour o f their own interests.119
A particularly ambivalent issue is the possibility of rewarding an (active or pas­
sive) briber with mitigation or even discharge if the person concerned voluntarily 
discloses insider knowledge and, thus, contributes to the prosecution of this and/or 
other corruption cases. On the one hand, the expectation of such a reward can func-
51
tion as an incitement to corruptive conduct, i f  one is clever enough to back out o f  die 
affair on time by disclosing one’s knowledge to the prosecuting authorities.120 On 
the other hand, one has to take into account that the mitigation o f  or the exemption 
from punishment is not only to reward return to legality, but may be the only way to 
bring cases suspicious o f  corruption to justice. Consequently, i f  the public confi­
dence in the functioning o f  proceedings and the efficacy o f  criminal law is also 
substantially strengthened by the ability of proving suspected corruption, rewards 
for disclosure or other devices o f  plea-bargaining may be acceptable and efficient 
weapons against corruption.121
120 Cf. also the reservations in GRECO Report on Romania, para. 84.
121 Cf. also infra 1II.A.5.
C. Assessment
Although the comparative analysis o f the core criminal law provisions against cor­
ruption brought quite a few flaws in various national laws to light, this should not 
throw into doubt that the network o f  substantive criminal provisions against corrup­
tion, at least with regard to its “effectiveness in breadth”, is both rather comprehen­
sive and quite consistent. I f  nevertheless the various countries surveyed here appear 
susceptible to cormption to a different degree, the explanation may be found in the 
prohibitions’ differring “effectiveness in depth”.
The discrepancies in substantive law, however, may still be not the only explana­
tion for the fact that some countries (including in particular, Albania, Bulgaria, 
Georgia, Romania and the Slovak Republic) see themselves exposed to a massive 
cormption problem whereas other countries with a similar -  even less developed-  
norm programme consider themselves as being almost free from this social phe­
nomenon (as, in particular, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg). Causes for such 
divergent developments may, at first, be traced to the whole social-political situa­
tion, in particular to the transition o f  certain countries from an authoritarian to a 
democratic state system, governed by rule o f law.
Furthermore, factual differences in spite o f  legal parallelism can also indicate that 
causes o f  poor efficiency in the fight against corruption may rather be found on the 
level o f  practical implementation o f  the cormption provisions. This is the question to 
be turned to in the following.
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III. The Practical Implementation of the Anti-Corruption Laws - 
Status and Deficiencies with Regard to the Guiding Principles 3, 
6 and 7 as Reflected by the GRECO Reports
In accordance with Art. 10 (3) of the GRECO Statute, the First Evaluation Round 
was based on Guiding Principles 3, 6 and 7.122 Although these topics cannot, of 
course, cover the phenomenon of corruption in its entirety, they are both fundamen­
tal and central enough to impart a basic picture o f the procedural implementation of 
anti-corruption strategies and laws whereby also certain structural deficiencies may 
be revealed.
As this study is to be understood also as a critical one, rather than merely repeat­
ing findings in the GRECO Reports, evaluations made here may differ from obser­
vations and recommendations in the GRECO Reports.
Although immunities from investigation, prosecution or adjudication of corrup­
tion, as they are rather generously granted by certain countries, dealt with under 
Guiding Principle 6 (infra C), appear as the perhaps most obvious impairments to 
the institutional efficiency of penal norms, this analysis will start with die topics of 
Guiding Principle 3 (infra A) and 7 (infra B) because both are closely related with 
each other. As far as deficiencies beyond these principles come to light, it appears 
appropriate to take notice o f them as well (infra D).
A. Law enforcement authorities and the effectiveness o f  means fo r  gathering evi­
dence - Guiding Principle 3
In comparison to formal immunities by which, as will be seen (infra C), the effec­
tiveness of corruption provisions can be thwarted in a rather obvious way, weaken­
ing the institutional efficiency of criminal law by organisational deficiencies o f the 
prosecution and other law enforcement bodies is more subtle, although no less per­
sistent. Even though such deficiencies can be of a different nature with regard to 
corruption, independence and impartiality of the law enforcement bodies are cer­
tainly o f crucial significance. This explains that GRECO, according to its Guiding 
Principle 3, expects its member states “to ensure that those in charge of the preven­
tion, investigation, prosecution and adjudication of corruption offences enjoy the 
independence and autonomy appropriate to their functions, are free from improper 
influence and have effective means for gathering evidence, protecting the persons 
who help the authorities in combating corruption and preserving the confidentiality 
of investigations”. Accordingly, in analysing the GRECO Reports with regard to
122 Cf. supra I.B.
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Guiding Principle 3, particular attention has to be given to how the independence 
and impartiality o f the law enforcement bodies and the effectiveness o f  their instru­
ments are guaranteed or by what kind o f  insufficiencies they might be impaired.
1. The judicial system
In principle, the independence o f judges from directives by other state organs is 
recognised by all GRECO members. On a closer look, however, it appears that this 
guarantee can be impaired by structures which allow, or at least are unable to pre­
vent, stimuli on judges and their decisions in a way which faciliates corruption. 
Among others, in particular three critical points must be mentioned:
>  The selection and promotion o f  judges can be used as means o f  soliciting 
“preemptive obedience” or preserving general benevolence. Such worries can arise 
if  judges are appointed by political organs without being guided by clear selection 
rules and without consulting members o f  the judiciary (as described and analysed 
with regard to Malta).  This allows to select judges on subjective grounds inde­
pendent o f the candidate’s merits and abilities rather than according to objective 
criteria. This might rise to an interweaving o f  interests between authority for ap­
pointments and promotions and the judge. A  similar kind o f  danger by political 
and/or partial interests seeping in the selection and promotion o f  judges may result 
from the requirement o f  a positive vote by parliament (as provided for in Slove­
nia).  This can function as a subtle pressure on the judge, if  he does not want to 
spoil his career, to perform his jurisprudence, particularly in politically delicate 
cases, in prejudiced conformity with the prevailing political system. Similar pres­
sures to conformity can ensue from the way in which judges are evaluated, for ex­
ample by a credit system that takes into account not only the number o f  finalised 
cases, but also suspensions o f  judgements by superior instances as well as the opin­
ion of superior judges, colleagues and even prosecutors (as, for instance, criticised 
even within Albania).  This is not to say that the career o f  judges should not be 
subjected to any evaluation whatsoever. Establishing a catalogue o f  certain criteria 
schould not be done for forcing political conformity on the judges but for securing a 
capable and impartial judiciary. The further question o f  what qualities should be 
asked for in such an evaluation catalogue can, o f  course, not be answered without 
taking into account the specific domestic situation, in particular with regard to toe 




>  No less questionable is an election system forjudges by which the candi­
date - comparably to political-parliamentarian election campaigns -  is dependent on 
substantial fund raising for soliciting sufficient votes (as toe GET was concerned
123 Cf. GRECO Report on Malta, paras. 34 ,92 .
124 Cf. GRECO Report on Slovenia, para. 40.
125 Cf. GRECO Report on Albania, paras. 9 9 ,1 5 7  ss.
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about with regard to the United States of America126). Such a system efltails the 
danger that a judge may lose his impartiality -  and with him “justicia” her supposed 
blindness -  if  he, in advance or afterwards, feels urged to answer the benevolence of 
sponsors with favourable judgements.
126 Cf. GRECO Report on the U S A  para. 151.
127 See GRECO Report on Croatia, para. 151.
128 Cf. GRECO Report on Albania, para. 100.
129 The need o f  their independence is particularly stressed by Carlo Federico Grosso, Independ­
ence o f  the Judiciary and Judicial Repression of the Phenomenon o f  Corruption, in: Bemasconi 
(supra footnote 20), p. 285: “It is clear that since corruption is largely a criminal phenomenon 
involving politicians, i f  w e have a judiciary that is independent o f  politics, it is possible, or at 
least easier, to repress corruption. Conversely, with a judiciary (and in particular a Public 
Prosecutor) subject to political manipulation, the repression o f  corruption will be impeded, if 
not totally frustrated.”
>  Negative impacts on the institutional efficiency of corruption prohibitions 
can also result from deficient working conditions within the judiciary. Shortcomings 
of this sort may not only produce a milieu susceptible for corruption but may also 
lower the public confidence in the efficacy of the judiciary, followed by the resigna­
tion of the public at large and a general deterioration of respect for and loyalty to the 
law. For this reason, it is quite alarming when the judicial personnel is understaffed 
and overloaded with a high number of cases and, in addition, is composed of a 
judgeship not adequately paid (as reported of Croatia127). The receptivity of a judge 
for undue advantages in exchange of a favourable decision must rise even more 
when the income of a judge of a district court is not enough to support a normal 
family (as noticed with regard to Albania128).
2. The independence o f  the law enforcement bodies
A position particularly exposed to corruptive temptations within the law enforce­
ment system is the office of the prosecutor, as well as bodies with similar investiga­
tive power. These authorities represent the interface between social reality and its 
criminal evaluation, and thus a point at which influencing the investigation and 
prosecution of crimes of any kind, including corruption, appears most promising.
For that reason, the independence of prosecutors from inadequate political influ­
ence is crucial.129 This worry over an independent prosecution manifests itself also 
in various recommendations by organs of the Council of Europe. In similar terms as 
promulgated in Guiding Principle 3 “to ensure that those in charge of the [...] prose­
cution and adjudication or corruption offences enjoy the independence and auton­
omy appropriate to their functions, are free from improper influence”, Recommenda­
tion Rec (2000) 19 o f  the Committee o f  Ministers to the member states on the role o f 
public prosecution in the criminal justice system in its Art. 11 requires the states to 
take care that “public prosecutors are able to perform their professional duties and 
responsibilities without unjustified interference”. More concrete are the Conclusions
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o f  the 4th Conference o f  the Prosecutors General ofEurope in recalling “the need for 
political authorities to do their utmost to promote public trust on public prosecutors. 
It further recalled that the latter's functions required the recognition of a formal 
statute, on the same basis as judges, ensuring, notably in terms o f appointments and 
career, absolute impartiality on the part o f all its members and effective safeguards 
against any partisan interference in the exercise of their tasks”.130 In systems in 
which the office of the prosecutor is part of the government, the aforementioned 
Recommendation (2000) 19 in its Art. 13 requires a minimum standard guaranteeing 
that “the nature and the scope of the powers of the government with respect to the pub­
lic prosecution are established by law; government exercises its powers in a transparent 
way and in accordance with international treaties, national legislation and general prin­
ciples of law; where government gives instructions of a general nature, such instruc­
tions must be in writing and published in an adequate way; public prosecutors remain 
free to submit to die court any legal arguments of their choice, even where they are 
under a duty to reflect in writing the instructions received; instructions not to prosecute 
in a specific case should, in principle, be prohibited”. In particular, individual orders 
are required to be “exceptional” and subjected to an “appropriate specific control 
with a view in particular to guaranteeing transparency”. In cases in which the gov­
ernment has reserved the right to give orders with regard to an individual case, “such 
instructions must cany with them adequate guarantees that transparency and equity are 
respected in accordance with national law”.131
130 These requirements are also relevant for fighting corruption which, according to N o. 11 o f  the 
Conclusions o f  the Conference o f  the 5th European Conference o f  Specialsed Services in the 
Fight against Corruption, “affects precisely, the holders o f  political and economic power”.
131 This general guideline is followed by various procedural recommendations, as “to seek prior 
written advice from either the competent public prosecutor or the body that is carrying out the 
public prosecution; the duty to explain its written instructions, especially when they device 
from the public prosecutor’s  advices and to transmit them through the hierarchical channels; to 
see to it that, before the trial, the advice and the instructions become part o f  the file so that the 
other parties may take cognisance o f  it and make comments”.
As manifested by these recommendations, politically motivated influencing is the 
main type of corruption that law enforcement bodies are exposed to. As concerns 
“classical bribery”, as distinct from “political” corruption, law enforcement bodies 
seem to be affected in no way different from other public authorities and their em­
ployees. In view of this situation the GRECO Reports are to be analysed with par­
ticular regard to structural deficiencies in the independence o f law enforcement 
authorities from inadequate, as in particular political, influencing.
a) The police
Risks o f corruptive impacts on investigative activities of the police must be envis­
aged from two perspectives:
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>  Due to the hierarchic structure of the police, combined with the (political) 
responsibility of the superiors, inadequate influencing o f investigations is facilitated 
by an organisational structure in which the police is at the same time the prosecuting 
authority; this is the case where the police is not only leading the (technical) investi­
gation, but also empowered to decide on “whether”  the defendant should be indicted 
(as in England/Wales, Ireland, for less grave crimes also in Norway and -  with re­
strictions- in Cyprus132 and Malta133). Yet, also in organisational structures in 
which the police is merely empowered with the investigation without having to 
decide on the indictment, influencing investigations is not precluded. This is appar­
ent in systems where a minister, acting in a political way by definition, is entitled to 
give police officers concrete orders (as, for instance, in Albania134 and Denmark135), 
which holds true no less to supreme political investigators functioning as so-called 
“political officials” (in terms of being removable for political reasons) like, for in­
stance, the director general of the police in France and the highest police officials in 
some German states. In the latter case the appointment to and the remaining in these 
positions depends on political opportunity considerations in which the expected 
conduct in (politically sensitive) investigations can also be taken into account. In 
cases of this sort it does not even matter whether the political influence is in fact 
exercised as long as the decisive police officers may be motivated by “preemptive 
obedience” to the expected conduct. Therefore the mere fact that decision makers at 
the top of the hierarchy are acting politically and entitled to influence individual 
cases, may be considered as a structural weakness in the institutional fight against 
corruption.
132 In this country the investigations are in principle led by the police, though in corruption cases 
directed by the (independent) attorney general (GRECO Report on Cyprus, para. 23); on this 
way, a higher degree o f  independence is at least safeguarded with the latter type o f  crimes, 
whereas with regard to other types o f  crime (politically) partial manoeuvring o f  the investiga­
tion by way o f  the internal hierarchy remains possible.
133 Cf. GRECO Report on Malta, para. 20 ss., 43.
134 Cf., in particular, the influence o f  the Minister o f  Public Order (GRECO Report on Albania, 
para. 152).
135 Cf. GRECO Report on Denmark, para. 41.
136 Cf. also the reflections in GRECO Report on Malta, para. 97.
137 Cf. GRECO Report on the U S A  para. 12.
>  A second entrance for less political than more criminally motivated influ­
encing can result from the structural lack o f an external control. This risk for the 
objectivity of the police can in particular arise in countries in which the police is at 
the same time the prosecuting authority whose decisions are not exposed to an addi­
tional check by a state attorney or examining magistrate. This kind of structure can 
especially be detrimental to the independence of the police if  its investigation con­
cerns a police officer and, thus, is guided by a benevolent “esprit de corps”.136  137But 
also in countries where the police is not at the same time the prosecuting authority, 
in case of investigations against colleagues said “esprit de corps” can tend to corrup­
tive efforts o f impeding the inquiry and leaving suspected crimes unrevealed.'37 
Problems of this sort are accumulating, if  there are areas in which the police is in-
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vestigating in an autonomous manner without being formally controlled by a state 
attorney.138
138 Cf. GRECO Report on the U S A  para. 100: “Generally, there is no formal prosecutorial super­
vision over investigations that do not reach the Grand Jury stage, but, according to the infor­
mation received by the GET, investigators often consult prosecutors.”
139 A s an example among others see GRECO Report on „the former Yugoslav Republic o f  Mace­
donia“, para. 114.
140 A s Albania, Cyprus, Finland, Greece and Slovenia.
141 As described o f  Latvia in the GRECO Report, paras. 4 4 ,5 3 , 58.
142 The French solution may be characterised as a middle course: Although according to the 
principle o f  “unity o f  the national judicial service” the procureurs are responsible to the minis­
ter o f  justice, a political organ (cf. GRECO Report on France, para. 55), there is neither full in­
dependence nor full freedom from political influencing.
143 The German situation is similar to that o f  France; cf. GRECO Report on Germany, para. 31.
144 Cf. GRECO Report on Poland, para. 60, GRECO Report on the U S A  para. 50.
For these reasons, the lack o f external leadership and control of internal proceed­
ings is to be considered as a structural weakness susceptible for corruptive perver­
sions of the investigation.
b) The office of the prosecutor
With regard to the status and functions o f the prosecutor as well, there is a broad 
field of various structures allowing inappropriate influence on politically undesirable 
investigations.139 This risk can be lower or higher, not the least depending on the 
degree of independence possessed by the individual state attorney in a given case 
versus his/her superiors) and, finally, at the top, the prosecutor general versus po­
litical powers such as the government or parliament.
>  The highest degree o f  prosecutorial independence -  at least from a struc­
tural perspective -  is guaranteed if  the office of the prosecutor is constituted as an 
organ holding equivalent independence as the judiciary; this, however, is only re­
ported of a minority of countries.  This type of -  at least formal -  independence of 
the individual state attorney is particularly high if  the powers o f  the prosecutor gen­
eral are limited to general organisational measures, whereas specific investigations 
are performed by the individual state attorney independent o f any superior orders.
140
141
> A sa  rule, however, the office o f the prosecutor is structured in form of hi­
erarchy, integrated into the executive branch and, thus, in the final end part of the 
political power (as in Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, Iceland, Poland, Romania, Spain 
and -  to a certain degree -  in France  and Germany ). This connection between 
the office of the prosecutor and die political sphere is particularly evident where -  as 
in the USA and in Poland -  the Prosecutor General is at the same time Minister of 




if superior political instances -  as the Minister of Justice145 or a politically installed 
supreme state attorney146 -  have the power of not only issuing general guidelines for 
the performance o f investigations, but may even intervene in individual cases by 
means of special orders.147 Such a lack of independence becomes even more appar­
ent when the minister o f justice or the superior prosecutor may decide in a specific 
case whether to prosecute or not.148
145 Cf. GRECO Report on Denmark, para. 50, GRECO Report on Luxembourg, para. 63, GRECO 
Report on the Netherlands, para. 39. Cf. also GRECO Report on Norway, para. 29 where not a 
single minister but the whole cabinet may give orders in single cases although this right seems 
not to be made use o f  (GRECO Report, para. 29).
146 GRECO Report on Spain, para. 47.
147 GRECO Report on Denmark, para. 50, furthermore GRECO Report on the Netherlands, 
para. 39 where such an order, together with the opinion o f  the Board o f  Procurators General, 
has to be sent to parliament.
148 Cf. GRECO Report on France, para. 61 where, despite a legal regulation and voluntary seif 
restraint, the question whether the minister o f  justice may instruct not to prosecute or to termi­
nate proceedings was subject to discussions until recently.
149 A s found in France: “. . .  the former practice and culture o f  instructions is still reflected in a 
certain wait and see attitude on the part o f  prosecutors, who in some “sensitive” cases appar­
ently try to gauge the views o f  their superiors as to the advisability o f  prosecutor” (GRECO 
Report on France, para. 65).
150 Otherwise it may happen, as reported o f  „the former Yugoslav Republic o f  Macedonia“ in a 
certainly very extreme form, that the composition o f  the public prosecution office is “modified 
at every important change that occurs in the political system” (GRECO Report on „the former 
Yugoslav Republic o f  Macedonia“, para. 115).
> Although political partiality can be introduced into a criminal investigation 
by means of orders, this is not the only way in which an investigation can be influ­
enced. More frequent as well as more subtle might be the “preemptive obedience” of 
subordinate officials in a hierarchic setting. If a certain political influence has de 
facto become noticeable, it can still remain effective even if the superior’s power to 
individual instruction has de iure been abolished.149 Without needing a formal order, 
hierarchic structures might also be used for exerting influence by discrete phone 
calls between the political top and the prosecutors in charge and possibly accompa­
nied by internal reorganisations of competences or the seeming “promotion” o f a 
particulary eager investigator to another position. These forms of influencing the 
course or result o f an investigation appear expedient particularly in cases in which 
not the minister personally but the superior state attorney can intervene in an indi­
vidual case and where this official is a political appointee. In view of these structural 
risks of political abuse in systems in which the office of the prosecutor is dependent 
from politics, public alertness is of vital importance.
>  For keeping out political influencing from prosecutions to the best extent 
possible, already the selection and appointment of prosecutors must be performed 
according to objective criteria guided by professional capabilities and merits rather 
than by the political convictions of the candidate. This is particularly important in 
systems in which state attorneys are appointed by the government.150
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3. The possibilities o f  influencing the commencement, continuation or termination 
o f  criminal prosecution
Enormous importance for the effective implementation o f  penal anti-corruption laws 
lies with the procedural provisions by which die decision range o f  the prosecutor to 
pursue the suspicion o f  corruption or to foreclose or terminate an investigation, is 
determined. The greater the discretion o f  the prosecutor, the more easily in­
appropriate influencing, not only for political reasons but also perhaps for “ordi­
nary” criminal motives, can creep in.
>  Procedural structures most easily to be used for taking all kinds o f  consid­
erations into account, including partial or otherwise inappropriate ones, can be found 
in systems in which the decision on the commencement, continuation or termination 
o f  a criminal investigation and prosecution is at the discretion o f  the prosecutor (as 
basically in the Czech Republic, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, M oldavia, the Neth­
erlands and the United Kingdom). I f  this discretion is not bound by certain objective 
criteria, the prosecutor can hardly be prevented from performing an investigation 
directed at, and perhaps prejudiced by, his/her subjectively desired result. This “dis­
cretionary system” also entails the danger that, particularly in com plex and less 
transparent cases, investigations are terminated too quickly or limited to a seemingly 
minor core which, in reality, may only be the “tip o f  the iceberg”.151
151 Cf. GRECO Report on the Netherlands, para. 90.
152 This danger is particularly not precluded where the prosecution office is  hierarchically organ­
ised and o p a l for being instructed by the political leadership, especially the minister o f  justice, 
as for example in Germany (cf. die recommendation in GRECO Report on Germany, para. 89).
153 Cf. GRECO Report on Luxembourg, para. 69.
>  In comparison to this structural availability o f  broad prosecutorial discre­
tion for corruptive influences, the opposite “mandatory system” appears better safe­
guarded by obliging the prosecutor in case o f  sufficient suspicion to investigate and 
indict (as basically in the procedural systems o f  Belgium , Denmark, Germany, 
Spain, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Lithuania and many other countries). But 
this system is also not as safe from corruptive influences as one might assume. In 
spite o f  the principal mandate to prosecute irrespective o f  considerations o f  oppor­
tuneness, there is still room for prosecutorial discretion, beginning with the assess­
ment o f  whether there is sufficient suspicion for comm encing an investigation, and 
ending with the evaluation whether the evidence suffices for an indictment or 
whether the investigation should be terminated. I f  this is even done in form o f  “plea 
bargaining”, the door is also open for considerations o f  political suitability.152
>  The more discretion -  with certainly different degrees in the aforemen­
tioned systems -  is left to  the prosecutor, the more transparency o f  the decision 
making is required. Therefore, i f  the discretionary system  coincides with the inquiry 
files not being accessible to tire public even after the final termination o f  the case, 
this may, in fact, result in a  public information barrier (as, for instance, in Luxem­
bourg153 and, in principle, also in Cyprus154).
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> Similar reservations are also at place within the “mandatory system” when 
investigations are in principle performed secretly without informing die public (as, 
e.g., reported o f Greece ), sin ce in this way the decisions of the prosecuting au­
thority are also kept from public knowledge and control. With regard to corruption, 
secrecy attitudes o f  this kind run the ride of provoking a loss of confidence in the 
propriatness of public proceeding, thus weakening the legal interest of public confi­
dence which in case of suspected corruption is affected irrespective of whether a 
proceeding was in fact inappropriately influenced or not.
15455
> It is not satisfying either if  the decision of not continuing an investigation 
can be examined only within the hierarchic prosecutorial system without enabling an 
external control or review. This is, for instance, the case when the decision of the 
prosecutor general cannot be challenged by a complainant (as in Estonia) or where 
the termination of an investigation has to be reported merely to the President, with­
out conceding any complaint (as in Malta ) . In these cases the institutional efficacy 
of corruption provisions is impaired by the fact that, by denying any remedy, an 
external control o f those decisions is precluded so that corruptive influence can 
remain undiscovered more easily.
156 157
154 Although in Cyprus the police files are not public either, leaving it in the decision o f  the attor­
ney general to disclose investigations according to the -  undefined -  “public interest”, the pre­
sent Attorney General is prepared voluntarily to inform the parliament and the public on the 
reasons for terminating an investigation (GRECO Report on Cyprus, paras. 34 ss.).
155 Cf. GRECO Report on Greece, para. 45.
156 Cf. GRECO Report on Malta, para. 44.
157 Cf. A rt 13 Recommendation Rec(2000)19 on the role o f  public prosecution in the criminal 
justice system.
In sum, with regard to the commencement, continuation and termination of 
criminal investigations, prosecutorial discretion requires transparency and the possi­
bility of external review if  the suspicion of inappropriate influencing shall be ex­
cluded, thus preserving confidence in the institutional efficacy of corruption provi- 
■ 157sums.
4. Operational means for gathering evidence
The fight against corruption cannot, o f course, be won only by optimising law en­
forcement bodies and their rules of procedure. No less important are the operative 
instruments available for prosecuting forces to perform their task. In this respect, 
however, one has come full circle with the independence and control of prosecuting 
authorities as described before. For only if  these forces can in fact be deemed unaf­
fected by corruption and subjected to efficient control, they should be entrusted with 
operative means which mean no less than the physical-technical symbols of en­
croachments on human rights. Therefore, when in die following the lack of certain 
means and instruments for fighting corruption is noticed, this is to be interpreted as 
recommending to install them only if  the legal system and its factual implementation
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of the country concerned is already in shape to employ them without having to en­
counter possible abuse.
As a matter o f fact, the investigative means and instruments o f the police and the 
office of the prosecutor quite often do not meet the needs arising in course of clear» 
ing up such a “discrete” criminal phenomenon such as corruption, which is charac­
terised by a “dark figure” of unreported crimes and of closed groups o f perpetrators 
and participants. The deficiencies in this area are manifold and are to be kept to the 
following remarks.
> Police powers on the operative level are, in particular, insufficient if any 
special investigative techniques such as recording, electronic surveillance, intercep­
tion of communication, bugging and the employment of an “agent provocateur” are 
precluded by the constitution (as, for instance, in “the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia“158). More frequent than this extreme bar is the situation that special 
investigative methods may be allowed in principle, but are de facto  not applied by 
the prosecuting authorities (as reported of Latvia159) or by the courts (as seems to be 
the case in Slovenia160) or are allowed only for certain types of corruption (as in 
Croatia161) or excluded in case of bribery when not connected to organised crime (as 
in Poland162). Although especially the last mentioned restriction addresses the fre­
quent connection of organised crime and cormption, this can hardly justify to re­
quire such a connection as a precondition because by thus making the investigation 
of “simple corruption” more difficult, the fight against consolidated criminal struc­
tures would certainly be weakened. As the existence of organised crime hardly 
comes to light by normal police investigations, efficient inquiries into corruption of 
any kind may for the first time reveal indications o f criminal organisations.
> Most frequent are references to the insufficient legal access to acoustic sur­
veillance. While some countries do not permit phone tapping for detecting corrup­
tion at all (like Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden) or at least not for 
active bribery (as Denmark and -  conclusively - Albania163), other countries allow it 
on certain conditions only (as Cyprus,164 Iceland, Malta,165 Poland166). Similar re­
strictions can also exist with regard to other investigative methods as, for instance,
158 Cf. GRECO Report on “the former Yugoslav Republic o f  Macedonia“, para. 37.
159 Cf. GRECO Report on Latvia, para. 97.
160 Cf. GRECO Report on Slovenia, para. 71.
161 Cf. GRECO Report on Croatia, para. 154.
162 GRECO Report on Poland, para. 86.
163 As special investigative means are applicable only for crimes punishable with deprivation d  
liberty over 5 years (GRECO Report on Albania, para. 40), active bribery due to its lower pun­
ishment is excluded.
164 Where acoustic surveillance, due to constitutional reservations, is made use o f  in rare cases 
only (cf. GRECO Report on Cyprus, para. 25).
165 Where the competence to order this technique is  restricted to the security service (cf. GRECO 
Report on Malta, para. 87).
166 By permitting phone tapping only i f  the investigation is at die same time directed against other 
qualified crimes (cf. GRECO Report on Poland, para. 86).
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with operative “tele surveillance” which in Sweden may be employed only in grave 
cases of passive bribery.167
167 Cf. GRECO Report on Sweden, para. 35.
168 Cf. GRECO Report on Norway, para. 40.
169 Cf. GRECO Report on Croatia, para. 101.
170 Cf. GRECO Report on Malta, para. 47.
>  The employment of undercover agents for investigating corruption is an­
other example of deficiencies: partly due to the lack of clear legal permissions (as in 
Finland, France, Iceland, Luxembourg), partly because this method of investigation 
is permitted only in connection with drug trafficking (as in France). Similarly ques­
tionable appears the exclusion of anonymous informants just with regard to corrup­
tion crimes although otherwise their use is principally allowed (as in Norway168).
>  A further obstacle in the institutional fight against corruption can also result 
from banking secrecy if access to information on the financial situation of persons 




Limitations of the above listed sort in a criminal area, which can hardly be 
cleared up with normal investigative methods, are impairing the institutions in the 
fight against corruption even if  certain encroachments on human rights must be 
taken into account and all the more kept under legal control. Thus, instead of not 
applying these extraordinary investigative instruments for fear of abuse at all with 
the consequence o f inefficacy in the institutional fight against corruption, the prefer­
able alternative must be to strengthen and safeguard the independence and loyalty of 
law enforcement bodies so as to ensure their immunity against the abuse of their 
powers. This in turn, however, presupposes that these authorities and their officials 
are themselves not affected by corruption.
5. Means for raising the incentive to co-operate with law enforcement bodies
Considering the fact that corruption is traditionally characterised by collusive co­
operation and, as a rule, without a certain natural “victim” being directly involved, 
special incentives are required, first, to inform law enforcement bodies about one’s 
suspicion of corruptive actions at all and, second, to make witnesses confirm their 
testimony, if  necessary, before court. Addressees of incentives can be personally 
uninvolved observers o f suspicious occurrences, as colleagues of suspected officials, 
as well as any citizen who learns of a questionable incidence; yet, they can also be 
participants in a corruptive activity who, for one reason or the other, want to back 
out. In analysing the GRECO Reports in this respect, the following observations 
appear noteworthy.
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>  The most basic precondition for bringing the suspicion of corruption to the 
knowledge of competent authorities is, particularly for the public at large, to know 
both to which body and at what place reports or complaints can be made.171
171 Lack and need o f  information in this respect is, in particular, reported o f  “the former Yugoslav 
Republic o f  Macedonia“ (GRECO Report, para. 103).
172 See GRECO Report on Croatia, para. 102.
173 Cf. GRECO Report on Poland, para. 22.
>  As concerns insiders, as a rule, they will disclose knowledge of corruptive 
actions to law enforcement bodies only if  they can be sure that their co-operation is 
more advantageous than disadvantageous for them. For this reason, Guiding Princi­
ple 3 asks for “effective means for gathering evidence [and] protecting the persons 
who help the authorities in combating corruption”. In view of this aim, it is counter­
productive if participants in a “corruption pact”, prepared to back out, cannot be 
promised by the prosecuting authorities to expect discharge of this own criminal 
involvement or at least mitigation to a degree, which would go beyond o f what is 
normally granted in return of cooperative behaviour, after the fact in the sentencing 
phase (as, for instance, in Germany and Ireland), or when rules for exempting from 
punishment are in general limited to the area of organised crime (as in Croatia in 
light of the particular weight o f this phenomenon). In need of optimisation are also 
rules which grant discharge only to the active briber but not for the corrupted recipi­
ent (as in Romania and the Slovak Republic). Contrary to this, optimal regulations 
aimed at revealing covert corruption approach this scene from both the active and 
passive side. For if  the first o f the two parties -  the active briber or the passive 
bribed person -  can be promised discharge or mitigation in return o f  early and vol­
untary uncovering, the awareness of this exclusive possibility can result in uncer­
tainties with regard to the conduct of the counterpart. Speculation on whether the 
other one may use this advantage, nourishes distrust between the parties and pro­
duces rifts in the connection otherwise tied by the mutual advantage and the shared 
expectation with regard to punishment. For this reason, this uncertainty can result in 
a “race” for the uncovering and the exclusive exemption or mitigation o f  punish­
ment In view o f this perspective (based on “game theory”), all legal orders lacking 
any, or merely granting (personally) limited, chances o f  reduced punishment deserve 
improvement.
>  I f  witnesses willing to back out are found, they are to be motivated to re­
peat their testimony in court, with the consequence that their identity might be dis­
closed. In addition to, or instead of, rewarding devices as discussed before, this may 
require protection programmes for endangered witnesses. Therefore, the state not 
only provides insufficient incentives for “drop outs” but also neglects its care for 
endangered witnesses if  efficient witness protection programmes are lacking (as, for 
instance, in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Iceland, Luxembourg, 
“the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia“, Norway and -  to a certain degree-  
Croatia172). With regard to corruption, the result is more or less the same if  witness 
protection, although provided for in general, is not available in case of corruption 
crimes (as in Poland173) or only in connection with organised crime (as in Ger-
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many174). Furthermore, the incentive for cooperating with prosecution authorities 
can also be lessened if  it is known to potential addressees of witness protection that 
these programmes, although legally possible, are in fact only rarely applied by the 
police (as reported o f  Lativa175).
174 Cf. GRECO Report on Germany, para. 89.
175 Cf. GRECO Report on Latvia, para. 110 s.
176 Cf. GRECO Report on Czech Republic, para. 90, GRECO Report on Germany, para. 53.
177 Cf. GRECO Report on Germany, para. 92.
178 Cf. GRECO Report on Malta, para. 94.
179 Cf. GRECO Report on Malta, para. 88.
>  A delaying effect, which may even prove as totally counteractive to the 
willingness of disclosing suspected corruption, can result from regulations which 
forbid public employees to report a suspicion directly to prosecuting authorities and, 
instead, oblige them to contact the next higher superior (as it is generally required in 
the Czech Republic and in Germany176). Even if such a primacy of internal reporting 
may be suitable for “normal” individual crimes within a public body, it appears 
hardly functional with “collusive” crimes like corruption in which mostly more than 
one official, perhaps even including superiors, are involved. Consequently, if  an 
employee, instead o f reporting directly to a neutral external authority, first has to 
contact his superior, particularly in organisations with an examplary “esprit de 
corps” like the police, he can be deterred not only for fear of social reprisals but also 
by the anticipation that his information might anyhow “peter out”, with the result 
that suspicions o f  internal corruption will not be reported at all or merely in an 
anonymous -  and, thus, for evidence purposes less forcing -  manner.177
> Lowering rather than strengthening the incentive to cooperate with law en­
forcement authorities can be produced by not notifying the informant about the 
result of his complaint against a public official (as was observed with regard to 
members of the judiciary in Malta178). Such a lack of transparency can have twofold 
effects: on the one hand, it can further internal decisions directed at a favourable 
result, on the other hand, by not disclosing the result of a proceeding, it can promote 
resignation in the population and weaken the willingness to report suspected corrup­
tion.
>  The question of whether the institutions against corruption are impaired if 
the police is not supposed to commence an investigation upon an anonymous charge 
is less clear. For instance it is generally prohibited in Malta179. The opposite, how­
ever, in terms of a general duty to start an inquiry upon any anonymous report could 
also have counterproductive effects if, for instance, resources are bound by un­
founded information, perhaps even launched for criminal motives. Therefore, in­
stead of using the personal anonymity of the informant onesidedly as inacceptable or 
still feasible, one should rather rely on the meritorious content of the information 
and, accordingly, commence or refrain from investigation.
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6. Coordination of the investigation
More than other types of criminality, investigations in a “covered” criminal area, 
characterised by a high number of unreported crimes and closed criminal circles, 
require quick and effective co-operation o f  the forces participating in the investiga­
tion. Furthermore, it must be avoided that information “peter out” or that crimes 
reach the “period of limitation”.
For these reasons, improvements are necessary where the jurisdictions of differ­
ent investigative authorities, as in particular the police, the office o f the prosecutor, 
and the investigating judge, are overlapping. In these cases, poor co-ordination not 
only leads to a duplication o f work in single cases but also overstresses the resources 
in structural respect.180 Clear signs of a procedure too complex and thus not optimal 
are apparent if  the coordination between the police and the office o f the prosecutor 
have to be based on “good will”, personal connections and even unlucky coinci­
dence rather than on clear rules (as lacking in Croatia and Slovenia181). This is not 
only detrimental to an efficient fight against crime in general, but can also serve as 
an entry gate for corruptive temptations; the possibility of subsequent inappropriate 
influencing may even be strengthened by a high susceptibility of police and prosecu­
tion authorities for (political) pressure within their hierarchic structure.182 Similar 
problems can result from structures in which a comprehensive series o f rules for 
regulating the co-operation between the investigating authorities is lacking, with the 
consequence that too much room for informal and, thus, uncoordinated and vulner­
able arrangements between police and state attorney may remain, as has been ob­
served in the USA.
180 Cf. GRECO Report on Croatia, para. 88 s.
181 Cf. GRECO Report on Croatia, para. 92, GRECO Report on  Slovenia, para. 60.
182 In this respect, the situation in Georgia where no functioning co-operation whatsoever was to 
notice is in urgent need o f  improvement (cf. GRECO Report on Georgia, paras. 105, 119). 
Weaknesses o f  this sort seem also to exist in in Latvia (GRECO Report, para. 90).
B. Specialised bodies and means fo r  dealing with corruption -
Guiding Principle 7
With regard to the aim, expressed in Guiding Principle 7, “to promote the specialisa­
tion of persons or bodies in charge of fighting corruption and to provide them with 
appropriate means and training to perform their tasks”, the analysis o f the GRECO 
Reports reveals various deficiencies.
In general, it may surprise that specialised departments of the police and the pub­
lic prosecution for fighting corruption may not only be missing in countries known 
for a low degree of corruption, but also -  and perhaps even more -  in countries with 
a high incidence of corruption. When these countries, at the same time, are charac­
terised by a high degree of organisational deficits and a lack of adequate equipment,
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it would appear that the causes for this deplorable state of affairs may be found in 
the minor importance attached to fighting cormption by the society concerned and, 
as a result o f that, in the weak political will to counter corruption and - last not least 
-  in the lack o f the necessary financial resources o f  some countries.
Some of the more particular deficiencies with regard to the specialisation and re­
sources of law enforcement bodies are the following.
1. Specialisation and resources of the police and the office of the prosecution
The institutional fight against cormption is already hampered in its basic structure if 
a complex legal, economic and social phenomenon such as cormption is not tackled 
with sufficient and well educated “manpower”.
>  Problems can start with the lack of specialised departments for investigat­
ing corruption, as, for instance, in Greece where all criminal investigations o f what­
ever kind may be led by any policeofficer. This does not only complicate the co­
operation of police and state attorney since no special corresponding partner is 
available, but also impedes a (personal and organisational) centralisation of specific 
expertise.183
183 Cf. GRECO Report on Greece, paras. 2 5 ,42 . Cf. also GRECO Report on the USA, para. 135.
With regard to other weak coordination spots cf. supra III.A.6 with further references.
184 Cf., e.g., GRECO Report on Denmark, para. 47, GRECO Report on the Netherlands, para. 89, 
GRECO Report on Malta, para. 85.
185 Cf. GRECO Report on Czech Republic, para. 50.
186 Cf. GRECO Report on the USA, paras. 78, 143.
> As long as special departments for fighting corruption are missing, there 
seems to be neither the need nor the chance for a specialised professional education 
in this field, and vice versa. This vicious circle must be broken by the political de­
termination to develop special training programmes for fighting economic crimes, in 
particular cormption, since efficient investigations in these criminal areas are not 
possible without specialised police investigators and state attorneys. So far, training 
programmes o f this sort are still exceptional and, if  available, need improving.184 
Without adequate training, investigators may fail even in understanding the peculari- 
ties of corruption, as, for instance, expressed in the comment on the situation in the 
Czech Republic that “the main problems concern the inadequate understanding of 
some police officers o f their powers and the complexity of the issues at stake, par­
ticularly when investigations and prosecutions do not concern tangible goods“.185 By 
no means may high standards of general and special education be lowered in favour 
of increased employment of personnel.186
Theoretical instruction is, o f course, not enough, it must be complemented with 
the practical experience o f investigators trained in corruption cases. Since this can­
not be built up without a certain degree of specialisation, some countries installed 
specialised investigation and prosecution teams within the police (like the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Latvia, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovak Republic, Spain) or
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the office of the prosecutor (Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, 
Norway, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain). Other countries still are lagging behind 
this optimum by not having any specialised or adequately equipped corruption teams 
within the police and the prosecuting authorities (as reported of Albania,187 Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Greece, Latvia, “the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia“, Malta,188 the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden), 
whereas again others pursue a middle course as, for instance, France where school­
ing in fighting corruption is offered, but, different from other types of economic 
crimes, no special units for investigating corruption exist.189  190In as far as specialised 
investigation groups for organised crime or economic crimes may also target corrup­
tion (as in Bulgaria, Hungary, “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia“ and 
the Netherlands), their financial and personal resources would partially deserve . ion
187 Whereas the police subdivision for fraud and falsification and corruption is equipped with 56 
officers (GRECO Report on Albania, para. 70), the newly founded Economic Crime Bureau of 
the Office o f  the Prosecutor General does not have specialised state attorneys (GRECO Report, 
para. 75). Somehow contrary to the existence o f  special police units, representatives o f  the ju­
diciary explain the low level o f  the adjudicated corruption as “a result o f  insufficient investiga­
tions” (GRECO Report on Albania, para. 101).
188 At any rate, Malta possesses an Economic Crime Unit, although only with 28 officers alto­
gether (GRECO Report on Malta, para. 21), which are in charge for a wide range o f  white col­
lar crime.
189 Cf. GRECO Report on France, para. 35.
190 Bulgaria provides 9 officers for fighting corruption (GRECO Report, para. 54), “the former 
Yugoslav Republic o f  Macedonia“ speaks o f  2 police inspectors (GRECO Report, para. 24), 
Hungary reserves 16 state attorneys for the entire area o f  organised crime and corruption 
(GRECO Report, para. 44); see also the critical recommendation in GRECO Report on the 
Netherlands, para. 89.
191 Cf. GRECO Report on Bosnia and Herzegovina, para. 17 s.
192 Cf. GRECO Report on Maha, para. 54 ss. Cf. also GRECO Report on France, para. 90 ss. to 
the Interministerial Task Force for Investigations into Public Work and Supply Contracts and 
Delegated Public Services (MIEM).
improvement.
> Even if the lack of specialised investigation groups of the police and the of­
fice of the prosecutor may be partly offset by special bodies outside the prosecution 
authorities, this cannot suffice if these external task forces have no investigative 
powers (as it seems to be the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina ) or if  they merely 
have documentation functions. The latter seems to apply to the Permanent Commis­
sion against Corruption in Malta which, although performing inquiries into corrup­
tion in the public sector, has no right o f its own to indict but merely reports to the 
Minister of Justice who has to decide on further measures, including the right to 
keep a report secret  Structural schemes of this sort not only fall short of the need 
of specialised investigating forces but may also ensue that unpleasant investigations 
are “channelised” and subjected to political disposals.
191
192
> Certainly, although a positive step in the fight against corruption, the crea­
tion of special Tribunals of Inquiry for the investigation of corruptive occurrences in
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Ireland is hardly optimal if  it entails the exclusion of investigations by the office of 
the prosecutor and thus the risk of losing evidential material.193
193 Cf. GRECO Report on Ireland, paras. 65-70,139.
194 Cf. GRECO Report on Malta, para. 95.
195 Cf. GRECO Report on the Netherlands, para. 92.
196 Cf. GRECO Report on France, para. 51 ss.
2. Specialisation of courts
Beside directly influencing the judicial decision making of judges by corruptive 
means (as described supra III.A.l), the institutional efficacy of corruption prohibi­
tions can also be weakened by organisational shortcomings, as in particular by the 
fact that courts are not able to handle indicted cases within appropriate time and in a 
comprehensive manner (as, for instance, observed in Malta194). An obvious reason 
may be that the judiciary is understaffed. But not less detrimental to an efficient 
fight against corruption may be that the judges who have to deal with corruption 
cases do not possess the necessary knowledge particularly concerning economics. 
Different from normal “street corruption”, particularly important cases, which due to 
their public “signal impact” need to be cleared up, are mostly embedded in complex 
economic occurrencies. For this reason, it appears appropriate, as explicitly recom­
mended by GRECO for the Netherlands, to create specialised panels of judges avail­
able to preside over the most complex and serious cases related to economic crime 
offences,195 including corruption. In these terms, Germany has installed special 
chambers for economic crimes, whereas France provides the possibility of transfer­
ring the prosecution of corruption to special “economic and financial courts”.196
On the whole, however, the GRECO Reports leave the impression that the prob­
lems of fighting corruption are located more in the pre-trial phase, in particular with 
the investigation by the police and the prosecutor’s office. Furthermore, corruption 
crimes by nature require high effort in the investigative work in die first instance, 
whereas specialised qualifications by the trial judges are less vital. Therefore, com­
pared to the need of specialised prosecuting forces in corruption cases, a specialisa­
tion of the trial and appeal judges appears less urgent.
C. Immunities with regard to corruption - Guiding Principle 6
The most obvious impairment of the validity of penal norms can result from grant­
ing immunity to certain persons or with regard to certain types of crimes. This also 
applies to corruption crimes in as far as they cannot be prosecuted for reasons of 
immunity. This concern is also mirrored in the request of Guiding Principle 6 “to 
limit immunity from investigation, prosecution or adjudication of corruption of­
fences to the degree necessary in a democratic society”.
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Immunities, very often based on constitutional recognition, exist probably in all 
countries of the world, including the GRECO members, though in different scope 
and shape. Since exclusive protection against criminal prosecution, strictly speaking, 
contradicts equality before the law, a privilege of this sort in a democracy ruled by 
law requires legitimisation. This can be rested only on treating the office, and not 
the office holder as individuum, as privileged, even if  this privileging of an office is 
necessarily attached to an individual person and, thus is, enjoyed by it as well.
In broad terms, any privilege or exemption from punishment and/or criminal pro­
ceedings could be understood as “immunity”. For reasons of forming coherent 
groups of different types of immunity, however, some differentiations appear appro­
priate, in particular for indicating the different scope and range of immunity regula- 
tions. 197 
>  The category of so-called “non-liability-immunity” comprises cases in 
which not only the prosecution, but even the substantive basis for punishing a per­
son concerned is excluded. This type of immunity which in various countries is also 
termed as “Indemnität”, “irresponsabilité”, “insindacabilitá”, “inviolabilidad” or 
“freedom of speech” is, as a rule, mostly granted to parliamentarians with regard to 
opinions expressed or vote casts in parliament. But also heads of state may some­
times enjoy this form of (occasionally also so-called) “absolute immunity”.
>  The so-called “inviolability-immunity” is less far reaching since, as a rule, 
it merely bars the procedural prosecution while not affectin the question o f whether 
the act should be punished. This “procedural immunity”, also known in various 
countries as “Immunität”, “¡inmunidad” or “improcedibilita”, may depend on special 
conditions and/or be granted only during the period o f time the person concerned is 
in office. Although not completely barring a criminal prosecution (indefinitely or for 
a certain period o f  time), this kind of immunity can also be seen in the protection of 
office holders against certain investigative measures, such as pretrial detention or 
search and seizure.
Considering the impediments that may result from immunities in prosecuting sus­
pected corruption particularly of high-level office holders, this issue found great 
attention in the GRECO Reports. Whereas in certain respects most countries follow 
the same approach, in other respects the national differences may be substantial. 
Key findings include the following:
1. Immunity o f the head o f state
>  Except for Norway, Slovenia and the Slovac Republic all nations provide 
for the immunity of their heads of state.
>  In monarchies such as Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom, but also in non-monarchistic nations like the
197 To the following cf. also “terminology in the field o f  immunity”. Document prepared by the 
GRECO Secretariat for the First Evaluation Round (GRECO Eval I (2001) 50E).
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Czech Republic,198 “absolute” non-liability immunity is granted to the head of state. 
A “quasi-absolute” immunity is granted in Finland where the head of state can only 
be prosecuted for high treason or crimes against humanity.199 This extensive privi­
lege results from constitutional traditions and has to be seen in connection with the 
representative and integrating function of a head of state. Nevertheless, an absolute 
immunity means by its very nature a weakening of the institutions against corrup­
tion. On the other hand, this privilege is concentrated on a single and outstanding 
person who is accompanied by the attention of the public and the media. The ac­
countability to the public controlled by a free press can in fact compensate the effect 
of absolute immunity.
198 GRECO Report on the Czech Republic, para. 77.
199 GRECO Report on Finland, para. 75.
200 GRECO Report on Albania, para. 131; GRECO Report on France, para. 106; GRECO Report 
on Greece, para. 63; GRECO Report on Ireland, para. 115; GRECO Report on Malta, para. 78.
201 Including “ministers, under-secretaries o f  state and other persons taking part in the delibera­
tion” (GRECO Report on the Netherlands, para. 73).
202 Restricted to “opinion expressed” (GRECO Report on Norway, para. 93).
>  All other countries provide for certain forms o f a “relative” inviolability­
immunity. It is remarkable that in some countries such as Albania, France, Greece, 
Ireland and Malta the immunity of the head of state is limited to actions performed 
in the exercise of his/her duty.200
2. Immunities for members of the legislative power
Immunity privileges for members of parliament exist in all GRECO member states.
As a rule, this is guaranteed in two distinct far reaching forms.
a) Protection o f the parliamentarian speech and vote
The connection between person and function in a democratic system is manifested 
by the protection from criminal prosecution for parliamentary acts. Many countries 
have regulations according to which parliamentarians cannot be prosecuted for 
speeches or votes in parliament. The way and scope of guaranteeing this, however, 
differ:
>  The most common protection from criminal prosecution rests on “non­
liability” immunity by excluding the substantive basis for punishing the parliamen­
tary acts in question (as it is the case in Albania, Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, 
France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, “the former 
Yugoslav Republic o f Macedonia“, Moldova, the Netherlands,201 Norway,202 Roma­
nia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain).
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>  Other countries would not preclude criminal investigations per se, but 
would condition it procedurally with the agreement o f parliament (as in Estonia, 
Finland, Poland, Sweden).203
203 Less clear is the situation in Cyprus (GRECO Report, para. 64) and the United Kingdom 
(GRECO Report, para. 71).
204 This need was in particular articulated in GRECO Report on the Czech Republic, para. 95.
205 With the additional privilege that, i f  the lifting o f  immunity has been denied by parliament, 
criminal prosecution o f  the person concerned shall be excluded even beyond the end o f  the 
parliamentarian membership (GRECO Report on the Czech Republic, para. 80).
Immunities o f this kind are hardly questionable since they aim at the democratic 
function o f a parliamentarian rather than his or her person.
b) Additional immunities
Beside the aforementioned office-oriented privileges, in various countries a multi­
tude of regulations can be found which in a democratic system cannot be so easily 
explained with reference to the parliamentary function of the person concerned. 
Therefore, if  those privileges cannot be reasoned by particular circumstances of the 
country concerned. They must be considered as privilege of the person; and whereas 
the protection from criminal prosecution with regard to parliamentarian acts is in­
herently justified by its function, immunities reaching beyond this purpose require a 
particular legitimation.204 Otherwise personal immunities may too easily be used as 
loopholes in the institutional fight against corruption. This is particularly true with 
regard to crimes that might as well be committed by “everybody” and, thus, could 
hardly be considered as committed in the exercise of a parliamentarian’s functions. 
If privileges granted with regard to such crimes cannot otherwise be justified in a 
satisfactory manner, they can hardly be reconciled with the principle o f equality. 
These reservations concern the following immunities (without wanting to pretend, 
however, that the countries concerned might not otherwise be able to provide satis­
factory reasons for still granting such privileges).
>  Most common are regulations which, regardless of the character of the 
crime, condition any formal criminal prosecution of parliamentarians on the prior 
performance of a special procedure, as, in particular, the requirement that the immu­
nity of the person concerned must be lifted by parliament (or a special parliamentar­
ian committee) or by the constitutional court. Regulations of this type o f inviolabil­
ity-immunity exist in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic,205 Denmark, Estonia, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Lat­
via, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia , Sweden and „the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia“.
>  Some countries go farther by not even allowing the commencement o f  in­
vestigative measures against members of parliamentary assemblies without a prior 
authorisation by the pertinent assembly (as in Belgium, Lithuania and in the Nether­
lands). This means that not only concrete measures of criminal prosecution, but even
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pre-investigations with regard to certain suspicions are depending on the agreement 
of political bodies. On this way, the neutral public prosecutor, in his capacity as 
“master of the proceeding”, is substituted by a political -  and, thus, by definition not 
neutral -  organ. Whether such an organ will be able to fulfil its role in an appropri­
ate manner, may be doubted; for if  the public prosecutor is prohibited from any 
investigations, he will not be able to provide the organ entrusted with the decision 
on immunity with reliable findings as they are in fact needed as a basis for making 
the decision on lifting immunity.206
206 See also the criticism in GRECO Report on the Netherlands, para. 96.
207 Cf. GRECO Report on the Netherlands, para. 74.
208 A close intertwining o f  criminal prosecution and political interests may be worried about i f  the 
criminal prosecution o f  parliamentarians is only possible on order o f  the general prosecution 
service the head o f  which is dependent on the president and government (cf. GRECO Report 
on Romania, paras. 3 5 ,7 6 ) and, thus, exposed to political influencing.
209 See also the criticism in GRECO Report on “the former Yugoslav Republic o f  Macedonia“, 
para. 118.
210 GRECO Report on “the former Yugoslav Republic o f  Macedonia“, para. 120, GRECO Report 
on Moldova, para. 77.
211 Cf. GRECO Report on Hungary, para. 71. Similar problems can arise if  the speaker o f  parlia­
ment has to announce the request o f  the prosecutor general for lifting the immunity o f  a mem­
ber o f  parliament in a plenary session (GRECO Report on Moldova, para. 77), thus, giving the 
person concerned time and opportunity for a cover-up.
>  Further privileges can consist in that the indictment is put to the discretion 
of the government or parliament (as in the Netherlands ) or of an official who also 
may decide along political lines (as in Romania ). Even if some countries concede 
exceptions by allowing measures o f the prosecuting authorities without the prior 
lifting of immunity, those exceptions appear too narrow if (as in “the former Yugo­
slav Republic o f Macedonia“) it is required that the perpetrator is caught in flagrante 





>  Furthermore, the procedure of lifting immunity appears deficient in some 
countries. This is in particular the case where a transparent and regulated procedure 
is lacking at all (as in “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia“ and 
Moldova ); but even an existing procedure can impair the success of investigations 
and of prospective coercive measures, if  the parliamentarian concerned is informed 
in advance about his immunity being withdrawn so that the proceeding can extend 
over several days.  Such an interval makes targeted investigation more difficult, in 
particular by enabling the person concerned to take collusive steps to cover up cer­
tain facts or even to escape.
210
211
>  Parliamentarians can also be privileged by requiring a special procedure for 
ordering and executing coercive measures, as in particular detention (as, though 
with differences in scope and detail, provided for in Albania, Belgium, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, 
Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Moldova, Romania, Slovak Republic, Spain, Swe-
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den and „the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia“).212 Compared to this broad 
privilege, Norway provides a much narrower protection against coercive measures 
by precluding the arrest o f a parliamentarian only on his way to parliament and 
during his presence there.213 Whereas the Norwegian approach, as evidently serving 
the protection of parliamentarian functions, appears unquestionable, it is less appar­
ent why most countries grant broader inviolability by requiring a special procedure 
for all cases of coercive measures. In comparison with ordinary citizens, the privi­
leging character o f these procedural precautions favouring the parliamentarian as a 
person emerges especially with regard to the requirement o f an imminent danger of 
escape or a particular gravity o f the suspected crime. For as these are requirements 
which, as a rule, have also to be complied with for coercive measures against any 
citizen, considered as sufficient for safeguarding his or her basic rights, additional 
procedural protection of parliamentarians might not longer be considered as a matter 
of course but, as a privilege, which in a democracy has to be explicitly justified.
212 Similar Portugal with regard to Member o f  the State Council (GRECO Report, para. 82); less 
clear the legal situation in Cyprus, Estonia, Slovenia and the United Kingdom.
213 GRECO Report on Norway, para. 93.
3. Immunities for members o f  the executive power
Whereas immunities of monarchs and heads o f state enjoy a long tradition that was 
later on also given to members of parliament, immunities for members of the execu­
tive power, at least below the level of government, are less common. Consequently, 
in this respect the various national regulations differ greatly.
>  In as far as members o f government (ministers or secretaries of state) are 
concerned, they may enjoy immunity already by virtue of also being members of 
parliament. If this is the case, there is indeed no reason why they should have less 
protection from criminal prosecution than any “normal” member o f parliament, both 
with regard to their substantive “non-liability” and their procedural “inviolability”. 
Consequently, in the same range as described with regard to members o f  the legisla­
tive power (supra III.C.2) -  though differing to a certain degree in various coun­
tries - ,  members o f the government, provided that they are at the same time mem­
bers of parliament, enjoy immunity.
>  A considerable number of countries, however, go further in granting im­
munity to members of government irrespectively of their being at the same time 
members o f parliament (e.g. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Estonia, 
Finland, Lithuania, “die former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia“, the Netherlands, 
Portugal). As die immunity of the executive branch cannot be founded on the func­
tional connection as is characteristic for the role of the legislative power in a democ­
racy governed by rule of law, it is even less a matter of course. Therefore it is all the 
more questionable whether the institutional efficacy o f criminal law, including the 
prohibition of corruption, may be impaired by subjecting the criminal prosecution of
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members of government (as in the Netherlands and Romania) and other members of 
the executive (like “judicial-police officers” in Luxembourg) to special procedures, 
as, in particular, requiring the approval of the government (as in Bosnia and Herze­
govina and “the former Yugoslav Republic o f Macedonia“) or of either government 
or parliament (as in the Netherlands). Particularly in politically undesirable investi­
gations against another member of the government, it may be doubted whether this 
body musters sufficient independence and impartiality for deciding on lifting immu­
nity.
>  Similar doubts arise with regard to the intertwining of state powers used to 
decide along political lines when, in repressing the independent judiciary power, 
members of the government are not indicted in an ordinary court but rather tried by 
a special court, which in its majority may consist of members of parliament (as in 
France214). An example of extraordinary far reaching immunities granted to mem­
bers of the executive can be found in Georgia: In addition to various impeachment 
requirements, provided by the constitution for certain high-ranking officials (as 
members of government, the prosecutor general, the chairman o f the chamber of 
control, members o f the national board), procedural “inviolability” against arrest, 
detention as well as house, car or office searches without the consent of the chair­
man o f the Supreme Court, is not only granted to the Prosecutor General, but also to 
his deputies, the heads of investigation departments in the office of the prosecutor 
and other members o f the general prosecutor board; in addition, several catagories of 
persons (including heads of local authorities) are also immune from disciplinary 
liability.215 The exemption of the members of government and the heads of local 
authorities from disciplinary responsibility according to the “Law on Conflict of 
Interests and Corruption in Public Services” is peculiarly remarkable since these 
persons should be supposed to be the true addressees of this law. Despite recently 
substantial changes, former regulations of Bosnia and Herzegovina hold another 
example o f an extremely wide scope of immunities, since, in personal respect, im­
munity was granted to “all officials and other persons employed by or authorised to 
represent institutions” as well as even extended to “civil action”.216
214 GRECO Report on France, para. 109.
215 For more details to this rather complex immunity regime cf. GRECO Report on Georgia, 
paras. 76 ss., 134 ss.
216 For more details cf. GRECO Report on Bosnia and Herzegovina, paras. 88 ss., 143 ss.
217 Cf. supra in.C .2.
218 GRECO Report on Norway, para. 94.
>  The opposite attitude towards immunities is represented by Norway; in 
strictly restricting immunities of parliament217 the executive and its members do not 
enjoy any procedural privileges.218
As demonstrated by the restrictive position of Norway, the executive power of a 
country is not destined to failure if  its heads and members cannot enjoy protection 
from criminal prosecution when suspected o f a crime, including corruption. As 
distinct from and different from the non-liability and inviolability of parliamentari­
ans who in case o f criminally suspicious conduct can be ousted from parliament at
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the latest in the next election, members of the executive, as otherwise without inde­
pendent public control, should not be allowed to shield themselves from criminal 
prosecution by invoking immunity. This is in particular relevant for the institutional 
fight against corruption.
4. Immunities for members of the judicial power, including prosecutors
The adjudicating power of the judiciary, as in principle independent of other state 
powers, appears particularly attractive for pushing through one’s own interests by 
corruptive means. The efficiency of such efforts may be explained by the fact that, 
as reported of Slovakia, “the judiciary [together with the health care system] is the 
most corrupted area in the Republic” while at the same time “no judges have been 
prosecuted for corruption”.219 Therefore, on the one hand, it is necessary to analyse 
immunity privileges for the judiciary (including the prosecuting authorities), as well 
with regard to possible weaknesses of die institutions against corruption. On the 
other hand, however, to care must be taken o f  protecting the independence o f  the 
Judiciary against false accusations220 and of maintaing the separation of power 
which is fundamental for a democracy against criminal investigations by which the 
functioning of the judicical power could be endangered. This may be the reason for 
immunities of the judiciary to be found in many countries and in different scope.
219 GRECO Report on Slovak Republic, paras. 65, 85.
220 As to relevant experience see GRECO Report on Moldova, para. 79: “ .. .  immunity represents 
an essential protection when carrying out their [the judges’] duties, notably vis-à-vis attempts 
to destabilise them (false accusations, questioning o f  their integrity e x t )  when dealing with 
sensitive cases”.
221 GRECO Report on Croatia, para. 129.
222 GRECO Report on Hungary, para. 69.
223 GRECO Report on Slovenia, para. 51.
>  Very common, although still not granted everywhere, are immunities en­
joyed by members of constitutional courts (as in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Poland, Portugal and 
Slovenia). While all of these countries provide for an inviolability o f these judges, 
some countries such as Croatia,221 Hungary222 and Slovenia223 grant “non-liability” 
or “professional” immunity for the vote casted or the opinion expressed in the court. 
In as far as constitutional courts are entrusted with controlling other state powers, 
including the competence to examine and invalidate legislative acts, their position 
comes close to that of other state organs. Consequently, granting members of consti­
tutional courts immunity for the protection of their state organisational function 
appears legitimate to the same degree as parliamentarians enjoy immunity. To this 
extent, immunities for members of the judicial power cannot be considered as weak­
ening institutions against corruption.
>  In contrast to constitutional courts, judges of the ordinary judiciary (includ­
ing public prosecutors) do not hold a position comparably to members o f other state
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organs as in particular to that o f parliaments. Although, on the other hand, their 
“service for the people” is similar to that of other public officials, their function is 
still distinct since (ordinary and even more administrative) courts may have the 
power o f controlling acts of the executive. For safeguarding this independent func­
tion of courts, many countries have norms by which the criminal prosecution of 
judges is excluded for the votes casted or the opinions expressed in court (“non­
liability”)224 or subjected to special procedures (like, for instance, in Albania, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Republic, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Moldova, 
Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Spain). As a rather unusual regulation Portu­
gal may be mentioned where judges and prosecutors, together with other “holders of 
political office”, are not to be tried by a jury, but rather may enjoy separate trial and 
“the freedom to amend the witness”.225 It appears strange, however, to exclude the 
control of professional judges from that of lay judges, otherwise a desired aim of lay 
participation, just in cases in which external control might be particularly appropri­
ate. In general, judges are privileged in that their detention or indictment must be 
approved by a special instance, as the Supreme Court (Georgia), the Prosecutor 
General (Latvia), a so-called Council of Justice (Albania) or a combination of sev­
eral organs (Moldova226). Regulations of this sort will involve corruptive risks only 
if they are structured in a way that entails the possibility of political influencing, as 
according to the Czech regulation that “criminal prosecution is subject to the con­
sent of the body which appointed the judge concerned (in case of judges, it is the 
President o f the Republic)”.227 In this way -  as in a similar manner also in Hun­
gary228 and the Slovak Republic229 -investigations with regard to any crimes are 
made dependent on the consent of an organ deciding along political lines; this en­
tails the danger that corruptive acts o f judges can be “covered up” by improperly 
motivated approvals or refusals o f investigations.
224 GRECO Report on Croatia, para. 129; GRECO Report on Hungary, para. 69; GRECO Report 
on Slovenia, para. 51; GRECO Report on Spain, para. 99.
225 GRECO Report on Portugal, para. 84.
226 According to GRECO Report on Moldova, para. 79 criminal proceedings may be instituted 
against judges solely by the Prosecutor General and with the consent o f  the Judicial Service 
Commission and die President o f  the Republic or -  in case o f  Supreme Court judges -  
Parliament.
227 GRECO Report on the Czech Republic, para. 82.
228 Here the decision lies with the President “on recommendation from the Office o f  the National 
Judiciary Council” (GRECO Report on Hungary, para. 69).
229 GRECO Report on the Slovak Republic, para. 29.
230 Cf. GRECO Report on Luxembourg, paras. 25 ,51 .
>  Beside judges, state attorneys as well are granted immunity in some coun­
tries (as, in particular, in Croatia, Hungary, “the former Yugoslav Republic of Ma­
cedonia“, Moldova, Poland, partially in Georgia and, even including judicial police 
officers who act under the supervision of the public prosecutor, in Luxembourg230). 
This extension can have a rationale at the level of the state in that the office of the 
prosecutor is part o f the judiciary and, thus, state attorneys enjoy the same inviola­
bility as judges (like in Bulgaria). Where state attorneys are not equated with judges,
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they may be privileged by requiring consent of their superiors to detention (as in 
Albania and Poland) or by not even allowing them to be held criminally liable be­
fore administrative or judicial authorities (as in Poland231). To what extent proce­
dural provisos o f this kind may be detrimental to the institutional fight against cor­
ruption, is difficult to evaluate without further data available. This may explain that 
the privileges of prosecutors did not find criticism in the GRECO Reports. Never­
theless, one must remain aware of the high attractivness o f prosecuting authorities as 
addressees of corruptive influencing.
>  Finally, it should not remain unnoticed that numerous countries which did 
not appear in this categorisation of immunities do not provide noteworthy privileges 
in criminal investigations or prosecutions, neither to judges nor to public prosecu­
tors. This may encourage less “immunity-free” countries to pursue this more democ­
ratic way.
In sum, even if  the existence and extent o f immunities from investigation, prose­
cution or adjudication have their own weight in the institutional fight against corrup­
tion, their real impact cannot be fully evaluated without taking other -  corruption- 
genic or corruption-resistent- factors into account, such as the stronger or weaker 
independence of the judicial system or the better or worse equipment o f the police 
and of prosecuting authorities: the higher the capability and impartiality of the per­
sonnel entrusted with the investigation, prosecution and adjudication of corruption 
crimes and the better the procedural structures of the public administration and judi­
ciary, the less risky is a generous granting o f immunities, and vice versa. The worst 
case, of course, would be if  procedural structures with a high risk o f  susceptibility 
for corrupting influencing coincided with broad immunities endowed to the very 
same tempted personnel. For this reason, the stronger or weaker corruption resis­
tance of a country’s structure should not only be judged with regard to the immuni­
ties granted to certain office-holders, but also depends on factors as have been ana­
lysed with regard to the basic substantive provisions against corruption (supra II), 
the Guiding Principle 3 on law enforcement authorities and the effectiveness of 
means for gathering evidence (supra III.A), Guiding Principle 7 on specialised bod­
ies and means for dealing with corruption (supra III.B). For the same reason other 
deficiencies revealed in GRECO Reports should be taken notice of as follows.
D. Other deficiencies as reflected by GRECO Reports
More or less in connection with one or the other Guiding Principle, the GRECO 
Reports reveal various structural weaknesses in the institutional fight against corrup­
tion, which have not yet been mentioned before. Without pretending to be exhaus­
tive, some particularly relevant aspects in the fight against corruption should be 
brought to attention here.
231 GRECO Report on Poland, para. 131.
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1. The organisation o f the public sector
a) Ensuring knowledge and loyalty to law and professional ethics
Corruptive conduct as a result of a conflict of interests in which entrusted public 
interests are put second to one’s own interests can be fought successfully only with 
the support o f an administration that is bound to law and professional ethics. This 
presupposes that public officials know what they are expected to do or not to do. In 
these terms, Guiding Principle 10 asks for “further specification of behaviour ex­
pected from public officials by appropriate means, such as codes of conduct”. Al­
though this Principle was not yet an object of the First Evaluation Round, some of 
its reports already reveal deficiencies worth to be noticed and improved.
>  A lack o f even the most basic knowledge expresses not only administrative, 
but also democratic shortcomings if  the administration does not entertain a clear 
picture of what licenses, authorisations and state subsidies may be required from or 
granted to citizens, as reported of Slovakia.232 Since corruption is most economically 
benefical if  the offered “public good” is “stolen” by the public official, as particu­
larly in the way that a license fee is fully led into the pocket o f the perpetrator,233 
sources of corruption particularly arise from situations where it is not clear what 
administrative acts must be “bought” by the citizen. Without clear legal authorisa­
tions for encroachments on the rights of the citizen, arbitrariness might not only be 
masked as publicly authorised, but there is also the danger of furthering a system in 
which the fee for an administrative act is raised by an “additional fee” for augment­
ing the income o f the official,234 if  not even the whole fee lands in the hands of a 
corrupt public official.
232 GRECO Report on the Slovak Republic, para. 33.
233 Cf. A. Shleifer/R. W. Vishny, Corruption, 108 The Quarterly Journal o f  Economics (1993), 
pp. 599,603 s.
234 GRECO Report on the Slovac Republic, para. 33.
235 At any rate, however, the Dutch law on civil servants contains some provisions that deal with 
conflict o f  interest, as do also special codes o f  conduct developed by various authorities 
(GRECO Report on the Netherlands, para. 81).
>  But even when letting aside such drastic examples, the public sector of any 
society needs institutional devices that disclose and, in the ideal case, prevent a 
conflict of interests in the fulfilment of a public task. A precondition of such preven­
tive efforts is that public officials are enabled to inform themselves on their duties 
with a special “code o f conducf ’. This requirement is not satisfied when general 
codices of this sort for public officials are completely lacking (as reported of 
Finland, Georgia, the Netherlands,235 Norway and the Slovak Republic) or where
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they are available only for partial areas of the public sector (as in Albania,236 Croa­
tia, Cyprus, Denmark,237 238 Hungary, Latvia and Poland). For giving unambiguous and 
reliable guidance, codes of conduct must not be limited to general admissions of 
“lawful behaviour”, thus, leaving much room for interpretation, rather must con­
cretely delineate the boundaries of legally permissible actions, particularly in areas 
of possible conflicts of interest. In accordance with Art. 13 of the Recommendation 
No. R (2000) 10 on the Codes o f  Conduct fo r  Public Officials™ conflicts of interest 
must be suspected in situations “in which the public official has a private interest 
which is such as to influence, or appear to influence, the impartial and objective 
performance of his or her duties”. A remarkable point o f this definition is that -  in 
accordance with the protective purpose o f corruption prohibitions as defined supra 
l.C - a critical situation can already be created by the mere suspicion o f influencing. 
Consequently, it cannot be left to the discretion of the public official concerned to 
define whether and when a conflict o f interest must be assumed. For this reason, if 
an official becomes aware of a situation which, if  known to outsiders, might provoke 
suspicion of a conflict of interest, according to the said recommendation, he or she 
must be prepared “to avoid such conflicts, disclose to his or her supervisor any such 
conflict as soon as he or she becomes aware o f it”. Therefore, it runs counter to this 
requirement if  a public official is not obliged to announce an economic activity to 
his supervisor prior to taking it up (as criticised with regard to Luxembourg and 
Romania239); for this means that it is left to his or her own assessment, possibly 
influenced by own interests where a potential conflict of interest may arise.
236 Whereas here a general Law on the Rules o f  Ethics is still in preparation, several codes of 
conduct are already available for die state supreme audit, state police, judidiciary, advocacy, 
accountants, medical doctors and nurses (GRECO Report on Albania, para. 43 ss.).
237 Here it is noteworthy that a code o f  ethics for the police was developed by the Police Trade 
Union (GRECO Report on Denmark, para. 46).
238 Cf. supra footnote 4.
239 GRECO Report on Luxembourg, para. 59, GRECO Report on Romania, para. 82.
240 GRECO Report on Hungary, para. 19.
241 GRECO Report on Slovenia, para. 44.
242 De facto, however, this duty seems not to be implemented (GRECO Report on Croatia, 
para. 142).
>  More difficult to answer is the question of whether public officials should be 
obliged to disclose their financial situation. Although a declaration o f  ethics would 
further transparency also with regard to potential conflicts of interest, a duty of this 
sort is so far provided in rather few countries as particularly in Hungary,240 partially 
in Slovenia241 and de jure  in Croatia,242 whereas the great majority o f countries, 
perhaps with the exception o f  high ranking office holders, refrain from requiring 
such a declaration from all civil servants. Interestingly enough, it is not requested by 
the Criminal Law Convention, the Guiding Principles or the Recommendations on 
the Codes of Conduct for public officials either, and this indeed for good reasons 
since the institutional fight against corruption is hardly impaired if  a general declara­
tion o f assets is not required. For such a general obligation would neither strengthen 
the prevention nor the detection of corruption in a significant manner. First o f all, in
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the case of a specified suspicion of a crime, law enforcement bodies are entitled to 
check the assets o f a suspected perpetrator. For this reason, the obligation to declare 
assets could solely optimise the preventive institutions against corruption. This does 
not seem to be very likely since a public official would not pay his proceeds of the 
corruption into his account and indicate it in his declaration. On the contrary, an 
obligation to disclose the financial situation would rise the motivation to invest 
assets in “dark channels”. More over, the few de iure improvements by declarations 
of assets could hamper the detection of corruption in praxi since the control authori­
ties could easily drown in the sheer mass of declarations to be controlled.
b) Internal supervision
Codes o f conduct are o f little use if  they are not -  in terms of “institution” as a unity 
of norm and implementation -  performed in reality and sanctioned, in case of viola­
tions,. Therefore, institutions against corruption are impaired when the duty to in­
form the supervisor of one’s intention to take up a new job only exists on paper 
whilst it is not applied and enforced in practice (as reported of Georgia243). Above 
all, the fight o f institutions against corruption can hardly be efficient without an 
internal supervision programme, at least in areas that are particularly exposed to 
corruptive influencing. Such a programme must not only allow own inquiries into 
suspicious situations,244 but must also take care o f consequences and improvements 
once structural deficiencies within an agency have been revealed.245
243 GRECO Report on Georgia, para. 107.
244 To deficiencies in this respect see GRECO Report on „The Former Yugoslav Republic o f  
Macedonia“,  para. 106.
245 As, for instance, reported o f  the tax administration o f  Croatia (GRECO Report, para. 116).
c) Intra-administrative co-operation
The structures o f the administration of modem democracies ruled by law used to be 
organised according to the principles of subsidiarity and differentiation. On the one 
hand, this produces an increase of transparency and proficiency of the officials con­
cerned and, thus, a higher democratic legitimisation of administrative acts. On the 
other hand, however, the advantages of differentiation and delegation have to be 
paid by higher expenditure o f coordination required for the steering and controlling 
of such complex systems. Thus, modem administrative structures are in danger of 
not keeping its various parts properly interconnected or of losing working contact 
with other areas o f activity altogether.
>  This also creates problems for an efficient fight of crime in general and cor­
ruption in particular. With special urgency in combating corruption, a quick and 
precise flow o f information is indispensable since crimes of this kind can be recog-
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nised only at few structural spots. Therefore all depends on recognising these “lucid 
moments” in order to transmit relevant information and to have them analysed by 
the competent authorities. If  this exchange of information is not performed in an 
efficient manner, the institutional efficacy o f penal norms is necessarily lowered. 
Furthermore, a lack of knowledge in parts o f  the administration can ensue inconsis­
tent results when -  as reported of the Netherlands -  as a consequence o f insufficient 
exchange of information “governmental bodies could grant licenses and subsidies to 
persons and organisations whose ‘honourable’ intentions might be questioned”.246
246 In reaction to this experience, the Netherlands established an information and control authority 
for licenses and subsidies (GRECO Report on the Netherlands, paras. 65 ss).
247 GRECO Report on Slovak Republic, paras. 7 ,3 1 .
248 Probably shared by other countries, the situation in Moldova might prove exemplary in that the 
general duty o f  tax officials to report suspicious cases to the prosecuting authorities is not 
enough to forestall that a tax administration, which is neither sensitised to corruption nor for­
mally engaged in the institutional fight against it, remains uninvolved in and disconnected 
from investigative and prosecutorial activities just like “any normal” public agency (cf. 
GRECO Report on Moldova, para. 75).
249 Cf. also GRECO Report on Cyprus, para. 83, GRECO Report on the Netherlands, para. 88.
250 A s manifested in GRECO Report on Belgium, paras. 37, 46, GRECO Report on Finland, 
para. 97, GRECO Report on Slovak Republic, para. 76 and GRECO Report on Spain, pa­
ra. 117.
>  Need of improvement is also evident if the co-operation at the crucial inter­
face between recognising suspicious financial situations and inquiring the potential 
criminal background does not function satisfactorily. This is obviously the case if, 
due to the general economic-political development, a functioning tax administration 
is yet to be established (as, for instance, observed in the Slovak Republic247). Some 
efforts will also be required if  the tax authorities are still to be made sensitive to 
corruption and wait to be integrated into the fight against it (as diagnosed with re­
gard to Moldova248). But even if single units are functioning in principle, the entire 
system of “fighting corruption” may suffer from a lack o f  coordination and an insuf­
ficient flow of information between tax and finance bodies on the one side and 
criminal prosecution authorities on the other (as, for instance, reported o f Luxem­
bourg and the Slovak Republic).249 Even where these problems are realised, the 
political will to attend them, i.e. to start efficient reforms and to allocate sufficient 
financial means, vaires strongly from one country to the other.250
> A crucial point discussed in many GRECO Reports in connection with in­
ter- and intra-administrative information is the question of whether public officials 
should be obliged by law (and perhaps even sanctioned) in cases of non-compliance 
to report the suspicion of a crime (including bribery) to their superiors or another 
competent authority. Such a duty of “whistleblowing”, however, can have a coun­
terproductive effect on fighting corruption if  any deviance of conduct from nor­
malcy is reported as potential corruption, thus, not only exposing innocent officials 
to unfounded suspicion, but also overburdening the means and resources o f police 
and prosecutors. For avoiding counter-effects of this sort, it would be indispensable
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to clearly define the types o f  deviances and suspicious circumstances which may 
give cause to report.
>  With these preconditions and restrictions in mind, a  duty to report one’s 
suspicion o f  corruption can be an appropriate device o f  fighting it, as it is provided 
for in one way or the other for public officials in Albania,251 Bosnia and Herzego­
vina,252 Bulgaria,253 Croatia,254 Denmark,255 Estonia,256 France,257 Georgia,258 
Greece,259 Luxembourg,260 Portugal,261 USA262 and partially in Hungary,263 „the 
former Yugoslav Republic o f  Macedonia“,264 Moldova,265 the Netherlands,266 Slo­
venia,267 Romania,268 furthermore as a disciplinary obligation in Poland269 and as a 
non-statutory obligation in a Code o f Conduct in the United Kingdom,270 or even for 
all citizens in Albania271, Bulgaria272, Cyprus, 273 Georgia274, Spain275 and partially in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina276, Croatia,277 the Netherlands278, Romania279 and Slove­
nia280. Such an all-encompassing approach makes clear that reporting suspicious 
conduct is not only a  matter o f  smooth intra-administrative co-operation but an im­
portant component o f  professional and social obligation.
251 GRECO Report on Albania, para. 48 ,83 .
252 GRECO Report on Bosnia and Herzegovina, para. 58.
253 GRECO Report on Bulgaria, para. 77.
254 GRECO Report on Croatia, para. 85.
255 GRECO Report on Denmark, para. 64.
256 GRECO Report on Estonia, para. 39.
257 GRECO Report on France, para. 80.
258 GRECO Report on Georgia, para. 69.
259 GRECO Report on Greece, para. 44.
260 GRECO Report on Luxembourg, para. 29.
261 GRECO Report on Portugal, paras. 65 ,112.
262 Regarding federal public officials GRECO Report on the USA, para. 22.
263 GRECO Report on Hungary, para. 60.
264 GRECO Report on „the former Yugoslav Republic o f  Macedonia“, para. 65.
265 GRECO Report on Moldova, paras. 67 ,77 .
266 GRECO Report on the Netherlands, para. 10
267 GRECO Report on Slovenia, para. 43.
268 GRECO Report on Romania, para. 78.
269 In Poland, no legal duty to report cases o f  corruption exists, but the failure to do so can be 
interpreted as a breach o f  duty and cause disciplinary measures, cf. GRECO Report on Poland, 
para. 88
270 GRECO Report on the United Kingdom, para. 24.
271 GRECO Report on Albania, para. 83.
272 GRECO Report on Bulgaria, para. 77.
273 GRECO Report on Cyprus, para. 23 (footnote 10).
274 GRECO Report on Georgia, para. 69.
275 GRECO Report on Spain, para. 84.
276 GRECO Report on Bosnia and Herzegovina, para. 58.
277 GRECO Report on Croatia, para. 85.
278 GRECO Report on the Netherlands, para. 10.
279 GRECO Report on Romania, para. 78.
280 GRECO Report on Slovenia, para. 43.
83
>  From this point o f  view, it must appear as a deficiency if  any duty to report 
suspicion o f  a crime is either lacking (as generally in Finland281 and Norway282) or 
not sufficiently clear (as in Cyprus283). Improvements are also needed when duties to 
inform appear inconsistent (as in the Netherlands284) or limited to certain areas (as, 
for instance, in Germany285). The latter way is particularly questionable where po­
lice officers (as in Iceland) or, for example, officials o f  the building and finance 
administration (as in all countries without a specific duty to report indications of 
crimes) are exempted from a duty to report.
281 GRECO Report on Finland, paras. 60 ,73 .
282 GRECO Report on Norway, para. 69.
283 GRECO Report on Cyprus, para. 80.
284 GRECO Report on the Netherlands, paras. 83 s.
285 GRECO Report on Germany, para. 53.
286 GRECO Report on Bosnia and Herzegovina, para. 137. Cf. also the analysis o f  weaknesses in 
GRECO Report on Hungary, para. 76.
287 GRECO Report on Albania, para. 113; GRECO Report on Lithuania, para. 108; GRECO 
Report on Romania, para. 94; GRECO Report on Sweden, para. 127.
288 GRECO Report on Germany, para. 66.
d) Public procurement
In this area incentives for corruptive influencing are high on both sides: The active 
briber will prevail over a competitor, the passively bribed has the power to follow 
this wish and, thus, the possibility o f  pursuing one’s own rent-seeking. A public 
procurement not only conjures the danger o f  a classical bribery, with an active and a 
passive participant; public proceedings are similarly susceptible for submission 
agreements between bidders. As it is typical for collusions in these cases that the 
bidder taking second place this time will be rewarded by being the first next time, 
the inappropriate influencing o f  the proceeding is to be considered as corruptive. For 
preventing this, it is necessary to regulate the procedures o f public procurement in a 
transparent, objective and reversible manner. In view o f this aim, a considerable 
number o f  deficiencies are revealed in the GRECO Reports:
>  In some countries the whole regulation o f  public procurement has been 
found in need o f improvement (as particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina286). This 
can be partly explained by the fact that this legal field is a novel one even for well 
developed west European countries and all the more difficult to implement in coun­
tries in transition. More special deficiencies have been found in lacking resources 
and insufficient organisation o f  supervisory bodies (as, for instance, in Albania, 
Lithuania, Romania and to a certain degree in Sweden)287 or in the lack o f  exchange 
of information on the misconduct o f  competitors between procurement authorities 
(as in Germany288). Other deficiencies concern the possibility o f  complaints against 
intransparent or inappropriately performed procurement proceedings. In this respect, 
Lithuania has not only problems with finding competent personnel for the control
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commission, but also burdens the complainant to pay a fee of examination in ad­
vance and with losing it in case of failure, thus demotivating the initiations of a 
control procedure.289
>  But even where the legal provisions for correct procurement proceedings 
appear satisfactory, their efficient implementation into practice can be impaired if 
public officials in charge, due to a lack of adequate education, are not able to recog­
nise irregularities in procurement proceedings and, thus, will also miss possible 
connections with corruption (as observed in Latvia).290 Other weaknesses can result 
from the lack of appropriate supervision in public procurement procedures (as ob­
served in Sweden) and o f adequate sanctioning programmes if procurement guide­
lines are violated.291
e) Supervisory bodies -  Audit authority
According to the principles of checks and balances, public administrations must 
(also) be under the control o f external authorities. This is especially important for 
administrative areas that, such as license authorities, are particularly susceptible to 
corruptive influencing.292 This supervisory function is best safeguarded if exercised 
by independent bodies as, in particular, audit authorities, which on a more or less 
regular basis examine fiscal activities of the executive, irrespective of a concrete 
suspicion of corruption. For not being limited in their scope of examination by the 
executive authority to be examined and, thus, for not being “kept out” of sensitive 
areas, independence o f audit authorities, comparably to that of courts, is of crucial 
significance. This requirement is still not satisfactorily implemented everywhere as 
revealed in some GRECO Reports:
>  The independence remains incomplete, if, for instance, the terms of em­
ployment and pay of municipal auditors lies in the responsibility o f  the cities’ execu­
tives (as observed in a German state293).
>  The jurisdiction o f the audit authority can additionally, for instance, be in­
appropriately limited if  its examination power ends just where political parties may 
be involved in financial transactions (as observed o f Cyprus294).
>  Further impairments can result from a lack of well trained personnel (Esto­
nia295), necessary control tools (Slovak Republic296) or technical equipment (Alba­
nia297). Deficiencies of this sort cannot only entail negative effects on the independ-
289 GRECO Report on Lithuania, paras. 110.
290 GRECO Report on Latvia, para. 112.
291 GRECO Report on Sweden, paras. 123, 127, 128.
292 See GRECO Report on Malta, para. 90.
293 GRECO Report on Germany, para. 101.
294 GRECO Report on Cyprus, para. 46.
295 GRECO Report on Estonia, para. 75.
296 GRECO Report on Slovak Republic, para. 78.
297 GRECO Report on Albania, para. 126.
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ence and correctness of the examination298 but -  in connection with short periods of 
limitation -  can also cause undiscovered cases of corruption in public procurement 
to remain unsanctioned (as observed in France299).
298 Cf. GRECO Report on Estonia, para. 75.
299 GRECO Report on France, para. 138.
300 Cf. to the extent and the problems o f  “political corruption” GRECO Report on Georgia, 
para. 29 (“parliamentary mandates are used for lobbying private interests and avoiding respon­
sibility for corruption and other offences“); cf. as well GRECO Report on „the former Yugo­
slav Republic o f  Macedonia“, para. 99); GRECO Report on Hungary, para. 75; GRECO Re­
port on Spain, para. 14.
301 Cf. httpy/portal.coe.ge/downloads/REC%20(2003)4.en.pdf.
2. Funding of political parties
One of the most attractive ways to get one’s own particular interests through is the 
influencing of persons and institutions sitting in the powerhouse of politics.300 This 
applies to political parties, including their members in general and parliamentarians 
in particular. Whereas influencing members of parliament and similar elected repre­
sentatives is mostly covered by general and/or special bribery provisions (dealt with 
supra II.A.l(a)(ii)), other forms of “financing of politics” are more difficult to be 
controlled by criminal law: first, because political sponsoring very often is not (yet) 
directed to a specific decision favourable for the sponsor; second, because money 
given to parties is not so easily traceable to a certain act or decision o f a public offi­
cial or a parliamentarian representative. This is not surprising, however, since cor­
mption of and by means of political parties functions differently: by generating 
benevolence through donations which in turn will influence the political course of 
the party and/or decisions o f public officials or parliamentarians who are either party 
members themselves or closely connected with or dependent on party members. For 
these and other reasons, not the least in view o f the unequal availability o f assets to 
be donated, it is more and more deemed necessary to take political financing under 
public control. With which aim and on what way this could be done was recently 
proclaimed by the Council o f Europe in its Recommendation Rec(2003)4 on com­
mon rules against corruption in the funding o f  political parties and electoral cam­
paigns.301 According to its Art. 1, “the state and its citizen are both entitled to sup­
port political parties”, whereas “state support should be limited to reasonable contri­
bution”, supplemented by Art. 3 which stresses the need “to ensure transparency of 
donations and to avoid secret donations”. Although these recommendations have not 
yet been available when the First Evaluation Round was started, the GRECO Re­
ports already addressed this issue, however, without going into details. Therefore 
only a few observations can be made in this respect
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>  So far, most GRECO members lack a comprehensive and consistent regula­
tion of political financing (like, for instance, Luxembourg).302
>  Contrary to this, rather comprehensive legislation and donations to parties 
is, for instance, reported o f countries such as the United Kingdom, Ireland and Ger­
many.  The legislation in the United States, where private sponsoring is the deci­
sive financial factor of election campaigns, tries to confine the influence of eco­
nomic power on politics by imposing quantitative limits on the amounts that indi­
viduals and political committees may contribute to political parties and by 
prohibiting contributions from treasury assets of corporations, labour organisations, 
banks and government contractors.  Moreover, the public can form an opinion of 
the (independence o f their candidates as they are required to file detailed reports 
on the contribution they receive and have to disclose their personal financial situa­





302 GRECO Report on Luxembourg, para. 59; similar situation in Croatia (GRECO Report on 
Croatia, para. 167), Cyprus (GRECO Report on Cyprus, para. 69), Greece (GRECO Report on 
Greece, para. 67), Iceland (GRECO Report on Iceland, para. 13), and also in France where the 
normative situation is described as “ramshakle” (GRECO Report on France, para. 14).
303 GRECO Report on Ireland, para. 81; GRECO Report on Germany, para. 57; GRECO Report 
on the United Kingdom, para. 23.
304 GRECO Report on the USA, para. 26.
305 GRECO Report on the USA, paras. 24 ,26 .
306 GRECO Report on France, paras. 92 ss.; cf. also GRECO Report on Greece, para. 59; GRECO 
Report on Estonia, para. 62 (“declaration o f  economic interests”); GRECO Report on the U SA  
para. 24.
307 GRECO Report on France, para. 94, footnote 25.
308 GRECO Report on Belgium para. 12; to similar problems see GRECO Report on Estonia, 
para. 68 (“not working properly”); GRECO Report on Finland, para. 59 (“no regular inspec­
tions are made to check the accurancy...and no sanctions are imposed in case o f  failure to 
comply with the obligations”); GRECO Report on Moldova, para. 90; GRECO Report on 
Norway, para. 67.
>  Other countries, in order to secure the confidence in the independence of 
politicians and to avoid conflicts of interests, require the members of parliament and 
government as well as presidents and councillors or regional and department coun­
cils and mayors to disclose their assets and incomes, as in France, to a “Transpar­
ency in Public Life Commission”.306
>  But even where this or that kind of regulations for political financing exist, 
the practical implementation can need improvement because, as has been com­
plained particularly in France, the controlling agency has no investigative powers as 
such, thus, not being able to control the substance and truthfulness of declarations.307 
A merely symbolic function seems to have the duty o f  Belgian civil servants to 
submit a list of their offices, duties and professions and to declare their assets, since 
this act o f 1995 is still lacking the necessary instruments for implementation.308
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3. Role o f the media -  Access to information
An important component in the fight of institutions against corruption is represented 
by the media. The media guards social and political developments and creates a 
forum in which the public can discuss topics of concern as for instance political 
corruption. These functions are, however, linked to essential prerequisites: in an 
open and pluralistic society the media has to be free from decisive political and 
economic influence and requires access to information. While restrictive access to 
official files is an important obstacle for the functioning of the media,309 transpar­
ency favours the necessary scrutiny by the media and the public to an extent that the 
media and the public prove to be true institutions against corruption. If, as an exam­
ple, Finland stands out as the least corrupt country in the world, this is not the least 
due to the active role of the media in searching and disseminating information on 
mismanagement, irregularities and suspicious activities in society.310 This important 
function o f the media in the fight against corruption cannot be efficiently realised if 
it is not given free access to official data and occurrences, though with due respect 
to the citizens’ rights of privacy. In this regard, the Finnish Constitution311 and sub­
constitutional legislation in the USA (especially the “Freedom o f Information 
Act”)312 grant, in principle, the right to obtain access to every single official record 
with only limited exceptions.313
309 Cf. GRECO Report on Lithuania, para. 23.
310 GRECO Report on Finland, para. 15.
311 Art. 12, par. 2 o f  the Constitution o f  Finland: “Documents and recordings in the possession of 
the authorities are public, unless their publication has for compelling reasons been specifically 
restricted by an A ct Everyone has the right o f  access to public documents and recordings” 
(GRECO Report on Finland, para. 16).
312 GRECO Report on the USA, paras, 29 ,131.
313 Cf. as well the Law on Free Access on Information in Bosnia and Herzegovina, GRECO 
Report on Bosnia and Herzegovina, para. 86.
4. Proactive strategies
As it is with any complex social phenomenon, corruption is the type o f crime which 
can hardly be repressed by a simple criminal prohibition; it rather requires a diversi­
fied programme o f instruments for combating it. Therefore the GRECO Reports had 
also to deal with the question o f a coordinated programme of anti-corruption strate­
gies. As documented in the compilation o f GRECO Recommendations and Observa­
tions (infra IV), a great deal remains to be done. In particular, the following findings 
appear noteworthy.
> The most basic result is that a considerable number of GRECO member states 
still lack a coordinated and comprehensively satisfying programme o f anti­
corruption strategies. This applies to Bulgaria, Finland, Georgia, Greece, Latvia, 
“the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia“, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
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Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and USA. This may be examplified by the Nor­
wegian evaluation that “cases stemming from the public sector have only been dis­
covered purely by chance by public supervisory bodies, and that some private sector 
entities prefer to handle possible corruption cases internally”.314 This state of affairs, 
however, is merely the apparent manifestation of underlying deficiencies.
314 GRECO Report on Norway, para. 111.
315 GRECO Report on France, para. 104.
316 GRECO Report on the Netherlands, para. 89.
317 GRECO Report on the Slovak Republic, para. 32.
318 GRECO Report on Albania, para. 138, GRECO Report on Estonia, paras. 102, 106; see also 
GRECO Report on Hungary, para. 74 with reference to certain “remuneration” in the health 
care sector.
>  One of the main reasons for this unsatisfactory situation must be seen in the 
fact that the authorities questioned by the GRECO Evaluation Team, as well as the 
public at large, still lack sufficient awareness o f the corruption problem. This is 
particularly true with regard to smaller countries, which see their own society as free 
from corruption. Very often a small number of investigations is used per se as indi­
cating that corruption in general presents “no problem” (as widely assumed in Ice­
land, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands); another way of ignoring the problem 
is not to pay attention to corruptive tendencies in the private sector (as in France315). 
Occasionally, the need of an anti-corruption strategy is even expressly denied (as by 
Luxembourg). This self-confidence, however, could as well be a fallacy: if not a 
sufficient number o f well trained investigators against corruption is employed, the 
majority of corruption cases inevitably cannot come to public light,316 with the con­
sequence that sensitising the public at large cannot be reached. As soon, however, as 
by way of information on the dangers and phenomona of corruption and proactive 
efforts o f the investigating authorities the public at large have been freed from the 
“veil of ignorance”, the fallacious illusion o f domestic non-existence of corruption 
problems will dwindle and the alertness for indications of corruption will rise.
>  Lack o f public activity against corruption is even more problematic where 
its existence is neither unknown nor denied, but where, to the contrary, society is 
reacting with resignation (as reported of the Slovak Republic317) or even with toler­
ance (as it seems to be the case in Albania and Estonia)318. Both are worrying indica­
tors of failing general-preventive measures, due to obvious flaws in creating an 
adequate awareness o f the corruption problem within the general population.
>  The public “veil of ignorance” of the dangers and phenomena of corruption 
mentioned before, can easily be connected with and traced back to another weakness 
in the institutional fight against corruption. Much too often empirical data and scien­
tific studies to the potential and/or actual susceptibility of a society for corruption 
are lacking (as observed with regard to Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, France, Georgia, 
Greece, Ireland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Spain). This defi­
ciency is not only weakening the awareness o f corruptive symptoms in the public at 
large, but also prevents the political decision makers from recognising the need of 
taking action, being caught in the vicious circle in which due to the lack of empirical
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investigations, only a small number of corruption cases will be detected, which, in 
turn, does not call for bigger resources for gaining and disseminating information. 
Thus, the assumption that corruption is not an issue presents itself as a discretionary 
contention. In this vicious circle, smaller and therefore more transparent societies 
are no less susceptible for circumventing procedural rules and granting privileges (as 
has been possibly underestimated in Iceland, Ireland or Luxembourg):319 Further­
more, by not knowing or disclosing the actual number of corruption investigations 
and indictments, the executive foregoes the chance of counteracting the sometimes 
prevailing impression of the judiciary deeply being influenced by economic groups 
and political authorities,320 and to regain the confidence of the public. For this rea­
son, heeding and attending rather than ignoring the phenomenon o f corruption is 
needed.
319 With far reaching personal familiarity, the chances o f  persuing own interests outside the rules 
increases.
320 As, for instance, assumed in GRECO Report on France, para. 10.
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IV. Compilation of the GRECO-Recommendations and Observations 
in the First Evaluation Round
The above documented particular and structural deficiencies constitute the back­
ground of national and international efforts to improve institutions against corrup­
tion. GRECO has two instruments to further national improvements: recommenda­
tions (A) with regard to particular points of concern the GRECO members have to 
comply with and to report on within a given period,321 and -  less formal - observa­
tions (B) the GRECO members concerned may take into consideration for im­
provements.
A. Recommendations
In total, the 34 GRECO Reports of the First Evaulation Round adopted so far con­
tain 413 recommendations, swaying between 3 (Iceland) and 25 (Georgia).
Although the individual recommendations strictly reflect the specific situation in 
the evaluated country, most o f them can be abstracted from their national back­
ground and transferred to other countries, especially to those which are characterised 
by comparably social circumstances.
Methodologically, this compilation is organised as follows: first, in order to con­
vey a comparative survey on what recommendations for which country have been 
made, the recommendations about the same topic contained in the various GRECO 
Reports have been summarised along the Guiding Principles 3, 7 and 6 (in a similar 
sequence as analysed in the preceding chapters) as well as supplemented with the 
names of those countries the relevant recommendations were given to; second, with 
regard to the contents o f the recommendations, as a rule they are quoted in their 
original terms; third, to avoid redundancies, not every single recommendation which 
is of the same or comparable content as recommendations already included in the 
compilation is explicitly listed; fourth, recommendations which reflect national 
particularities that cannot, under any circumstance, be abstracted and transferred to 
other countries, appeared as dispensable and therefore are not included here.
321 For details to this recommendation and compliance procedure see Statute o f  GRECO Art. 15 
(6) and the GRECO Rules o f  Procedure 29 (5) and 30-33.
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As to Guiding Principle 3: GRECO recommended with regard to
1. the appointment of judges and prosecutors
> to continue the efforts to enhance the merit-based selection of members of 
judicial bodies at all territorial levels, including the lower ones (Bosnia and Herze­
govina); to create clearly defined conditions and examination procedures for the 
appointment of all new candidates to the Public Prosecution Office and to the Courts 
valid equally to both prosecutors and judges; to undertake all necessary measures to 
reduce the risk o f any interference in the process of nomination of prosecutors and 
judges (“the former Yugoslav Republic o f  Macedonia“, with regard to prosecutors 
also Slovenia);
>  to use the Commission for the Administration o f Justice in its advisiory ca­
pacity on appointments to the post concerned in the judiciary, thus contributing to 
the objectivity of appointments (Malta, and comparably Slovakia).
2. the judiciary
>  that the reform of the judicial system be carried out as a matter o f urgency 
and that the judiciary strengthens its independence vis-à-vis the political power, and 
that measures be taken to improve the disciplinary procedure with a view to ensur­
ing impartiality (Slovakia); in order to better guarantee the necessary independence 
for the judicial bodies responsible for judging corruption offences, the authorities 
should introduce the legislative reforms to restrict the Minister o f Justice’s powers 
to intervene in the supervision of judges, and to provide guarantees with regard to 
the immovability o f the judges at the Supreme Court, without affecting the possibil­
ity of placing a time restriction on the post of president or deputy president of this 
court (Romania);
>  that the US authorities promote a public policy discussion with the partici­
pation of all interested parties, addressing the process o f  selection o f Federal judges 
with a view to enhancing the efficient functioning o f the judicial process (USA);
>  to reconsider the evaluation system of judges, in order to develop an ac­
countability mechanism of the judges without undue interference with their inde­
pendence and impartiality (Albania);
>  to improve the system for supervision of court management and judicial 
disciplinary proceedings with regard to the need o f independence o f the judiciary, 
and to subject the management of the courts to the supervision of an independent 
and impartial body (Lithuania);
>  to design and implement a national plan in co-operation with all the stake­
holders to address the problem of the overburdening o f courts (Croatia); to signifi­
cantly increase the means allocated to the courts in order to improve their function-
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ing (Latvia, Slovakia); to improve the conditions o f judges, and to guarantee judges 
satisfactory legal and financial status (Latvia);
>  to create a culture o f  morality in the judiciary notably by adopting a Code 
of Ethics for judges and increasing internal control among judges and restore the 
social image of judges by eliminating those judges that are corrupt (Slovakia); to 
oblige judges to disclose annually their property and income to an appropriate body 
(Slovakia); to ensure that declaration of assets and background security checks be 
extended to all judges investigating and adjudicating anti-corruption-unit cases and 
that the introduction of a requirement for the declaration of assets for all prosecutors 
and all judges be considered (Croatia);
>  that, in cases o f corruption, where the Commission for the Administration 
of Justice recommends dismissal [of a judge], the decision be made known to the 
public, and in cases where the Commission does not recommend dismissal, the 
complainant is made aware o f this decision, and that said Commission makes appro­
priate changes to the Code o f Ethics for the judiciary when the cases before it so 
warrant (Malta);
>  to reform the disciplinary senates in order to make them play a more active 
and objective role and eliminate possible interference and abuses resulting from 
personal or close contacts between judges and member o f the senate (Slovakia);
>  in order to restore faith of the public in the judicial system, to make efforts 
to inform the media about successfully handled corruption and other sensitive cases 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina);
>  to take the legal and financial measures necessary for the courts to have 
easy access to the expertise they require and to allow the use o f  that expertise as 
evidence before the courts (Bosnia and Herzegovina).
3. the prevention o f  intimidation
>  that, in relation to judges, prosecutors and police officers, specific legal 
measures and appropriate sanctions with regard to intimidation as well as measures 
to protect physical integrity be elaborated (Slovakia).
4. the independence o f  the prosecution office
>  to guarantee that the nature and the scope of the powers o f  the Government 
in relation to the prosecution office be established by law, exercised in a transparent 
way and in accordance with international treaties, national legislation and the gen­
eral principles o f law (Spain); to take particular care to ensure that the financial 
dependency does not diminish its independence (Spain); to ensure the independence 
of the prosecution in dealing with corruption cases, avoiding to the largest possible 
extent risks o f undue influences in the exercise o f prosecutorial powers (Germany, 
Estonia); in this context, that authorities should consider removing the political
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status of prosecutor generals where it still exists (Germany); to provide additional 
guarantees to safeguard the professional impartiality o f prosecutors, in particular 
those in a leading position, and to ensure that the cases can only be reassigned on the 
basis of objective professional criteria (Hungary);
>  to undertake the necessary legislative reforms so as to reduce appropriately 
the Minister of Justice’s power of intervention vis-à-vis prosecutors in order to 
guarantee the necessary independence (Romania); to reconsider the situation that the 
Minister of Justice may, in principle, intervene in the work of the police and/or the 
prosecutor in individual cases of corruption during investigation/prosecution (Den­
mark); to enact legislation confirming the commitments of the current Minister of 
Justice and the predecessor not to interfere in individual cases (France); to ensure 
that instructions o f a general nature be made public in writing and that instructions 
to prosecute in a specific case carry adequate guarantees of transparency and equity 
(Spain); to guarantee that instructions not to prosecute in a specific case, be prohib­
ited in principle or remain exceptional and subject to appropriate specific controls 
(Spain);
>  that measures be taken to ensure that the basis for superior prosecutor’s de­
cisions overruling prior decisions made by a prosecutor at a lower level can be con­
trolled (Georgia, Slovakia), for instance, by requiring that the basis for decisions be 
indicated in writing (Slovakia); to entitle the prosecutors to submit to the court any 
legal arguments o f  their choice, even where they are under a duty to reflect in writ­
ing the instructions received (Spain);
>  that the Department o f Justice remind State and local authorities that, to the 
greatest extent possible, practices for the selection o f District and State prosecutors 
should be transparent and that the selection procedure should take account of the 
need to exclude or restrict the risks of jeopardising the independent and impartial 
exercise of the prosecutorial functions (USA);
>  to undertake the necessary measures to ensure an adequate level of remu­
neration for prosecutors (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia; Moldova);
>  that the obligation to report, on a regular basis, on their financial situation 
be extended to prosecutors (Croatia, Slovenia, Slovakia);
>  to establish fair and objective disciplinary proceedings for prosecutors 
(Georgia); to ensure that die system o f retirement of prosecutors be harmonised with 
the criteria applied to judges (Hungary).
5. the rights and duties of the public prosecutor
>  to strengthen the general competencies o f the public prosecutors to direct 
and supervise the work of the police in preliminary investigation stages and to un­
dertake particular efforts to increase general co-operation between the police and 
prosecutors (Croatia); to provide die Public Prosecutor with the means to direct die 
investigations not only in theory but also in practice (Slovenia); in order to 
strengthen the role of the public prosecutor, to impose upon the police the obligation
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to report the case to the Public Prosecutor as soon as there is sufficient indication 
that a corruption offence could have been committed, and that from this moment 
onwards, the Police should pursue the investigation under the sole direction and 
authority of the Public Prosecutor (Slovenia);
> to ensure that the Public Prosecution Service in practice pursue investiga­
tions as fully as possible and to enable the prosecution authorities to take an appro­
priate and fully informed decision on whether to initiate or continue a prosecution 
(the Netherlands);
> to provide for speedier criminal proceedings and adjudication of cases con­
cerning corruption, when linked to financial-economic crime (Lithuania);
>  to adopt guidelines for the application of the discretionary principle in cor­
ruption-related cases (Luxembourg, comparably United Kingdom).
6. the police
>  to adopt regulations, based on objective criteria, to improve the selection of 
staff o f the Police Force and prevent and sanction nepotism [and] establish a pro­
gramme aimed at enhancing social standing and the financial and moral value of the 
work done by the Police Force members and introduce, in the Code of Conduct, a 
prohibition of corruptive conduct (Slovakia);
>  to implement measures to ensure effective monitoring of police actions, in­
cluding corruption (Latvia); to implement the most effective means of allaying pub­
lic concern about effective oversight of police actions, including corruption; these 
could include an expansion o f the Police Complaint Authority competence and re­
sources or an independent police complaints authority (United Kingdom);
>  to give consideration to whether it is preferable to initiate and carry on, 
with regard to serious allegations of corruption, parallel criminal police investiga­
tions [beside extraordinary quasi-judicial Tribunals o f Inquiry] in order to safeguard 
the necessary evidential material (Ireland);
>  to ensure that the organisational structures of the police be reconsidered 
with a view to establishing a higher degree of organisational autonomy of the police 
(Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria); especially re-consider the situation 
that the Minister o f Justice may, in principle, intervene in the work of the police 
and/or the prosecutor in individual cases of corruption during investiga- 
tion/prosecution, in order to avoid risks of undue or improper influence (Denmark);
>  to examine the possibility of creating a specialised complaints-unit within 
the police, which would be surrounded with all the appropriate guarantees of inde­
pendence (Cyprus); to strengthen the Internal Affairs Division of the police and to 
gradually extend its jurisdiction to other sectors of public administration (the Minis­
try o f Finance, among others), starting with officials who hold police powers 
(Greece);
>  that the police review and strengthen its current approach to inspection and 
review to ensure firstly that the learning, which may be identified from corruption
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investigations, can be audited as being introduced back into the organisation, and, 
secondly that points o f vulnerability within working practices and processes can be 
quickly identified and acted upon (Ireland);
>  to consider the possibility o f increasing, within the budgetary restrictions, 
the salaries o f  police officers responsible for administration checks and investiga­
tions (Romania, Moldova).
7. the incentive for co-operation with the law enforcement bodies
>  to facilitate the reporting of suspicions o f  corruption cases by individuals 
(Czech Republic); that the public should be able to identify those with whom they 
come in contact (Georgia, “the former Yugoslav Republic o f  Macedonia“) and to be 
well informed about procedures for making complaints (“the former Yugoslav Re­
public o f Macedonia“, Moldova); to implement proper complaints procedures for 
submitting complaints, advising on the reaction and informing on possible compen­
sation (Georgia);
>  to provide appropriate safeguards against retaliation for members o f  the 
public who lodge complaints about potential cases o f  suspicious enrichment, includ­
ing potential cases o f corruption (Luxembourg); to adopt measures to enable witness 
protection to be developed (Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Czech Republic; 
Georgia, Luxembourg); to improve the measures already in place for the protection 
of witnesses and collaborators o f justice (Finland); to increase the financial and 
technical resources provided for the departments responsible for implementing wit­
ness-protection and related programs (Moldova); to raise information campaigns on 
the existence and the possibility o f  the use o f  the witness protection programme 
(Latvia);
>  to consider the institution o f a procedure for interviewing whistle-blowers 
and other witnesses whose identity is known only to the competent judicial authority 
(“the former Yugoslav Republic o f  Macedonia“, France, Romania) and therefore to 
relax the restrictions on the use o f anonymous witnesses to the extent permitted by 
international human-rights obligations (Luxembourg; comparably Georgia).
8. sentence-bargaining
>  to create further incentives for persons involved in criminal offences who 
wish to collaborate with justice (Luxembourg); to give further consideration to die 
existing proposals aiming at allowing the police and/or the prosecution to negotiate 
agreements on outcome in corruption cases, with the participation o f  the court, i f  the 
suspect or accused person agrees to co-operate with the authorities (Germany); that 
when granting a certificate exempting a person from criminal proceedings, as pro­
vided for by law, such decision should be given in written form, included in the file 
and, to the extent possible, submitted to public scrutiny (Malta).
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9. the co-ordination o f the investigation
> that the relation and coordination between the prosecution and the investi­
gation service be reconsidered also in light o f the tasks of the law enforcement bod­
ies (Bulgaria); that the simplification of the pre-trial proceedings, by clarifying the 
respective roles of the investigation judge and the public prosecutor, be pursued 
(Slovenia); that the authorities streamline the work of the anti-corruption co­
ordination bodies by defining their responsibilities, by establishing their respective 
priorities and tasks to ensure more effective co-operation (Moldova); to promote 
coordination experience, sharing and circulation of information among different 
police forces involved in anti corruption investigations (Latvia, comparably Slova­
kia); that the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice endeavour to devise a 
method to facilitate the sharing of information between law enforcement agencies in 
similar corruption matters (USA); to consider the opportunity to establish a system 
of coordination between existing institutions responsible for the fight against corrup­
tion (Latvia); that there should be some streamlining and rationalisation of the func­
tions o f the operational and the investigative police and early completion of the 
merging of the functions of the operational and the investigative police (Czech Re­
public);
> that, in order to encourage and facilitate effective law enforcement (in par­
ticular, the sharing o f information), the Criminal Division of die Department of 
Justice, in training programmes and otherwise, emphasise the critical importance of 
full co-operation and coordination between prosecutors and investigators as soon as 
possible after an investigation is initiated (USA).
10. the intra-administrative co-operation and the exchange of information
>  that the relevant authorities involve in their anti-corruption efforts public 
servants by introducing measures aimed at facilitating, at their level, the recognition 
and whistle-blowing o f suspicious acts o f corruption (Moldova);
>  to support more effective coordination and co-operation among die entities 
through, for example, co-operation and training, the dissemination of trend analyses 
and the sharing o f  information on effective practices (USA);
>  to maintain and enhance the co-operation between law enforcement au­
thorities and other State Bodies, agencies and authorities which play a role in the 
prevention and control o f corruption (Denmark); to make a particular effort to con­
vince tax authorities that they have a very important role to play in this connection 
and encourage them to cooperate in full with the prosecution office (Luxembourg); 
to organise a system according to which information from different sources that 
could lead to the detection o f  corruption would be centralised and treated, in particu­
lar reports on suspicions o f bidding cartels, complaints about irregularities in tender­
ing procedures, reports o f the State Auditor and local auditors, reports from tax
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authorities on suspicious declarations o f  expenses, reports from competition authori­
ties (Finland); to establish a light structure o f  exchange o f  information and practice 
with the participation o f the Prosecutor General’s Office, the Police, the State Audi­
tor’s Office, the auditors o f  local authorities, public procurement services and tax 
authorities (Finland, with regard to the tax authorities also Slovakia, Luxembourg, 
with regard to the Audit Office Belgium, Norway and Greece); to complete inter­
connection o f  the various police databases and examine the specific characteristics 
of Judicial Police work in order to adjust working methods accordingly (Portugal); 
to create appropriate links between the data-collection systems o f  the authorities on 
the understanding, o f course, that the sharing o f information would be authorised by 
law and restricted to appropriate cases where the adverse effects o f  the intrusion of 
privacy will be counterbalanced by the gravity o f  the concerns about the risk of 
corruption (Cyprus); to ensure that the Central Anti-Corruption Office and the ser­
vice in charge o f supervising public tenders as well as other police forces when 
starting investigation of corruption matters exchange information effectively (Bel­
gium); to make use o f the Information Agency on Property and Financial Declara­
tions as a source o f  information to be used in a pro-active way to detect and investi­
gate possible corruption cases (Georgia); that the interagency unit should be institu­
tionalised and used to put forward solutions for improving the exchange of 
information (Belgium);
>  to establish an obligation on civil servants to report cases o f  corruption 
known to them in the exercise o f  their duties to the authorities in charge o f  detect­
ing, investigating and prosecuting corruption offences (Ireland; comparably Cyprus, 
Estonia and Iceland); to clarify the obligation on public servants when and how to 
report unlawful, improper or unethical behaviour, or behaviour which involves 
maladministration (Norway); to remind government departments and all government 
departments and all other public agencies o f  the existence and content o f  the general 
obligation to inform o f any offences discovered and take steps to facilitate its use 
without hindrance in corruption cases (France, comparably Portugal); that measures 
be taken to ensure that the Ministry o f  Foreign Affairs complies with the obligation 
to report suspicion o f corruption cases to law enforcement authorities (Slovakia); to 
consider applying whistle blowing regulations for all public sector entities (the 
Netherlands); that disciplinary measures should not apply to an official who -  in 
breach o f internal reporting duties -  reports directly a grounded suspicion o f  corrup­
tion to the police or prosecution (Germany).
11. information held in the private sector
>  to undertake measures that the Public Prosecution Service, police forces, 
develop a strategy to establish a fluid channel o f  communication with the private 
sector, and by disseminating information on the results achieved (the Netherlands, 
comparably Spain);
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>  to make the necessary investment so as to enable access to be had to essen­
tial private sources o f  information and considering the rapid implementation o f legal 
provisions related to the police enabling access to internal databases (Belgium); in 
particular, that access to information held by telecommunication companies be fa­
cilitated through a centralised access system (Belgium);
>  to extend the powers o f  the State Revenue Service Corruption Prevention 
and Control Division to encompass disclosure from banking institutions with regard 
to information on an individual financial account (Latvia).
12. special investigation means
>  to make more effective use o f  the existing legislative tools provided to dis­
cover and combat corruption and in particular those concerning the use of special 
investigative technical means in the detection o f  corrupt behaviour (Latvia);
>  to make the necessary legislative changes so as to permit the use of proce­
dural means thar are lacking at present, including telephone-tapping in corruption 
cases and machinery for value based seizure (Belgium; comparably Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and „the former Yugoslav Republic o f  Macedonia“); to reconsider the 
conditions for using special investigative techniques in cases involving serious cor­
ruption, keeping in mind the need to respect die principle of proportionality and 
existing legal safeguards (Albania); to allow for the surveillance o f communications 
in all inquiries into corruption offences (Luxembourg); to extend, as far as possible, 
the use o f  special investigative means to cases o f  corruption, in line with the princi­
ple o f  proportionality and existing safeguards (Croatia, Denmark, Finland, „The 
Former Yugoslav Republic o f  Macedonia“, Sweden); that the authorities consider 
the legislation giving police the authority to seek and obtain wiretaps in the investi­
gation o f  at least serious corruption offences, empowering the judicial authority to 
authorise wiretap, and to make wiretap evidence admissible in court, in die light o f 
the case law o f the European Court o f  Human Rights (Malta); to extend the possibil­
ity o f  using interception o f  communications so as to apply to serious corruption 
offences (Germany);
to give consideration to the need to legislate in order to allow the use o f  in­
filtration in corruption cases (France, comparably Poland); to elaborate guiding rules 
for the use o f “special agents”, taking full account o f  the case law o f the European 
Court o f  Human Rights, in order that die results o f this technique are not challenged 
in court as being contrary to human rights (Slovenia);
>  to further regulate the use o f  undercover agents to facilitate co-operation 
with foreign police forces in die field (Luxembourg);
>  that the measures which exist in urgent cases for search o f  other premises 
be adopted mutatis mutandis to house search (Slovakia).
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As to Guiding Principle 7: GRECO recommended with regard to
13. special anti-corruption units
> to consider the formation of an independent specialised anti-corruption in­
vestigation unit (Georgia, Latvia, Luxembourg, „the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia“), that would centralise and systematically treat relevant information 
coming from different sources and would ensure that a sufficiently proactive ap­
proach is taken towards the detection of corruption (Luxembourg). In particular with 
regard to Georgia, the following recommendations were made: All law-enforcement 
and other authorities would be required to report to the specialised corruption unit 
any suspicions of corrupt behaviour. Cases o f corruption, as soon as identified dur­
ing a preliminary investigation would also be transmitted to the unit, which would 
continue and deepen the investigation to the extent necessary to bring charges. The 
creation of this special unit would also allow a better collection and analysis o f data 
relating to corruption and would enable the preparation o f accurate statistics to assist 
future strategy and policy enhancement; to select the Head and staff of the above- 
mentioned unit with the greatest care to ensure their highest integrity; that the unit 
be open to independent scrutiny and produces an annual progress report of its activi­
ties to be made available to the general public; that the above-mentioned unit should 
be proactive and have a legal basis for requiring information, assistance and co­
operation from all governmental departments and bodies; that the unit should also be 
empowered to make use of special investigative techniques available in the legal 
system with due respect to constitutional and legal safeguards and establish close 
working relations with the specialised unit which is recommended to be created 
within the Prosecutor’s Office;
>  to establish or designate a body responsible for the enhancement of coun­
try-wide anti-cormption activities, which could also be in charge of international co­
operation aspects and research activities on the phenomena, modus operandi and 
importance of criminal activities, including cormption (Bosnia and Herzegovina);
>  that the Permanent Commission on Corruption be empowered to make use 
of means of compulsion, be given the possibility to appoint, on its own capacity, 
persons with special knowledge when it is necessary to assist the Commission in its 
investigations, publish the results of its investigations on its own, without prejudice 
to pending Court proceedings and be empowered to present its reports before Par­
liament (Malta);
>  to allocate more staff resources to the Interministerial Task Force, and to 
strengthen the guarantees that when a case is taken up for technical advice (pre­
sented anonymously to the Force), it would be reported to the Prosecutor’s Office by 
the requesting body if the Force concluded that there had been embezzlement and to 
grant the Force the power to decide on its own whether to investigate a case 
(France).
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14. the investigation units o f the police
>  to enhance modernisation of the police bodies at all territorial levels, espe­
cially at the lower levels, with the adequate institutional, legal, awareness-raising 
and other safeguarding measures (Bosnia and Herzegovina); to develop a criminal 
investigation department under the supervision of prosecutors and investigative 
judges (Greece);
> to establish, within this criminal investigation department, units specialis­
ing in economic and financial crime including corruption (France, Greece); to de­
velop a specialisation on the problem of corruption within the Police (Bulgaria, 
Sweden); that the Economic Crime Unit within the Central Criminal Police should 
also be given a greater specialisation in corruption (Estonia, Finland and Iceland); to 
form smaller units reporting to the Central Criminal Police in the prefectures with 
training and equipment to address local corruption offences linked with economic 
crime (Estonia);
>  to ensure that steps are taken with regard to the recruitment of personnel of 
the Anti-Corruption Office so as to permit persons having training or a specialisa­
tion usefill to the service to be recruited, whilst making sure that staff mobility 
within the judicial police is not detrimental to the sound operation of the service 
(Belgium);
>  to enhance the human, material and other means necessary for the police to 
carry out, to the full, their functions in the fight against corruption (Portugal); to 
ensure that the special police unit for investigating corruption offences be more 
appropriately staffed (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain); to 
provide the Police Force with the necessaiy computer equipments to improve the 
capacity of data processing systems (Slovakia); to ensure that adequate and qualified 
resources exist in the police to provide a constant and geographically comprehensive 
warning capability on the incidence of corruption (United Kingdom).
15. the prosecution office
>  to study possibilities o f increasing the number o f prosecutors [and magis­
trates respectively] and investigating judges (Belgium, Bulgaria, Luxembourg); that 
the Department of Justice remind State and local officials to take account o f the 
need to provide sufficient resources for prosecutors’ offices (USA);
J* to envisage the creation o f a higher number o f prosecutors specialised in 
economic crime, including corruption (Estonia, Finland, “the former Yugoslav Re­
public of Macedonia“); to undertake the necessaiy measures to create, within the 
Public Prosecution Office, a special section/unit responsible for dealing with corrup­
tion and corruption-related offences (Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, “the former Yugo­
slav Republic o f Macedonia“, Georgia);
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>  to maintain and strengthen the prosecution service’s specialised unit for 
fighting organised crime and corruption, by assigning it the necessary extra financial 
and human resources (Romania, comparably Moldova), especially in terms o f  spe­
cialised staff seconded from other public bodies whose secondment shall be ex­
tended in order to ensure more stability (Romania); that one o f  the existing units 
within the Prosecutor Generals Office dealing with corruption cases be responsible 
for training, support and sharing o f  practice to other units involved in the fight 
against corruption (Latvia); that the Department o f Justice facilitate the participation 
o f an increasing number o f practitioners in specialised training on prosecuting cor­
ruption cases, including prosecutors from offices where no specialised units for the 
fight against corruption exist (USA).
16. general and special training o f law enforcement bodies
>  to establish an institutionalised training structure (school o f  magistrates) for 
new judges and prosecutors who have passed the selection and to introduce a sound 
and coherent training curriculum (Estonia); to provide training in investigation for 
police forces engaged in the fight against corruption in early courses (Czech Repub­
lic, comparably Malta), putting emphasis on corruption (Malta);
>  that the Department o f  Justice emphasise to Directors o f  Federal law en­
forcement agencies the need to maintain, at all levels, including through periods of 
intense recruitment drives, a rigorous vetting process in order to recruit personnel of 
the highest standards (USA);
>  to set up a working group o f  police, prosecutors, judges and other experts 
who would design and implement a comprehensive and effective master training 
plan for die new legislation concerning serious crime, especially corruption (Esto­
nia);
>  that initial and in-service training o f  prosecutors and judges particularly in 
combating economic and financial crimes and related offences such as tax evasion 
and, more specifically, corruption be stepped up (Moldova); to intensify the initial 
and in-service training o f  police officers and public prosecutors with regard to the 
legal bases and practice o f  public procurement and to improve their knowledge in 
this area (the Netherlands); to provide the prosecutors with appropriate education, 
training and technical equipment as well as preparing internal guidelines and annual 
education/training for prosecutors o f all levels o f  the Public Prosecution Office (“die 
former Yugoslav Republic o f  Macedonia“); that specialised education and training 
o f police, prosecutors and judicial police on corruption and its links to connected 
crime is arranged (Albania, comparably Bulgaria, Croatia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithua­
nia and the Netherlands, with regard to judges and prosecutors, Poland), in particular 
on the typologies o f  corruption, including its international dimensions (Denmark, 
Hungary, Ireland, Latvia; Sweden; with regard to prosecutors Finland); to make use 
o f  international organisations whenever possible (Slovakia);
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>  that efforts be made to raise awareness within the judicial authorities of the 
seriousness of corruption offences and the specific difficulties related to their detec­
tion and the gathering of evidence (Slovenia).
17. the judiciary
>  to provide the courts with an adequate number of staff (Bulgaria);
>  that, as a general rule, cases of corruption committed by certain categories 
of persons, such as police officers or members of judiciary, should be in exclusive 
competence of the criminal court (Malta);
>  to take at least some steps to increase specialisation of judges and improve 
human resources/expertise in the field of complex offences such as corruption (Por­
tugal); to raise the specialisation in corruption cases of some investigating judges 
and judges hearing cases (Belgium, Estonia); to appoint the judges to court cham­
bers and prosecution office sections which become specialised on corruption 
(Greece); to consider the possibility to create - within the major district courts -  
specialised panels o f judges who should be available to preside over the most com­
plex and serious cases related to economic crime offences (the Netherlands, Portu­
gal); to take steps, subject to existing budgetary constraints, to establish economic 
and financial sections in the most important courts, while at the same time strength­
ening the resources available to the economic and financial sections at the courts of 
appeal (France).
18. the border police and the custom office
>  to strengthen the efforts in favour of a modernisation of the border police in 
terms o f premises, training, anti-corruption policies and investigations, management 
etc (Estonia); to set up training centres for customs officials, to ensure initial and in­
service training and to develop a sense of professional ethics (Romania); to allocate 
the necessary financial and technical resources to the operational directorate of the 
customs department and to give officers initial and in-service training in regulations 
and professional conduct (Moldova).
As to Guiding Principle 6: GRECO recommended with regard to
19. the legal framwork of immunities
>  to review the system o f immunities and to make sure that the legal frame­
work is clear, coherent, comprehensive, and understood by practitioners and the 
public at large (Bosnia and Herzegovina).
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20. the list of categories of immunities
>  to consider a reduction in the list o f categories o f  officials covered by im­
munity and/or to reduce the scope o f immunity to a minimum (Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Poland, „the former Yugoslav Republic o f Macedonia“, 
Romania), in particular to abolish the immunities provided for the candidates to 
member of parliament (Georgia).
21. the period of immunity
>  to guarantee immunity only for the period of the mandate and to bar the 
lapse of time set for statutory limitation until the end o f immunity (Hungary); to 
reconsider the fact that the system in place precludes prosecution after the suspect of 
a criminal offence ceases to be a member of Parliament (Czech Republic).
22. lifting immunity
> to establish guidelines for lifting immunities, containing criteria to be ap­
plied, with a view to a uniform application of the rules (Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Georgia, Latvia, “the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia“, Moldova, Portugal, Slovenia), ensuring that decisions are based on 
the merits o f the request submitted by the Public Prosecutor (Estonia, Georgia, Lat­
via, Romania, Slovenia); to avoid to the largest extent possible political or other 
undue considerations (Czech Republic, Hungary);
>  to review the procedure for waiving the immunity of members o f parlia­
ment and of the government, in order to make it more transparent and easier to apply 
(Greece);
>  to simplify the procedure for lifting the immunity of State officials (Po­
land);
>  to amend the national legislation to ensure that the procedure for deciding 
on immunities of members of Government is not be carried out by the Government 
itself (“the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia“);
>  to abolish the requirement of the authorisation o f  the body concerned where 
the offender is apprehended "in flagrante delicto" (Georgia);
>  to reconsider the regulations concerning immunity, with a view to avoiding 
more than one decision concerning the lifting of the immunity in each case (Lithua­
nia);
> to ensure that in the case of judges, decisions concerning immunity are free 
from political consideration and based on the merits of the request (Estonia, Latvia, 
Slovenia).
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23. the possibility o f evidence being given in court with regard to proceedings in 
parliament
>  to exempt corruption offences from the application o f Art. 9 of the Bill of 
Rights (United Kingdom).
As to other reflections in the First Evaluation Round: GRECO recommended with 
regard to
24. sufficient anti-corruption laws
>  to speed up the process o f  reform of the criminal legislation and, through 
that process, to harmonise the criminal codes and criminal procedure codes to the 
largest extent possible (Bosnia and Herzegovina);
>  to continue the efforts in developing an efficient anti-corruption legal 
framework, in order to avoid, to the extent possible, “legal lacunas” which may be 
used for corruption purposes (Bulgaria); to increase prescribed punishments (and 
also extend the statute o f limitations) for serious types o f corruption and corruption- 
related offences (Croatia); to prolong the limitation period with respect to offences 
of corruption in order to allow extra time for investigation in complex cases (Slova­
kia).
25. speed up the criminal proceedings
>  to review the investigation procedure for serious offences, including cor­
ruption offences, and to examine the best possible way o f remedying the problems 
associated with the possibility of challenging every individual decision of the inves­
tigating judge during the investigation phase by providing, for example, for the 
exercise o f the right to appeal at the end o f the investigating phase, reconsidering the 
non-suspensive nature, for purposes o f statutory limitations, of appeals filed before 
the Constitutional Court, in order to avoid procedural abuses aimed at preventing 
sensitive cases from going to trial (Portugal).
26. a comprehensive pro-active strategy
>  that the authorities responsible for formulating anti-corruption policies 
adopt a more proactive approach towards the phenomenon of corruption in order to 
combat it more efficiently (die Netherlands);
>  to develop a national programme for the fight against corruption, including 
preventive and repressive perspectives (Bulgaria, Georgia, Poland, “the former
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Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia“), including the development of all the elements 
(legislative, executive, judicial authority) necessary for reducing opportunities for 
corruption (Poland, Spain), launching within the law enforcement agencies (notably 
the police and the prosecution office) and other private and public bodies which 
could be involved in the anti-corruption policies, a specific anti-corruption plan that 
should introduce a multi agency focus and more proactive investigative strategies to 
help preventing and detecting criminal conduct or wrong doing (Ireland);
> to elaborate a proactive anti-corruption policy with the necessary resources 
within which the inherent potential of, inter alia, the following institutions to prevent 
and control corruption would be more fully exploited: the Ombudsman, the Compe­
tition Authority, the National Audit Office, the Financial Supervisory Authority, the 
Chamber of Commerce, the Confederation of Employers, the media and others (Ice­
land);
> to elaborate a comprehensive programme, a series o f very specific and 
measurable objectives and the detailed steps required to achieve them are indicated 
(Czech Republic); to elaborate a comprehensive programme, including preventive 
and awareness raising measures, aimed at progressively eliminating the widespread 
practice of gratuities, rewards or other forms of private remuneration paid to public 
employees in the healthcare sector and other public service where they found to 
exist (Hungary); to expand existing programmes and the development of additional 
endeavours with regard to prevention and detection strategies on corruption (USA);
> to assign the overall coordination of its implementation to a body especially 
tasked for that purpose (Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Greece, Ireland, 
Lithuania, Portugal, Slovenia) or to entrust a existing body with this responsibility 
(Lithuania); to clearly identify the bodies in charge of its implementation and coor­
dination with other authorities (Czech Republic); to extend the scope o f  the Corrup­
tion Prevention Council to ensure the effective implementation o f  its campaign 
(Latvia); to reinforce the visibility of the subdivision on economic crime within the 
Ministry of Justice by drawing in officials from the various ministries and depart­
ments concerned to encourage genuine dialogue, stimulate joint discussion and 
develop common approaches based on their respective experience to enhance the 
interministerial dialogue, nurture communal discussions and develop the emergence 
of summaries of the various experiences made (France);
> to keep regularly updated and to disseminate compilations of anti­
corruption measures adopted (Germany); in the light of these, systems should ensure 
appropriate follow up of anti-corruption initiatives providing for the possibility for 
making recommendations for improvements (Greece);
> to improve the resourcing o f the fight against corruption (Latvia); to amend 
the national anti-corruption plan explicitly with a stronger notion o f involvement of 
the civil society and business sector in the implementation of the plan (Albania); to 
take further steps to ensure die implementation of the Programme and Action Plan 
and the continuous monitoring of the implementation o f the existing legislation in 
the anti-corruption area; for this purpose, one o f the possibilities could be establish-
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ing a cross cutting monitoring commission, possibly linked to the parliament, and 
comprising representatives o f  the various governmental bodies, civil society and the 
business community (Czech Republic); to urgently strengthen and improve the ap­
plication o f  the Anti-Corruption Act as concerns the control over declaration o f 
interests and other forms o f  limitation upon conflicting interests the parliamentarian 
anti-corruption committee should be strengthened in order to cany out its tasks 
effectively, including the overall monitoring of the Anti-Corruption Act application 
(Estonia);
>  that the Department o f  Justice maintain a regular process for evaluating and 
assessing the adequacy o f Federal investigative and prosecutorial resources directed 
at Federal, State or local corruption, with a view to ensuring that resources are allo­
cated where needed (USA).
27. raising awareness among public officials and in die society
>  to enhance the general awareness o f  corruption in its wider sense, its dan­
gers to society and to the particular sectors which are likely to be affected, associate 
the public more closely to the authorities’ action against corruption, in particular, by 
better informing it about the measures adopted to counter corruption, and encourage 
them to co-operate with the law-enforcement authorities in tire investigation and 
detection o f  these crimes (Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Malta, Moldova, 
Romania, Slovakia); to enhance the involvement o f  the media and non­
governmental organisations in a coordinated awareness raising campaign (Latvia, 
Romania, Slovakia); to raise the awareness o f  public officials, particularly among 
those more likely to be in contact with corrupt practices, about the need to remain 
vigilant, report serious suspicions o f  corruption in accordance with agreed proce­
dures and contribute to the efforts o f  law enforcement authorities aimed at the detec­
tion o f  corruption offence (Finland, Luxembourg, Spain, Sweden); to strengthen the 
involvement o f  civil society and the business sector in the activities o f  the Anti­
corruption Monitoring Group (Albania); to put in place procedures to support man­
agers to identify, prevent, challenge and deal with corrupt, dishonest and unethical- 
behaviour - such procedures should include education, training, prevention and 
enquiry (Georgia, „the former Yugoslav Republic o f  Macedonia“); to make a par­
ticular effort so as to raise awareness with regard to the link between money- 
laundering and corruption and to establish guidance notes for the recognition of 
suspicious transactions by accountants and lawyers (Cyprus).
28. safeguarding lawful conduct o f  public officials
>  to establish rigorous selection criteria and to conduct robust vetting checks 
in order to ensure integrity o f  all those recruited for public service, particularly those 
called to occupy sensitive positions (Georgia); to consider the introduction o f  tenure
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procedures that will reduce the potential for corruption, in particular for sensitive 
posts (Georgia);
>  to develop ethical codes against corruption for all public officials (Bulgaria, 
Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Spain, and with respect to Northern Ireland the 
United Kingdom), preferably including anti-corruption measures, such as reporting 
indicia of corruption etc., as a complement to legislation (Lithuania), using the 
Model Code drawn up by the Council o f Europe and included in the committee of 
Ministers Recommendation R(2000) 10 as inspiration (Georgia, Spain); to give the 
adoption o f  the Law on Prevention o f  Conflicts o f  Interests in Public Service, as 
well the adoption o f  a General Code o f  Conduct for Public Officials, a high priority, 
and to designate a special body or bodies to ensure the efficient implementation of 
the obligations prescribed by those documents (Croatia); that all public officials 
receive training on codes o f conduct (Georgia, „the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia“); to implement a global training programme aimed at increasing aware­
ness among public officials o f  all levels (Poland);
>  to urgently strengthen and improve the application o f  the Anti-Corruption 
Act as concerns the control over declaration o f interests (Estonia); to ensure that a 
system should be established for the declaration o f assets and interests o f  high State 
officials, including Members o f  Parliament, the President o f  the Republic, the Attor­
ney-General and Ministers (Cyprus); that a central mechanism should be created for 
the registration o f  interests by senior civil servants and ministers and for recording 
and investigating complaints (United Kingdom); to ensure that the employer be 
empowered to check declarations o f  interests, income and assets or have them 
checked by an appropriate body (Hungary, comparably Georgia); to promote the full 
application o f  the mechanism for the declaration o f assets (Greece).
29. a sufficient control mechanism for the public sector
>  to ensure an appropriate oversight o f  the exercise o f  licensing powers o f  the 
Local Councils (Malta); to take measures to eliminate unnecessary licenses and to 
determine objective and transparent criteria for die granting o f  licenses, authorisa­
tions and state subsidies that remain necessary (Slovakia); to undertake steps to­
wards progressively reducing the scope o f  discretionary powers o f  administrative 
officers, enhancing transparent procedures and abolishing, whenever possible, li­
censing and authorisation procedures (Poland); to develop stronger transparent and 
public accountability policies in the public administration to increase governmental 
efficiency (“the former Yugoslav Republic o f  Macedonia“);
>  that all government departments and agencies introduce internal inspection 
units (Georgia); to provide for the introduction in all departments and agencies of 
external monitoring councils (Georgia); to create, or to strengthen where they al­
ready exist, special departments and inspection bodies responsible for the prevention 
and examination o f  internal cases of corruption (“the former Yugoslav Republic of
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Macedonia“); to strengthen the internal control mechanisms and capacities within 
ministerial structures providing them with proper independence and competencies to 
investigate corruption practices inside their organisations (Croatia).
30. the systematic collection o f  data and research on corruption
>  to systematically collect and process in a coherent way data concerning cor­
ruption in particular in fields where there are particular corruption problems encoun­
tered (Albania, comparably Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxem­
bourg, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain); to ensure more efficient statistical monitoring o f 
corruption and corruption related offences in all spheres o f  the police, public prose­
cution offices and the courts on the basis on harmonised methodology, which would 
enable comparisons among institutions (Croatia); to create a central intelligence 
database with a view  to providing law enforcement and prosecution authorities with 
an extremely useful tool for a comprehensive approach to the fight against corrup­
tion (Poland);
>  to promote objective research on corruption with a view  to developing a 
precise picture o f  the situation in the country and in particular institutions (Bulgaria, 
comparably Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, 
„The Former Yugoslav Republic o f  Macedonia“, Moldova, the Netherlands, Nor­
way, Romania, Slovenia), so that anti-corruption initiatives and plans can be tar­
geted more effectively (Moldova).
31. public procurement
>  to create conditions for transparency and equality in competition, in order 
to minimise the risk o f  corruption opportunities in the field o f  public procurement 
(Hungary); to develop further rules and regulations to govern public procurement at 
the State and Entity level (Bosnia and Herzegovina);
>  to consider improving competition mechanisms at level o f  local govern­
ment authorities in order to avoid excessive familiarity between officials and suppli­
ers, leading to direct orders being placed without applying tendering procedures, 
such as, for instance, collective decision-making procedures, rotation o f  officials 
deciding on purchases, specific supervision o f  contracts concluded directly etc. 
(Latvia, Sweden); to provide proper training to all those public officials who deal 
with public procurement activities in the central and local agencies in order to make 
them aware o f  regulation in force and ensure that they would be able to assess pro­
cedural irregularities in the context o f  evidencing corruption (Latvia);
>  to better enforce the rules on public procurement, including in cases which 
fall below  the threshold for EU-wide competition (Germany), and to adopt legisla­
tive measures to establish a central register ('blacklist') o f  companies which have 
previously been found untrustworthy in bids for public contracts (Germany); pro-
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vide for strengthening the independence and specialisation o f  the Public Procure­
ment Agency (Sweden); to consider assigning to the Government Contracts Com­
mittee more powers in order to meet concerns related to the lack o f  a central author­
ity or body responsible for all public procurement procedures, or to examine the 
possibility to establish another central and independent body responsible solely with 
the public procurement procedure (Ireland); to increase both the human and the 
material resources allocated to the Public Procurement Office in order for it to exer­
cise a strict control over public procurement (Poland);
>  to reconsider the complaint procedure within the field o f  public procure­
ment, in order to make it more efficient and easier to access by the public (Lithua­
nia); to introduce a more independent procedure/authority when it comes to dealing 
with public procurement (Malta); to considerably strengthen the independence and 
specialisation o f  the Public Procurement Agency (Albania, comparably Romania);
>  to examine ways o f  improving the effectiveness o f  sanctions for noncom­
pliance with applicable public tendering procedures (Sweden); in public procure­
ment matters, to enable the courts to pronounce interlocutory decisions that suspend 
the tender procedure in the event of an appeal by a bidder on grounds o f  unlawful 
exclusion from the consultation or adjudication procedure (“the former Yugoslav 
Republic o f Macedonia“);
>  to provide that staff, to the extent possible, be given civil servant status and 
that training be institutionalised and focused on anti-corruption measures (Albania).
32. privatisation
>  that transparent and clear rules as well as efficient control mechanisms be 
established with regard to privatisation (Slovakia).
33. the media and the access to public information
>  to promote professionalism and ethical conduct among journalists (Bosnia 
and Herzegovina);
>  to improve the transparency o f  public authorities, vis-à-vis media and die 
wider public, through implementation o f  the legislation on access to public informa­
tion and documents (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Hungary, Lithuania), to 
promote more widely appropriate disclosure mechanisms under the Public Interest 
Disclosure Act in the public sector (United Kingdom); to make special efforts to 
promote access by the media to official documents and inform/train the public and 
public officials about the conditions required to obtain access to public documents 
and files held by the local and state authorities (Malta); to study ways o f  reconciling 
the protection o f  private life with the need for some public scrutiny over the manner 
in which closed corruption cases have been dealt with (Luxembourg);
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>  to undertake legislative and administrative reforms in order to guarantee an 
adequate system o f conservation and archiving of the administrative documents and 
files and to prevent their destruction (Romania).
34. the Ombudsman
>  to strengthen the role of the Ombudsman institution (People’s Advocate) in 
preventing and combating corruption and raise effectively public awareness of this 
role of the Ombudsman institution (Albania; Bosnia and Herzegovina, Czech Re­
public); moreover, to consider allowing the People’s Advocate to cany out reviews 
ex officio (Albania).
35. the auditing o f public expenditures
>  to familiarise public decision makers with the purposes of audit (Estonia);
>  to envisage the introduction of some form of independent audit of depart­
ments strictly related to integrity measures which could take the form of a “coordi­
nating council” comprising State officials and NGOs (Georgia);
>  to submit local governments to appropriate auditing procedures (Sweden);
>  to extend the powers of the supreme audit office, notably to evaluate and 
make effective suggestions for improving the management (Slovakia); to provide 
that the mandate o f the audit office should be extended to cover a wider category of 
public funds, including the political parties (Cyprus); to provide that the State Su­
preme Audit at the outset of the fiscal year should announce a public statement re­
flecting the scope and justification for planned activities (Albania);
>  to give the supreme audit office adequate and predictable budgetary means 
to plan and fund their intended activities (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina); to give 
the court of auditors adequate staff (Luxembourg); to organise permanent in-house 
training for these controllers, focussing on the issue of corruption (Poland);
>  to analyse the functioning o f existing earmarked funds in die context of 
creating opportunities for corruption and to liquidate those funds whose tasks could 
be achieved in the framework of die general State budget and ensure, especially by 
way o f monitoring, that the functioning funds do not create opportunities for corrup­
tion (Poland); to enhance and develop the work o f financial controllers controlling 
public administrations and public enterprises increasing, whenever necessary, their 
number and ensure that their findings are made public as far as possible (Poland).
36. funding o f  politics
>  to extend the system for die registration o f  die interests o f the Members of 
the House o f Commons to cover the exact amount of donations, the interests of all
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“key connected persons” and all shareholdings (United Kingdom); to establish a 
system for the declaration o f  assets and interests o f high state officials, including 
Members of Parliament, the President of the Republic, the Attorney General and the 
Ministers (Cyprus);
>  to ensure, in the context of the financing of political parties, that effective 
co-operation between external auditors and the specialised service o f  the judicial 
police and/or the competent prosecutors’ offices exist (Belgium);
> to ensure that information transmitted by the Parliamentary Commission 
under the Act on incompatibility of performing public function with business activ­
ity to the proper authorities, be followed by effective sanctions against those offi­
cials found to be in breach o f the law, and that, to this end, the said Commission be 
informed about the outcome of the procedure undertaken against such officials (Slo­
venia);
>  to consider the possibility o f preventing conflicts o f interest by placing 
limitations on the functions of lawyer when a person is elected to the representa­
tive’s office (Romania).
37. the tax authorities
>  to provide tax officials and inspectors with training and guidelines on their 
possible contribution to the detection o f corruptions (Slovenia); to make officials of 
the Tax Inspectorate aware o f the problem and dangers o f corruption and their role 
in fighting it and to take concrete measures to ensure that the initial monitoring 
directorate performs stricter checks on the activities o f tax inspectorate officials 
(Moldova).
38. Non governmental organisations (NGOs)
>  to support more actively, notably with the help of the Central Corruption 
Prevention Department, private initiatives, by strengthening the links between gov­
ernment preventive activities and such initiatives (France); to organise regular ex­
changes of information with NGOs to discuss government actions and initiatives 
against corruption with a view to strengthening co-operation in this field (Poland); 
to continue co-operation with NGOs in the form o f a more structured dialogue at na­
tional level (Georgia); to establish, for the purpose of devising a multidisciplinary 
strategy to combat corruption, channels o f contact or even mechanisms for associat­
ing NGOs with the definition o f  policies in the field (Greece); to envisage the intro­
duction of some form of independent audit o f departments strictly related to integ­
rity measures which could take the form o f a “coordinating council” comprising 
State officials and NGOs (Georgia).
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B. Observations
Besides formai recommendations, the compliance with which the country con­
cerned has to report on within a given period,322 the GRECO Reports in their ana­
lytical parts may also articulate observations about deficiencies in the country con­
cerned. Although these observations are not subjected to the compliance procedure 
as it is provided for recommendations,323 they still reflect concerns about the institu­
tional fight against corruption in the relevant country. Furthermore, one should be 
aware that the distinction between mere observations and binding recommendations 
is not a clear-cut one and that, thus, the borderline between both might eventually 
also have to be drawn differently. Therefore, even if a deficiency observed by 
GRECO did not give rise to a recommendation, the country concerned might con­
sider itself as invited for further improvements. So in order to get a full picture of 
particular and structural deficiencies in the institutions against corruption, observa­
tions made in the analytical parts of GRECO Reports will in the following be simi­
larly compiled as the above-discussed recommendations.
322 Cf. supra LB.
323 “Observations” are provided for in Rule 28 o f  the Rules o f  Procedure but do not underlie a 
special compliance procedure, different from “recommendations” which are not only men­
tioned in Art. 15 (6) o f  the GRECO-Statute but also subjected to a special compliance proce­
dure according to Rules 30, 31 Rules o f  Procedure. Consequently, die GRECO Plenary in its 
14th meeting, after an intensive discussion, decided that the member nations are neither 
obliged to submit commentaries on observations in their Situation Reports nor will Compli­
ance Reports contain any reference to possible information provided by members in their 
Situation Reports on the implementation o f  observations made in the Evaluation Reports 
(GRECO (2003) 17E.
As to Guiding Principle 3: GRECO observed with regard to
1. the prosecution
>  that continued vigilance against improper interference by the Executive in 
the prosecution o f corruption is required (Iceland); that the State Prosecution Service 
has a lower degree o f independence than the judiciary on account of tire rules for 
appointing and dismissing the State Attorney General and the latter’s powers to give 
instructions to the prosecutor in charge of the specific case (Spain); that it seems 
necessary to adopt legislative reforms so as to reduce tire Parliament’s possibility of 
inappropriate intervention vis-à-vis prosecutors and in particular its power to ap­
point and dismiss the Prosecutor General and its Deputies (“the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia“); that the Prosecutor General has far-going powers with 
regard to the running of the prosecution service, and that s/he can exert influence 
over prosecutors’ decisions on the merits in individual cases. If this system prevails,
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it would mean for example that a prosecutor's decision to prosecute somebody could 
be overruled by the Prosecutor General. The independence o f individual prosecutors 
would therefore appear ambiguous; for these reasons, the situation needed to be 
clarified (Lithuania);
>  that the public perception of the Prosecutor General’s independence and 
impartiality would be enhanced if  he/she was elected by a qualified majority of 
votes in Parliament; the same type of majority ought to be required for the Prosecu­
tor General’s dismissal (Hungary);
>  that it is important that the Public Prosecutor Service, and public officials in 
general, should be made aware o f the problem of corruption in public procurement 
(the Netherlands);
> that in all corruption related cases the reasons for not instituting or discon­
tinuing criminal proceedings should continue to be recorded in the relevant file with 
sufficient clarity as a normal practice, and that the authorities could usefully exam­
ine whether to confirm the existing practice by adopting standard-setting provisions 
to that effect (Cyprus, Ireland);
>  that it should be ensured that salaries of prosecutors are at an appropriate 
level in order to dissuade corruption and attract applicant prosecutors (Slovak Re­
public).
2. the police
>  that efforts to change attitudes and behaviour o f police officers would prove 
beneficial in implementing anti-corruption strategies (Latvia);
>  that the independence the police seems to enjoy in practice when handling 
criminal investigations on corruption should be better guaranteed either by specific 
legal provisions or through adequate institutional safeguards (Ireland);
> that appropriate priority should be given to the investigation o f  police cor­
ruption; to that end, co-operation between the Internal Affairs Unit and the Police 
units should be strengthened and streamlined with a view to making the investiga­
tion of alleged internal corruption more timely, consistent and focused, assisting the 
Police Board to effectively exercise its oversight powers (Malta).
3. special units
> that this specialised unit should include specialised police officers, experts 
in the legal and financial and banking fields, experts from the tax administration, 
etc., and that it should possibly be established as a task force which experts from 
other fields can join whenever necessary (“the former Yugoslav Republic o f Mace­
donia“).
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4. the means for gathering evidence
>  that the public prosecutor lacks the means to investigate the case with the 
means (in fact) at his disposal (Slovenia);
> that it is necessary to ensure that the special investigative means can be 
used in the investigation of serious corruption cases either under existing law or, if 
this is not possible, by enacting new legislation (Iceland);
> that expression of legislative distaste for anonymous tips could actively dis­
courage the reporting of corrupt activity within a small community (Malta);
>  that the Police have no direct access to databases of the tax authorities, al­
though technically it would be possible (Bulgaria);
> that the authorities may wish to re-examine Sect. 163 of the Criminal 
Code’s section on effective repentance with a view to assessing its effect in practice 
(Czech Republic), because GRECO considers that the proper course for a person, 
who is offered a bribe, or from whom a bribe is solicited, is to refuse to enter into 
the corrupt transaction and also to report the approach which has been received.
5. proceedings and the judiciary
>  that due to the complexity of pre-trial procedures the role of the police, the 
public prosecutor and the investigating judge are interwoven to such an extent that 
there is confusion about the exact role performed by each one o f them (Slovenia);
>  that the handling of cases of corruption within the existing judicial struc­
tures could be considerably improved; that fundamental changes in the composition 
of the Judiciary might be another possibility for a more efficient criminal justice 
system (Bulgaria);
>  that the authorities could examine the possibility to carry out an audit of the 
criminal courts in order to identify malfunctions and propose means of speeding up 
the decision-making process (Malta);
>  that the number of corruption cases transmitted to the courts seemed to be 
quite limited, which could be a token of a criminal justice system, in particular at the 
investigation and prosecution stages, that lack suitable efficiency (Bulgaria);
>  the disparity in the ratio of reported offences and subsequent convictions 
when police or customs officers are involved on the one hand, and when offences 
are perpetrated by other persons, on the other hand (Croatia);
>  the usefulness of a mechanism that provides, when necessary in order to 
ensure impartial court proceedings, the possibility for cases to be removed from a 
given judicial jurisdiction and transferred to another one, with all the requisite guar­
antees (Greece).
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As to Guiding Principle 7: GRECO observed with regard to
6. specialisation o f  authorities against corruption
> that some degree of specialisation [of prosecutors] also in the district would 
be a useful follow-up (Albania);
>  that the important institutions [of the police and the special anti-corruption 
office] do not have a common understanding o f which offences should be treated as 
corruption offences (Croatia);
>  that the Central Corruption Prevention Department would deserve to be re­
asserted as the central body for the prevention of corruption, with an enhanced dia­
logue with and training within the private sector, the granting of the power to decide 
whether to publish its reports and of the right to remain informed o f the outcome of 
a file handed over to the courts (France);
> that the Financial and Economic Crime Office should certainly be more ac­
tively enrolled in fighting corruption by sensitising its members to this function and 
specifically including corruption among the economic offences the office is respon­
sible for investigating (Greece);
>  that it is desirable that additional training [for the Competition Authority] 
should take place - preferably in co-operation with the police - to enhance the inves­
tigative capacities o f the Authority (Iceland).
As to Guiding Principle 6: GRECO observed with regard to
7. immunities of certain persons and organs
> that the competent authorities should consider die possibility to reduce the 
scope of the immunities of members of parliament, and/or simplify the procedure for 
lifting their immunity (“the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia“);
> that the possibility of excluding acts o f abuse o f  office (and in particular 
passive corruption) from the scope o f the procedure reserved for persons enjoying 
immunity or alternatively simplifying this procedure, facilitating the course of 
criminal justice (the Netherlands);
> to consider die possibility of excluding acts o f corruption from the scope of 
the immunity granted to Members of Government or alternatively simplifying die 
procedure for lifting their immunity, facilitating the course o f criminal justice when 
MGs are suspected o f  having committed a corruption offence in office (Finland).
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As to other concerns: GRECO observed with regard to
8. new legislation on corruption
>  that a clear strategy for implementing new legislation and measures aimed 
at preventing and combating corruption is lacking (“the former Yugoslav Republic 
o f Macedonia“); that it would be preferable if  the “pro-coordination” approach were 
taken one step further: in its view, for the risk o f  excessive divergence to be mini­
mised, the central government should consider whether a protocol should be drawn 
up with the authorities in Scotland and Northern Ireland concerning both the timing 
and the general approach to any legislation introduced in the United Kingdom in 
response to international conventions in the field o f  corruption (United Kingdom).
9. the core criminal law
>  that corruption o f  foreign officials or o f members o f international organisa­
tions, international courts, foreign public assemblies and international parliamentary 
assemblies is not classified as a criminal offence (Romania);
>  that a narrow concept o f corruption hides in itself a danger that certain be­
haviour will not be perceived as corruption for the reason that the competent au­
thorities in a concrete case cannot prove, for instance, bribery o f  a public official, 
but only some other criminal offence related to abuse o f power or similar crime 
(Denmark);
>  that some tolerance exists vis-à-vis certain forms o f  bribery, the existence 
o f  “grey areas” and the existence o f  corruption in certain sectors without adequate 
mechanisms to control it (Estonia).
10. to penalties and limitations
>  that, with a view to the future, the relevant authorities may wish to consider 
introducing more dissuasive sanctions to ensure the independence o f  members o f 
parliament (Germany);
>  that the maximum penalties for corruption in the private sector (and, to a 
lesser extent, for active bribery in die public sector) could be called into question in 
the event o f  a serious case, even if  such acts could be covered by other provisions 
providing for heavier penalties (Denmark); that the authorities may wish to consider 
better harmonising the punishment o f  corruption offences, perhaps by increasing the 
severity o f  punishment to reflect greater societal condemnation o f  corrupt activity, 
and that they may also wish to increase the limitation period with regard to corrup­
tion offences (Malta);
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>  that the authorities should reconsider the system o f  statutory limitations in 
order to avoid that prosecution o f  corruption offences -  a complex form o f crime, 
difficult to detect and prove -  are regularly abandoned because limitation periods 
are over (Estonia, Lithuania); that the question o f  time-bars in corruption cases 
should be reconsidered in the light o f a study (France).
11. to international cooperation
>  that there is an urgent need to adopt legislation and accede to relevant 
European legal instruments in order to make mutual legal assistance smoother and 
faster, and to promote direct contacts between competent national and foreign agen­
cies (Bosnia and Herzegovina);
>  that the authorities should consider signing and ratifying the European 
Convention on Transfer o f  Criminal Proceedings in order to make international co­
operation on criminal cases more efficient and that the central authorities should co­
ordinate the training o f staff at all levels dealing with requests for international co­
operation (Poland);
>  that experience o f other countries in fighting corruption -  often provided 
through international organisations -  should be disseminated as widely as possible 
(Albania).
12. safeguarding lawful conduct o f  public officials
>  that there seemed to be more reliance on personal relationships among State 
officials and feelings of mutual trust and confidence than on a sound constitutional 
approach o f “checks and balances”, among different State institutions and, which is 
essential, in the fight against a crime such as corruption (Slovenia);
>  that it would be appropriate to re-examine the administrative and judicial 
procedures, which, given the considerable economic interests at state, may increase 
the likelihood o f  corruption; this should be done by making the procedures, as well 
as the reasons o f  the decision taken, public (Romania);
>  that it would be appropriate to update the legal framework for disqualifica­
tion from office currently applicable to members o f  the various authorities and the 
civil service, radically limiting the opportunities o f  private activities which, by their 
nature, are perceived by the public opinion as being incompatible with the dignity 
and objectivity that should characterise the exercise o f  public responsibilities (Ro­
mania); that the effectiveness o f  this rule is weakened by the fact that the rules on 
disqualification from office applicable to staff in certain authorities and civil ser­
vants have not been updated (Romania);
>  that those carrying out the same functions should as a main rule have the 
same status [as civil servant] (Bulgaria);
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>  that it would be worth considering whether these measures [action against 
the risk of corruption, for example the existence o f a code of ethics, mobility every 3 
years for customs officers, material advantages to motivate the staff] should be ex­
tended to other categories o f public officials (Poland); that although there is a num­
ber o f  control mechanisms, there is still some room for improvements to strengthen 
control over all senior public officials (Germany);
>  that the discussion on anti-intemal-corruption measures relating to particu­
lar services should take place at the appropriate levels and requires input from vari­
ous institutions as well as from the public (Lithuania);
>  that the authorities on which the Supreme Chamber o f Control exercises its 
controlling functions should follow its recommendations, at least when the authority 
has breached regulations related to the performance of its task (Poland);
>  that it would be a positive initiative if the competent ministry were to take 
more active steps in carrying out its responsibilities to promote awareness and issue 
specific guidelines and training on corruption issues among civil servants and offi­
cials (Norway).
13. auditing
>  that the system of the Audit Office could be improved by having independ­
ent procurement supervision for local government as a safeguard against the vulner­
ability to corruption (Iceland);
>  that if  the Audit Court considers the deadline for its opinion to be too short 
in view of the importance or the circumstances o f  the contract, it should be able of 
its own motion to extend the deadline by issuing a reasoned order to this effect 
(Greece);
>  that municipal auditors were not granted the same degree of independence 
as is enjoyed by Federal and State Courts of Auditors, for example, municipal audi­
tors’ terms o f employment and pay are the responsibility of the city’s executive, and 
that this situation might be worthy o f further consideration (Germany with regard to 
North Rhine Westphalia).
14. the funding o f politics
>  that the authorities should consider the revision of the legal framework ap­
plicable to the financing of political parties as a key element of their anti-corruption 
strategy and, more particularly, that a more effective monitoring of the resources, 
property and donations of political parties would be required (Cyprus, Hungary, 
Iceland);
>  that it would also be desirable for the Political Party Finance Control 
Commission to be required, like other state institutions, to report to the public prose­
cutor any criminal acts that come to its notice, in return, the public prosecutor ought
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to notify the department or official supplying the information o f  the action taken on 
it (Greece).
15. data and research
>  that no comprehensive statistical information on investigated, detected, 
prosecuted or adjudicated corruption cases was available (Bulgaria, Spain);
>  the importance o f  elaborating a database o f  statistics concerning interna­
tional requests from Polish and from foreign authorities (Poland).
16. miscellaneous
>  that public entities are not subject to scrutiny by the Administration Inspec­
torate and secondly that the system for supervising public procurement contracts is 
complex because responsibility for it is shared among three ministries (Greece);
>  that it would be useful to abolish anonymous and numerical accounts (Slo­
vak Republic);
>  that sufficient resources should be allocated to the Ombudsman institution 
in order for these important activities to continue properly (Lithuania).
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V. Concluding Considerations
A. Assessment o f  the GRECO Recommendations and Observations
Having in mind the multitude o f diverse national situations, the general coherence of 
the recommendations is one o f the remarkable achievements o f  GRECO’s work. 
This certainly is a result o f  the consistent application o f  the Guiding Principles in 
GRECO’s Plenary Meetings and the coordinating work o f  the GRECO Secretariat.
However, a closer look reveals few, but nevertheless notable, inconsistencies. 
Some o f them can be explained with national pecularities, requiring a flexible appli­
cation o f  the Guiding Principles on the given national situation, sometimes reflect­
ing the unique historic circumstances o f  nations in a process o f  transition. These 
national differences require even more differentiated recommendations when it 
comes to complex and diversified structures, such as those o f  the judicial and law 
enforcement bodies whose particularties contravene a complete comparison. For 
these reasons fully coherent recommendations would not only be surprising, but 
would also neglect national pecularities and treat countries as alike, which are in fact 
embedded in totally different historic backgrounds and social situations.
While this can offer a reasonable explanation for most o f  the (few) discrepancies, 
some o f  them, however, may also reflect an uncertainty with regard to politically 
sensitive questions, partially caused by the rather vague wording o f the Guiding 
Principles. The latter could be an explanation for diverting recommendations as to 
the independence o f  prosecutors from political orders: In one case GRECO solely 
asks for “reconsidering the situation that the Minister o f  Justice may intervene in 
individual cases”,324 while in another case it is recommended “to guarantee that 
instructions not to prosecute in a specific case, be prohibited in principle or remain 
exceptional”,325 and in a third case GRECO even insists “to enact legislation con­
firming the commitments o f  the current Minister o f  Justice and her predecessors not 
to interfere in individual cases”.326 Another field o f  discrepancies concerns recom­
mendations about the special investigative means: Diverse proposals are made for 
the “object” o f  improvement, ranging from the general term of “special investigative 
means” to “surveillance o f  communications” and “wire tap”. While this finding can 
be explained with differences in existing national provisions, another aspect might 
reflect a slight uncertainty as to the desirable legal policy: The question whether 
such special investigative means should be available for “all corruption cases” or
324 GRECO Report on Denmark, para. 111: recommendation (ii).
325 GRECO Report on Spain, para. 140: recommendation (v).
326 GRECO Report on France, para. 148: recommendation (iii).
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only in “cases o f  serious corruption”, is o f  great importance for balancing human 
rights and investigative needs.
The scope o f  immunities proved to be another delicate field, as it not only affects 
the interests o f  the “political class”, but also reaches in its effects far beyond the 
subject o f  corruption while remaining essentially linked to it. It is remarkable that 
the recommendations are quite coherent, though, in some cases, remaining rather 
vague: When it is recommended that the immunities shall be “reduced to a mini­
mum”, the necessary room for discretion is left to the nations and their particulari­
ties. On the other hand, the limited concrétisation o f  Guiding Principle 6, as well as 
some of the recommendations, prove to be an insufficient guideline to determine 
both a general view and a concrete scope o f  immunities.
B. The achievement o f GRECO in the international harmonisation o f  standards
The current state o f  harmonisation in fighting corruption can be concluded from the 
number o f  countries which so far signed and ratified the two relevant conventions o f 
the Council o f  Europe, the Criminal and the Civil Law Conventions on Corrup­
tion.327 328 Besides the efforts o f  the Council o f  Europe and GRECO, a remarkable 
contribution for setting worldwide standards has also been made by the OECD Con­
vention on Combating Bribery o f  Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions,323 whereas the recently proclaimed UN Convention against Corrup­
tion, although directed at a global harmonisation both with regard to its reach and 
content, still must be proven by its practical implementation.
327 With die exception o f  Spain, die Criminal L aw  Convention on Corruption has been signed by 
all member states o f  GRECO, with the ratification pending only in Armenia, France, Georgia, 
Germany, Greece, Luxembourg and USA (ratification status as o f  25/10/2004). With the ex­
ception o f  the Netherlands, Portugal, Serbia and Montenegro, Spain and U SA , the Civil Law  
Convention on Corruption has been signed by all GRECO members, with the ratification still 
pending in Armenia, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Luxem­
bourg, Norway, the United Kingdom (ratification status as o f  25 October 2004).
328 This OECD Convention has so far been ratified by these GRECO member states: Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia 
(which so far did not enact full implementing legislation), Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United 
Kingdom and U SA  (ratification status as o f  10 March 2004).
329 Cf. supra LB.
This proof in practice has in fact been delivered by GRECO, above all due to its 
structure and rules, laid down in the various international conventions and the addi­
tional procedural instruments.329 This story o f  success may be exemplified in three 
respects:
>  Probably the most efficient device in getting things moved is the Compli­
ance Procedure according to which the member states must report on their efforts 
and accomplishments in complying with the recommendations made by GRECO in
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the various GRECO Reports.330 By way o f this procedure, GRECO can demonstrate 
whether it fights corruption as “toothless tiger” or as “lion king”. Since in die mean­
time a considerable number o f  Compliance Reports to the First Evaluation Round 
have been finalised, thus making the response o f  the member states to the GRECO 
Recommendations transparent and public, a first assessment may be ventured: 
GRECO is, indeed, not “toothless”; its reports reveal that countries in particular 
need o f  fighting corruption have become alert and started to bare their teeth. So far, 
though with some exceptions o f “not implemented” recommendations,331 the vast 
majority o f them were found as “having been dealt with in a satisfactory manner” or 
even as “implemented satisfactory” (as according to Rule 31 o f the Rules o f  Proce­
dure332 the highest degree o f compliance), or at least as “partially implemented”.333 
On this way, GRECO has indeed become a true institution against corruption.
330 As to this procedure cf. supra LB with references to A rt 15 o f  the GRECO Statute and Rule 31 
o f  the Rules o f  Procedure.
331 According to the Compliance Reports Georgia has not implemented 7 recommendations and 
was considered as not be in compliance with the recommendations, Luxembourg has failed to 
implement 5 recommendations, and both Latvia and the United Kingdom one.
332 Cf. GRECO (2003) 6E Final Rev.
333 A s o f  the 20th Plenary Meeting o f  September 2004, the Compliance Report o f  the following 
countries have been finalised by GRECO, made public and stated at least a partial implementa­
tion o f  the recommendations: Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden. For details in which way and what degree the relevant recommenda­
tions have been implemented see the individual GRECO Compliance Reports, available by 
Internet (www.greco.coe.int/evaluations/Defiiulthtm).
>  This effectiveness is not occurring by chance, however, but rather is 
founded in the structure o f  GRECO. The mechanism provided for by the Council o f 
Europe in form o f  20 Guiding Principles and the implementation o f GRECO, in 
combination with the peer review-procedure, ensure that all Member States agree to 
the compliance procedure in trusting that the mutual pressure for changes is not 
restricted to themselves but reaches the other countries as well. This mutual confi­
dence in the decisiveness o f  fighting corruption paves the way for reforms which 
would hardly succeed on a purely national level for lack of comparably pressures to 
act. In so far GRECO functions as a supranational catalyst for creating transparency, 
comparability and finally competition for the best structure o f  an optimal anti­
corruption strategy. This effect is not a matter o f  course, however, since the states do 
not act as abstract entities but as democracies where it is lastly for individuals and 
groups o f  individuals to decide. Particularly in cases in which rational interests o f 
these decision makers are effected, the resistance against supranational pressure for 
changes can turn out as particularly persistent This individualising view to decision 
processes once more reveals that often the most basic individual interests cause the 
most complex problems, since they resist even the most refined solutions. This phe­
nomenon, however, can be met solely by means o f a transnational competition by 
which States less willing to reforms and their decision makers are subjected to sus­
tained pressure o f  justification. This is exactly what is done by GRECO: by way of
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the compliance procedure, even the most stubborn preservers o f  a status quo are to 
argumentatively oppose a forum o f  other positions and are, thus, burdened to defend 
their disregard o f  seriously fighting corruption.
>  The working method o f  GRECO as well proves to be particularly adequate. 
The broadly conceived evaluation proceeding comprises not merely isolated parts o f 
the corruption problems but is devoted to the social phenomenon in due breadth and 
depth, though it should be noted that, aside from aspects o f  law and social science, 
the economic conditions are also to be taken into consideration, since these are the 
main driving forces behind corruption. This GRECO method produces a remarkable 
effect in that it sometimes appears as i f  the evaluation is creating the reality, which 
in fact is to be evaluated. This effect is apparent in countries, which only by the very 
kind o f  questions put to them by GRECO became aware o f  the measures necessary 
for efficiently fighting corruption. Thus, it was not at least due to the exchange o f 
experience between GRECO and the countries concerned that for the first time the 
specialisation o f  police, prosecuting authorities and judges for fighting corruption 
were reflected. This idea o f  the evaluation preceding the reality to be evaluated can 
still be taken one step further in that it cannot be ruled out that certain phenomena 
which so far appeared socially feasible, were only noticed as corruption in course o f 
the GRECO evaluation and accordingly devaluated.
>  Not the least, social and normative sciences can profit from a “collateral ef­
fect” o f  GRECO: die breadth and depth o f  the GRECO Evaluation Teams (GET), as 
well as the regular exchange o f  experience with representatives o f  the countries 
concerned, and finally the GRECO Reports for and the discussion thereof by the 
GRECO Plenaries provide a unique platform for comparing different national legal 
systems and state structures. If the materials collected in this evaluation process is 
carefully analysed, with die accompanying support o f  the participants in the 
GRECO evaluation process as “multipliers” in their home countries, the work o f 
GRECO would not only be able to further the harmonisation o f  anti-corruption 
strategies but could perhaps also encourage similar comparative efforts in other 
areas o f  law and state. In this case, GRECO would have proven as a catalyst for 
ideas that reach far beyond the fight against corruption and may help the states to 
optimise their institutions by adopting solutions that stood their test abroad.
124
C. Outlook
The work o f GRECO reveals that corruption can affect and does affect both nations 
in a process o f  transition and those highly developed. For this reason, three devices 
appear as important for future efforts o f all GRECO member nations:
1. If corruption shall be fought, a society is at first to realise corruption as a 
social phenomenon. Therefore, an efficient fight against corruption requires a com­
prehensive approach directed at social awareness.
2. As criminal law can prohibit corruption on paper only, its social effective­
ness cannot be accomplished without implementing the relevant norms into practice; 
therefore, the main weight o f efforts must be the practical implementation. As crimi­
nal prosecution, by definition, can only extinguish existing fires, without being able 
to prevent dangerous smouldering, the social system must be preventively safe­
guarded from corruption rather than by merely reacting with repressive prohibitions. 
Consequently, optimal institutions against corruption require no less than efficient 
structures of the state and the law which provide utmost resistance against corrup­
tion.
3. Because of the close links o f  all social systems, corruptive tendencies are to 
be combated with equal decisiveness on all levels and in each single system: in 
principle, the same rules must be applied to the administration, the political sphere 
and the private sector. With view of the increasing development of supranational 
systems and the progressing internationalisation, an optimal fight against corruption 
requires an extension of standards beyond national borders.
In view o f these needs o f an optimal fight against corruption, GRECO with its 
comprehensive approach has proved as an excellent institution. If the States united 
in this effort continue this way with determination, then the fight against corruption, 
despite its complexity and its origin in tire conditio humana, will not be a hopeless 
tilt at windmills.
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Appendix: Scheme of criminal and procedural provisions
? XS CR
O 5 UN Q Q*  w £ iZQ GE




Functional notion 4 ? ? + 4 4- 4- 4- 4- - - 4- ? - 4- 4- 4- ■> 4- 4- 4- 4- 4 4- 4- + 4 4 9 4 -
Statutory notion 4 ? ? + 4 - 4- - 4- 4- 4- 4- ? 4- - - - ? 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- - 4- 4- - - ? 4
Elected person as 
public officials + ? + + + 4- 4- - 4- 4- 4- 4- ? 4- - 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- - 4 4- - 4- 4- 4 4 ?
_2 4
Bribery of elected 
persons as a special 
offence
- ? - + - - ? 4- - - - - - - 4- - - - - - - 4- 4- 4- - 4- 4- - - - - ? - 4
Foreign officials • + J’ 4 4- - P 4- P 4- P 4- - P 4" 4- P 4- - - P 4- 4- - 4- P 4- - P 4 p - P
Object of corruption m 1
Material advantage 4 V 4 4 4 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4 4 9 4 4
Intangible advantage 4 9 - 4 4- 4- 4- 4- - - 4- ? A 4- ? 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 9 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4 4 9 4
Third persons - ? 4 - p 4- p 4- 4- 4- - ? 4- p 4- - - 4- - 4- - 4- - 4- • 4 ? 4
X i ■ ■
R
Corruption pact 9 ? ? ? P
Intentional connection p ? + + + 4- - 4- P 4- 4- 4- ? 4- 4- - P 4- 4- 4- 4- p 4- 4- 4- - 4 4 p ? ? 4
Objective connection p ? - - - - 4- - p - - ? - 4- 4- P - - - p 4- P - 4- p ? ? -
Legal nature of the 
influenced action
■ » * 9 ■
Illegal + ? 4 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 1 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4 4 9 9 4
Illegal + legal 4 ? 4 4 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- - 4- 4- ? 4- - 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4 - 4- 4- 4- 4 4 ? ? 4
Liability/Sanctions ■ » 3
Criminal liability of 
legal persons + - - - - 4- - - 4- 4- - - - 4- 4- - - - 4- 4- 4- - 4- p - p - 4 4 4
Special offences with 
aggravated sanctions + ? - - - - 4- - - - 4- - 4- 4- - 4- P - - 4- 4- - 4- 4- 4- - - 4- - - 4
? ? ?
Confiscation 4 4 + 4 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- ? 4- 4- ? 4- 4- P 4- ? ? ? 4- 4- ? P 4- 4- 4- ? ? ? 4 4
Private sector 
corruption - 4
P’ 4' + - P + 4* 4 4- 4- p 4 4- - o - 4- - 4- + - 4- 4 - 4 4- 4 4 4- p
Trading In influence p 4 - + 4- 4 + 4 4 4 » 4 + + - 4- 4- - ? - - 4- 4- 4- 4 » p - 4 4 - 4
Money laundering 4 4 4 P + + + 4- 4- 4- 4- 4 4- 4- 4- 4- 4 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4 4 4 4 4 4
1 Based on the provisions of the Criminal Code in force at the time of the adoption of the GRECO-Report.
2 In England and Wales bribery of elected persons is likely to be an common law offence.
3 Only the Criminal Code of the Federation provides for the criminalization of „Forming a Prejudical Contract“ (Art. 260).

Legend:
AL -  Albania 
B -Belgium  
BG -Bulgaria
BIH - Bosnia-Herzegovina
CRO - Croatia 
CY -Cyprus
CZ - Czech Republic 
D - Germany
P -Portugal 
PL -Poland  
RO -Romania 
S -Sweden
SK - Slovakia 
SLO - Slowenia 
UK -United Kingdom 
USA - United States o f  America
DK - Denmark 
E - Spain 
EST - Estonia 
FIN - Finland 
GR -Greece 
H - Hungary 
IRL - Ireland 




M -M alta 
MD -M oldowa 
MK -Macedonia 
N  -Norway 
NL -Netherlands
+ - Rule exists
- - Rule does not exist
p - Corresponding contort is partially provided for.
? - N o information in the GRECO-Report

